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dicial District Court Kootenai Coun 
ROA 
New Case Filed - Other Claims Lansing L Haynes 
Filing: A All initial civil case filings of any type Lansing Haynes 
not listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: Eric S Rossman Receipt 
number: 0049998 Dated: 12/11/2013 Amount: 
$96.00 (Check) For: Barrett, Ronnel E (plaintiff) 




Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Summons Issued-Hecla Mining Co Lansing L. Haynes 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Lansing L. Haynes 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Ramsden, 
Michael E. (attorney for Hecla Mining Company) 
Receipt number: 0002621 Dated: 1/21/2014 
Amount: $66.00 (Check) For: Hecla Mining 
Company (defendant) 
Notice Of Appearance - Michael Ramsden 080 Lansing L. Haynes 
Hecla Mining Company 
Affidavit of Michael E. Ramsden in Support of Lansing L. Haynes 
Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs' Lawyer 
Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs' Lawyer Lansing L. Haynes 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/10/2014 03:30 Lansing L. Haynes 
PM) Motion to DQ Plaintiffs Attorney, Ramsden 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
LEU Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Lansing L. Haynes 
Any File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid 
by: Andrew Schoppe Receipt number: 0002824 
Dated: 1/22/2014 Amount: $23.00 (E-payment) 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Lansing L. Haynes 
02/10/2014 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
to DQ Plaintiffs Attorney, Ramsden 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/12/2014 03:30 Lansing L. Haynes 
PM) Motion to DQ Pit's Attorney, Ramsden 
CRUMPACKER Amended Notice Of Hearing 
BAXLEY 
DEGLMAN 
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To 
Disqualify Plaintiffs' Lawyer 
Reply Memorandum In Support of Motion to 
Disqualify Plaintiffs' Lawyer 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L Haynes 




3/12/201 DCHH SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
03/12/2014 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: Charlotte Crouch 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion io DQ Pit's Attorney, 
Ramsden ERIC ROSSMAN APPEARING 
TELEPHONICALL Y 208-830-3777 
4/2/2014 MEMO SVERDSTEN Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs' 
Lawyer 
4/16/2014 MOTN LEU Motion For Appeal By Permission Lansing L. Haynes 
4/17/2014 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/13/2014 03:30 Lansing L. Haynes 
PM) Motion for Appeal by Permission, Ramsden 
NOTH KIPP Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
FILE LEU New File Created----#2---CREATED - expando Lansing L. Haynes 
4/28/2014 ACKS DEGLMAN Acceptance Of Service- Michael Ramsden obo Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendants 
5/6/2014 MEMO KIPP Affdavit Of Erica S. Phillips In Support Of Lansing L. Haynes 
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion By Appeal 
By Permission 
MEMO KIPP Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Lansing L Haynes 
Appeal By Permission 
5/12/2014 HUFFMAN Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Lansing L. Haynes 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Ramsden, 
Michael E. (attorney for Bayer, Doug) Receipt 
number: 0020234 Dated: 5/12/2014 Amount: 
$66.00 (Check) For: Bayer, Doug (defendant), 
Hogamier, Scott (defendant) and Jordan, John 
(defendant) 
NOAP HUFFMAN Notice Of Appearance for Defendants John Lansing L Haynes 
Jordan, Doug Bayer an d Scott Hogamier -
Michael E Ramsden 
NTWD HUFFMAN Notice Of Withdrawal of Motion for Appeal by Lansing L Haynes 
Permission 
ANSW HUFFMAN Answer Lansing L. Haynes 
5/13/2014 HRVC SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Lansing L. Haynes 
05/13/2014 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
for Appeal by Permission, Ramsden PA MIKE 
CHRISTIAN APPEARING TELEPHONICALL Y 
208-342-3563 
5/19/2014 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Lansing L. Haynes 
07/08/2014 03:30 PM) 
SVERDSTEN Notice of Hearing L 





5/28/2014 MITCHELL Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Haynes 
Any File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid 
by: Andrew Hanebutt Receipt number: 0022350 
Dated: 5/28/2014 Amount: $27.00 (E-payment) 
RSCN DEGLMAN Response to Status Conference Notice- Michael Lansing L. Haynes 
Ramsden 
6/2/2014 RSCN LEU Response to Status Conference Notice-Eric Lansing L. Haynes 
Rossman 
7/8/2014 DCHH SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
on 07/08/2014 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Val Nunemacher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
7/9/2014 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
05/18/2015 09:00 AM) 10 days 
SVERDSTEN Notice of Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
10/15/2014 FiLE JLEiGH New File Created *******#3***** Lansing L. Haynes 
10/16/2014 NTSD JLEIGH Notice Of Service Of Discovery Requests Lansing L. Haynes 
10/28/2014 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue Lansing L. Haynes 
11/14/2014 10:30 AM) PA ROSSMAN 
APPEARING TELEPHONICALLY 208-331-2030 
10/30/2014 NOTH CLEVELAND Notice of Telephonic Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
AFFD CLEVELAND Affidavit of Eric S Rossman in Support of Lansing L. Haynes 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Trial and Reschedule 
MEMO CLEVELAND Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Lansing L. Haynes 
Vacate Trial and Reschedule 
MOTN CLEVELAND Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Trial and Reschedule Lansing L. Haynes 
11/7/2014 OBJT LEU Defendants' Oposition To Plaintiffs' Motion To Lansing L. Haynes 
Vacate Trial And Reschedule 
AFFD LEU Affidavit Of Michael E. Ramsden Re Defendants' Lansing L. Haynes 
Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion To Vacate Trial 
And Reschedule 
11/10/2014 NOTO DIGIOVANNI Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum Of Lansing L. Haynes 
Karl Hartman 
NOTO DIGIOVANNI Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum Of Lansing L. Haynes 
Mark Board 
NOTO DIGIOVANNI Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum Of Lansing L. Haynes 
Wilson Blake 
NOTO DIGIOVANNI Notice Of Ta king Duces Tecum L 
Jerry Anderson 
NOTO DIGIOVANNI Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces T ecum Of Bill Lansing L. Haynes 
Banks 
Duces Tecum Of 
icial District Kootenai 
Date Code User 
11i10/2014 NOTD DIGIOVANNI Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum Of 
Scott Hogamier 
NOTO DIGIOVANNI Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecurn Of Lansing L Haynes 
Doug Bayer 
NOTO DIGIOVANNI Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum Of Lansing L. Haynes 
John Jordan 
11/12/2014 MEMO HUFFMAN Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Lansing L. Haynes 
Motion to Vacate Trial and Reschedule 
11/13/2014 NOTE HUFFMAN Clerk's Notation - sent to Judge for Review Lansing L Haynes 
11/14/2014 DCHH SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion to Continue scheduled Lansing L Haynes 
on 11/14/2014 10:30 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Val Nunemacher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: PA ROSSMAN APPEARING 
TELEPHONICALLY 208-331-2030 
ORDR SVERDSTEN Order to Vacate and Reschedule Triai Lansing L Haynes 
HRVC SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled Lansing L Haynes 
on 05/18/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 10 
days 
HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled Lansing L Haynes 
10/19/2015 09:00 AM) 1 O days 
SVERDSTEN AMENDED Notice of Trial Lansing L Haynes 
NTSV JLEIGH Notice Of Service Lansing L Haynes 
11/26/2014 NTSD JLEIGH Notice Of Service Of Discovery Requests Lansing L Haynes 
12/31/2014 NTSD JLEIGH Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses Lansing L Haynes 
NTSD JLEIGH Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses Lansing L. Haynes 
NTSD JLEIGH Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses Lansing L. Haynes 
NTSD JLEIGH Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses Lansing L. Haynes 
1/23/2015 NOTO LUNNEN Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Lansing L. Haynes 
Tecum Of Karl Hartman 
NOTO LUNNEN Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Lansing L Haynes 
T ecum Of Mark Board 
NOTO LUNNEN Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Lansing L Haynes 
Tecum Of Wilson Blake 
NOTO LUNNEN Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Lansing L Haynes 
T ecum Of Jerry Anderson 
NOTO LUNNEN Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Lansing L. Haynes 
Tecum Of Bill Banks 
NOTD LUNNEN Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Lansing L. Haynes 
Tecum Of John Lund 
NOTO LUNNEN Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Lansing L. Haynes 
Tecum Of Scott Hogamier 
Date: 
Time: 
Date Code User 
1/23/201 NOTO LUNNEN Amended Notice Of Taking Duces L Haynes 
Tecum Of Doug Bayer 
NOTO LUNNEN Amended Notice Of Ta king Deposition Duces Lansing L. Haynes 
Tecum Of John Jordan 
2/5/2015 NOTO MCKEON Second Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Lansing L. Haynes 
Duces Tecum Of Wilson Blake 
2/17/2015 NTSD MCKEON Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responsesn Lansing L. Haynes 
NTSD MCKEON Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses Lansing L. Haynes 
3/3/2015 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Lansing L. Haynes 
04/07/2015 03:30 PM) Rossman 
3/5/2015 MNCL MCKEON Plaintiffs' Motion To Compel Discovery Lansing L. Haynes 
Responses 
AFFD MCKEON Affidavit Of Eric S. Rossman In Support Of Lansing L. Haynes 
Plaintiffs' Motion To Compel Discovery 
Responses 
NOHG MCKEON Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
3/9/2015 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Lansing L. Haynes 
04/07/2015 03:30 PM) Ramsden 
3/10/2015 FILE MCKEON ************New File Created #4 ****************** Lansing L. Haynes 
3/17/2015 AFFD MCKEON Affidavit Of Michael E. Ramsden In Support Of Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendants' Motion To Compel Discovery 
MEMO MCKEON Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion Lansing L. Haynes 
To Compel Discovery 
MNCL MCKEON Defendants' Motion To Compel Discovery Lansing L. Haynes 
NOHG MCKEON Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
3/27/2015 NTSD STAMPER Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses Lansing L. Haynes 
3/30/2015 AFFD MCKEON First Supplemental Affidavit Of Eric S. Rossman Lansing L. Haynes 
In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion To Compel 
Discovery Responses 
AFFD MCKEON Affidavit OfMichael E. Ramsden In Opposition To Lansing L. Haynes 
Plaintiffs' Motion To Compel Discovery 
MEMO MCKEON Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion Lansing L. Haynes 
To Compel Discovery 
4/1/2015 NTSD MCKEON Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses Lansing L. Haynes 
MISC WOOSLEY Plaintiffs Response To Hecla's Motion to Compel Lansing L. Haynes 
and Notice of Compliance With Discovery 
AFFD WOOSLEY Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman in Opposition to Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery 
4/2/2015 MISC WOOSLEY Reply Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs' Lansing L. Haynes 
Motion To Compel Discovery Responses 
MNCL WOOSLEY Plaintiffs' Second Motion To Compel Discovery L Haynes 
Responses 
udicial District Court Kootenai 
Date Code User 
4/2/201 AFFD WOOSLEY Second Supplemental Affidavit of Eric S. L Haynes 
Rossman In Support of Plaintiffs Motion to 
Compel Discovery Responses 
MOTN WOOSLEY Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time RE: Hearing on Lansing L. Haynes 
Plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel Discovery 
Responses 
4/6/2015 AFFD LUNNEN Supplemental Affidavit Of Michael E Ramsden In Lansing L. Haynes 
Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion To Compel 
Discovery Responses And Plaintiffs' Second 
Motion To Compel Discovery Responses 
MEMO LUNNEN Supplemental Memorandum In Opposition To Lansing L. Haynes 
Plaintiffs' Motion To Compel Discovery And 
Plaintiffs' Second Motion To Compel Discovery 
Responses 
4/7/2015 HRVC SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
on 04/07/2015 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Ramsden 
HRVC SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
on 04/07/2015 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Rossman 
4/16/2015 NTSD MCKEON Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses Lansing L. Haynes 
4/20/2015 FILE MCKEON **************** New File Created #5 Lansing L. Haynes 
**************** 
4/22/2015 PLWL MCKEON Plaintiffs Disclosure Of Expert Witnesses Lansing L. Haynes 
PLWL MCKEON Plaintiffs First Supplemental Disclosure Of Expert Lansing L. Haynes 
Witnesses 
4/23/2015 NOTR MCKEON Notice Of Transcript Delivery - Deponents: Scott Lansing L. Haynes 
Hogamier And John Lund 
NOTR MCKEON Notice Of Transcript Delivery - Depontent: John Lansing L. Haynes 
Jordan And Doug Bayer 
4/24/2015 HRSC HODGE Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment 06/30/2015 03:30 PM) Ramsden 
4/27/2015 MNCL MCKEON Plaintiffs' Third Motion To Compel Discovery Lansing L. Haynes 
Responses 
AFFD MCKEON Affidavit Of Eric S. Rossman In Support Of Lansing L. Haynes 
Plaintiffs' Third Motion To Compel Discovery 
Responses 
HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Lansing L. Haynes 
05/15/2015 10:30 AM) Rossman, Eric Rossman 
appearing telephonically 208-331-2030 
5 NOTH JLEIGH Notice Of Telephonic Hearing L. Haynes 
NOTR JLEIGH Notice Of Transcript Delivery Lansing L. Haynes 
5/8/2015 MISC MCKEON Defendants' Opposition To Plaintiffs Third Motion L Haynes 
To Compel Discovery 
dicial District Court Kootenai Cou 
ROA 
Date Code User Judge 
5/8/2015 AFFD MCKEON Affidavit Of Michael E. Ramsden In Support Of Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendants' Opposition To Plaintiffs Third Motion 
To Compel Discovery 
5/15/2015 HRVC SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
on 05/15/2015 10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Rossman, Eric Rossman appearing 
telephonically 208-331-2030 
5/18/2015 NOTO JLEIGH Second Amended Notice Of Ta king Deposition Lansing L. Haynes 
Duces Tecum Of Bill Banks 
5/21/2015 NOTC JLEIGH Third Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Lansing L Haynes 
Duces Tecum Of Bill Banks 
5/22/2015 FILE JLEIGH New File Created ******#6******* Lansing L Haynes 
5/29/2015 NTSD JLEIGH Notice Of Service Of Discovery Requests Lansing L. Haynes 
MNSJ JLEIGH Declaration Of Michael E Ramsden In Support Of Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment 
NOTC JLEIGH Notice Of Compliance Lansing L. Haynes 
DFWL JLEIGH Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure Lansing L. Haynes 
NOTH JLEIGH Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
MNSJ JLEIGH Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
MEMS JLEIGH Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment 
MISC JLEIGH Declaration Of Douglas C Bayer In Support Of Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment 
6/10/2015 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment 07/28/2015 03:30 PM) Rossman, 
Telephonic 208-331-2030 
6/11/2015 STIP DEGLMAN Stipulated Motion to Extend Deadline to Hear Lansing L. Haynes 
Motions for Summary Judgment 
6/15/2015 AFFD JLEIGH Affidavit Of Eric S Rossman In Support Of Lansing L. Haynes 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
NOTR JLEIGH Notice Of Transcript Delivery Deponent: Bill Lansing L Haynes 
Shea, Vol II 
MNSJ JLEIGH Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
MNSJ JLEIGH Plaintiffs' Statement Of Facts In Support Of Lansing L. Haynes 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment And In 
Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
MEMS JLEIGH Plaintiff's Memorandum In Support Of Motion for Lansing L Haynes 
Partial Summary Judgment 
NOTH JLEIGH Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
AFFD JLEIGH Affidavit Of Jack Spanaro In Support Of Plaintiffs' Lansing L Haynes 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
AFFD JLEIGH Affidavit Of Rick 
E. 
District Court • Kootenai 
Date Code User 
6/15/2015 AFFD JLEIGH Affidavit Of Matthew Williams L Haynes 
FILE LEU New File Created---#7---CREATED ---expando Lansing L. Haynes 
6/1 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
J.,,..j,...........,_ ........ f'\7/"lQ/r')f'\,;fC (V'').4")('\ n~A\ n---.-i---
VUU!::jlllC"ll v,u: .. ou:.v IJ Uv • ..JV rtVIJ f'\cilli:::>Ut:11 
HRVC SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
scheduled on 06/30/2015 03:30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated Ramsden 
ORDR SVERDSTEN Order to Extend Deadline to Hear Motions for Lansing L. Haynes 
Summary Judgment 
6/17/2015 FILE JLEIGH New File Created *****#8****** Lansing L. Haynes 
6/18/2015 ANHR JLEIGH Amended Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
NTSV JLEIGH Notice Of Service Lansing L. Haynes 
6/19/2015 MISC JLEIGH Declaration Of Philip A Hanger, PHO Lansing L. Haynes 
AFFD JLEIGH Affidavit Of Rick Norman Lansing L. Haynes 
AFFD JLEIGH Affidavit Of James W Dally, PHO In Support Of Lansing L. Haynes 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
FILE GARZA ***********New File Created #9 ****EXPANDO Lansing L. Haynes 
6/24/2015 NTSD JLEIGH Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses Lansing L. Haynes 
7/14/2015 MEMO HUFFMAN Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
MEMO DEGLMAN Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Lansing L. Haynes 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
MISC DEGLMAN Declaration of Michael E Ramsden in Support of Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
RONNEL E. BARRETT, an individual; 
GREGG HAMMERBERG, an individual; 
ERIC J. TESTER, an individual; and 












HECLA MINING COMPANY, a Delaware ) 
Corporation; JOHN JORDAN, an individual; ) 
DOUG SCOTT ) 
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CASE NO. C iJ 13 ~ 7 j_J 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL 
Fee Category: A-1 
Filing Fee: $96.00 
, the above-named 
Company, John Jordan, Doug Bayer, Scott Hogamier and Does I-X, CO:MPLAINS AND 
ALLEGES as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. At all times relevant to the allegations herein, Plaintiff Ronnel E. Barrett 
("Barrett") was and is a resident of the County of Shoshone, State of Idaho. 
2. At all times relevant to the allegations herein, Plaintiff Gregg Hammerberg 
("Hammerberg") was and is a resident of the County of Shoshone, State of Idaho. 
3. At all times relevant to the allegations herein, Plaintiff Eric J. Tester ("Tester") 
was and is a resident of the County of Shoshone, State ofldaho. 
4. At all times relevant to the allegations herein, Plaintiff Matthew Williams 
("Williams") was and is a resident of the County of Shoshone, State of Idaho. 
5. At all times relevant to the allegations herein, upon information and belief, 
Defendant Hecla Mining Company ("Hecla") was and is a Delaware corporation authorized to do 
business in the State of Idaho. 
6. At all times relevant to the allegations herein, upon information and belief, 
Defendant John Jordan ("Jordan") was and is a resident of the County of Shoshone, State of 
Idaho. 
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to the allegations belief, 
Defendant Scott Hogamier ("Hogamier") was and is a resident of the County of Shoshone, State 
ofidaho. 
9. The true names of John Does I - X are unknown. Each of the Defendants, including 
the Doe Defendants, is or may be responsible in some manner for Plaintiffs' damages, either directly 
or through the acts and omissions of their agent and employee, and each is or may be the agent 
and/or employee of the others. Plaintiffs will move the Court to allow amendment when the 
identities and roles of the Doe Defendants become known. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
10. Jurisdiction is appropriate pursuant to Idaho Code § 1-705. 
11. Venue is appropriate pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404 as Hecla is a resident of and 
has its principal place of business in Kootenai County. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
12. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiffs were employed with Hecla as miners 
working within Lucky Friday mine in Northern Idaho. 
13. Established in 1891, Hecla and its subsidiaries discover, acquire, develop, produce 
and sell silver, gold, lead, and zinc. 
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15. 111ullan, Idaho, of two separate 
uu~,~,..,. (i) a shaft built 1960 (named and hereinafter referred to as the "#2 Shaft"); and (ii) a 
shaft constructed in 1983 (named and hereinafter referred to as the "Silver Shaft"). 
16. The Silver Shaft has been the primary route of access to underground mine 
workings at the Lucky Friday mine since its completion. The Silver Shaft is an eighteen-foot 
diameter concrete line shaft used to transport ore, miners and materials. The #2 Shaft is the 
statutorily-required escape route and is timber-framed. Pursuant to federal regulations, both the 
Silver Shaft and the 
miners at all times. 
Shaft must be maintained in a safe manner to provide a safe route for 
17. Hecla is one of the largest silver producers in the United States. Through its two 
operating mines, the Greens Creek mine in southeast Alaska and the Lucky Friday mine in 
northern Idaho, Hecla generated revenues of approximately $334.7 million from silver sales, 
representing 70% of the Company's total revenues for the year 2011. 
18. The Lucky Friday mine is Hecla's flagship mine and is located in the Coeur 
d'Alene tvfining District in no1ihern Idaho. It has been owned and operated by Hecla since 1958 
and is one of the deepest underground silver, lead, and zinc mines in the nation. 
19. Upon information and belief, during all relevant times herein mentioned, Jordan 
was employed with Hecla as its Mine Manager, responsible for safety and operations at the 
Lucky Friday mine in Northern Idaho. 
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21. Upon information and belief, during mentioned, 
Hogamier was employed with Hecla as its Safety Foreman, responsible for safety at the Lucky 
Friday mine in Northern Idaho. 
22. Despite the Defendants' awareness of the critical need to strictly comply with 
mining safety regulations, they knowingly allowed the Lucky Friday mine to operate in an unsafe 
manner for years. The long-standing dangerous conditions at the Lucky Friday mine, known and 
repeatedly ignored by the Defendants, eventually led to a series of catastrophic incidents in 2011. 
23. The Defendants knew that the dangerous conditions at the Lucky Friday mine 
were increasing over time. They knew that the Lucky Friday mine employees were missing 
more days of work due to nonfatal incidents, than the national average, in every year between 
2004 and 2011, except for 2007. 
24. Between 2006 and 2010, the Lucky Friday mine experienced several rock burst 
and tunnel collapse issues that earned the Company several Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Administration ("MSHA") citations. More specifically, the Lucky Friday mine had six rock burst 
or tunnel collapse issues that led to several citations concerning the Company's safety violations. 
25. Moreover, in 2010, the Lucky Friday mine experienced a series of serious safety 
incidents caused by rock bursts directly following an increase in mine safety regulations and 
procedures instituted that same year. More specifically, the Lucky Friday mine experienced five 
large rock bursts and tunnel collapses between August 10 and March 2011. 
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,a was m a he was 
in collapsed. The Defendants once again failed to take any meaningful action to stop 
the safety violations at the Lucky Friday mine after this tragedy. Six months later, on November 
17, 2011, another miner was fatally injured after being buried in rubble while working in the 
Lucky Friday mine. Then, less than a month later, on December 14, 2011, seven miners, 
including each of the Plaintiffs, were injured and hospitalized following yet another rock burst 
incident at the Lucky Friday mine. 
27. These three catastrophic incidents are the result of years of the Defendants' 
knowing refusal to meaningfully act consistent with their duties of ensuring compliance with 
safety regulations. In fact, MSHA concluded that these catastrophic 2011 incidents at the Lucky 
Friday mine were not the result of employee error or unavoidable geological conditions, but were 
in fact the direct result of management's conduct, including the failure to implement and utilize 
proper procedures during mining operations. It was the duty of the Defendants to correct such 
wrongful safety conditions. Despite these duties, the Defendants knowingly, willfully and 
intentionally failed to ensure safety compliance or enact controls to correct the dangerous 
conditions which they had known about for years. 
28. A rock burst is a spontaneous, violent fracture of rock that typically occurs in deep 
mines. As mines are dug deeper into the earth, the thickness and weight of the overlying rock 
increases. Likewise, pressure from the sides also increases with depth. world's deepest 
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are 
29. Rock bursts commonly cause a range of tunnel collapses sometimes referred to as 
"fall ofroof1 and "fall of back" incidents, which are serious concerns for underground mines and 
for the officers and directors who are responsible for ensuring safety compliance in mines. 
30. In addition to being located in the rock burst prone Coeur d1Alene Mining District, 
the Lucky Friday mine is one of the deepest mines in the United States. There are increased 
dangers and risks associated with rock burst and/or tunnel collapse incidents when operating in 
deeper mines, such as the Lucky Friday mine. This fact, coupled with the fact that the Lucky 
Friday mine is located in the Coeur d'Alene Mining District, creates an even greater risk of 
dangerous incidents occurring more frequently, putting an increased burden on the Defendants in 
ensuring safety compliance at the Lucky Friday mine. 
3 L Hecla operates in a heavily regulated industry. The Lucky Friday mine, along 
with all mines located in the United States, is regulated by MSHA, along with the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, among others. 
32. MSHA is a government agency with the stated purpose "to prevent death, disease, 
and injury from mining and to promote safe and healthful workplaces for the Nation's miners." 
MSHA regulations are strict and Hecla has acknowledged in Hecla's Social 
Responsibility Report that the mining industry is second only to nuclear energy in terms of 
regulatory requirements. 
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35. standards were enacted MSHA Safety 
and Health Act 1977 (the "Mine Act"). Pursuant to the Mine Act, Hecla has primary 
responsibility for ensuring safe working conditions and practices at 
its other operations. 
Lucky Friday mine and 
36. More specifically, in section 2 of the Mine Act, Congress declares "the first 
priority and concern of all in the coal or other mining industry must be the health and safety of its 
most precious resource - the miner .... " The Mine Act goes on to state in the same section that 
"the operators of such mines with the assistance of the miners have the primary responsibility to 
prevent the existence of such [unsafe and unhealthful] conditions and practices in such mines .... " 
3 7. In 1997, in response to a trend of increasing accidental mining deaths, MSHA 
announced the launch of an "unprecedented safety sweep," focusing specifically on metal and 
non-metal mines. This sweep included dispatching its entire non-coal inspection and training 
force, as well as a portion of additional coal mine representatives, to the nation's metal and non-
metal mines. 
38. Since at least 2003, the Defendants have known that Hecla was "one of the world's 
low cost producers in the precious metals mining industry and the lowest cost silver producer" as 
stated on the Company's website and also in several filings with the SEC. Specifically, in 
Heda's Form S-1, filed with the SEC on January 8, 2003, Hecla stated, "[w]e believe we are an 
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2003, including filings 2005 2008. Notably, mine's costs 
and other direct production costs are even significantly lower than its counterpart, the 
Greens Creek mine, and have been since 2008. 
40. Defendants were aware that for years the Company has reported having the lowest 
production costs in the industry. In fact, on a November 17, 2011 appearance on Fox Business 
News, a Hecla representative talked favorably about the Company's low costs. More 
importantly, the Hecla representative stated that the first priority of the Company is the 
deepening the Lucky Friday mine. did not list safety concerns of Heda's miners as a 
priority. 
41. In 2007 and 2008, the Lucky Friday mine experienced at least one rock burst 
incident per year. 
42. On February 24, 2007, a miner was installing rock bolts at the Lucky Friday mine 
when a rock burst occurred. Flying rock resulting from the rock burst struck him on the head 
and shoulders. 
43. Similarly, on January 2008, a miner was injured at the Lucky Friday mine by 
falling rocks due to a rock burst. 
44. These two incidents were published on MSHA's Mine Data Retrieval System 
which provides data and incident reports oniine based on the history of each mine. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 9 
46. It was areas these 
incidents that there were no deaths. Although no one was injured by these incidents, the size 
the rock bursts and affected areas show the magnitude and potential for catastrophic injuries. It 
is merely luck concerning the timing of the rock bursts that there were no deaths. 
47. On August 24, 2010, a rock burst occurred with the day shift's end at blasting 
time. It was discovered by the afternoon shift at approximately 4:30 p.m. A portion of the back 
came out. This hole measured four feet wide, by eleven feet long, and five feet high. 
48. On September 10,2010, the Lucky Friday mine experienced another rock burst at 
blasting time of the day shift. It was discovered by the night shift and reported to MSHA. The 
affected area of the rock burst measured six feet high, eighteen feet long, and four feet wide. The 
area was secured until MSHA inspectors arrived the next day. 
49. A mere thirteen days later, on September 23, 2010, a rock burst occurred at the 
Lucky Friday mine during the afternoon shift blast. It was discovered by the graveyard shift boss 
and again reported to MSHA. The affected area of the rock was about eight feet long and four 
feet wide. The rock burst also knocked out one four foot bolt. 
50. On November 16, 2010, another rock burst occurred during the dayshift blasting 
time. It caused a section that was approximately six feet high, fourteen feet long, and eight feet 
wide to come out. The debris from the rock burst blocked the roadway in the shaft it occurred in. 
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at 
mine. 
5 3. On April 15, 2011 two miners, Larry and Michael Marek, began their shifts at the 
Lucky Friday mine. The Mareks were both production miners assigned to perform various tasks 
to advance a stope. They fixed a spray chamber in the ventilation raise to help cool the stope and 
then watered down the muck in the stopes to cool the work area. Approximately one hour into 
their shift, Michael Marek had finished watering the muck in the east stope when he heard the 
ground caving in where Larry Marek was watering and felt a tremendous rush of air. As the east 
stope quickly filled with dust and debris, Michael Marek ran to the west side only to find the 
stope completely caved in. 
54. A crew was contacted for assistance to remove the fallen ground and MSHA was 
notified of the incident and immediately dispatched its personnel to the mine. Rescue crews 
worked around the clock removing material from the ground failure location and after an 
extensive effort, nine days later, Larry Marek's body was recovered. Larry Marek's cause of 
death was attributed to blunt force trauma from the rock fall, which was approximately ninety 
feet long, twenty feet wide, and thirty feet high. 
55. MSHA's investigation of the fatal incident resulted in penalties against Hecla and a 
scathing investigation report in which MSHA blamed the catastrophe on inadequate safety 
measures. 
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on 
to incidents, as discussed 13, 2007; 21, 2009; 
(iii) September 22, 2009; and (iv) February 17, 2010. 
57. MSHA found that the incident occurred not because of employee error but because 
of management's failures, stating in the report that "[m]anagement policies, procedures, and 
controls failed to ensure appropriate supervisors or other designated persons examined and tested 
ground conditions to determine if additional ground control measures needed to be taken to 
ensure the safety of miners prior to commencing work in the stope" and because "[m]anagers 
failed to design, install, and maintain a support system to control the ground in places where 
miners worked and traveled." 
58. On August 8, 2011, MSHA issued a section 104(d) citation and section 104(d)(l) 
order against Hecla related to this incident. The citation specifically stated "mine management 
has engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence by ... allowing 
miners to work under inadequately supported ground." The citation continued that "[t]his is an 
unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard." 
59. Similarly, the order issued by MSHA read "[m]anagement failed to adequately 
examine and test the ground conditions to determine if additional measures needed to be taken" 
and the "operator has engaged in aggravated conduct [which] constituted more than ordinary 
negligence." 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 12 
to to 
compliance with safety regulations and to remedy the significant safety 
Lucky Friday mine. 
to ensure 
the 
61. On November 16, 2011, at the same location as the April 2011 incident, there was 
another rock burst at the 5900 foot level of the Lucky Friday mine, registering 2.8 on the richter 
scale and triggered by blasting in the area. Luckily, no miners were present at the time of the 
rock burst. 
62. In response, on November 16, 2011, MSHA issued 103K order #8605614. Order 
#8605614-03 required Hecla to conduct two daily surveys at the start and end of the first shift to 
"indicate if movement is occurring or stress levels are increasing" at the 5900 foot level of the 
mme. 
63. Hecla submitted a plan to MSHA promising that the required readings would be 
conducted at the start and end of each shift. 
64. In late November, Hecla obtained a report from a consultant indicating, among 
other things, that pressures were increasing at the 5900 foot level and that any further activity in 
the mine at that level be conducted while "proceeding with great caution." 
65. On November 25, 2011, a second consultant's report was obtained by Hecla 
indicating, among other things, that extensive damage had resulted to the 5900 pillar as a result 
of the November 16, 2011 rock burst. The report recognized that there was still "the possibility 
of small bursts" occurring in the pillar. Finally, report indicated, the 
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was 
in two ,c,u.«:..vu. First, short term repairs were conducted to install wire fencing and 
shotcrete to provide additional ground support to the pillar. Second, long-term repairs were 
anticipated to provide a steel tunnel liner to absorb any wall squeeze from increased pressures in 
the pillar. 
67. Plaintiffs were requested to participate in the second stage repairs to the pillar. 
Bayer, knowingly, willingly and intentionally misrepresented the condition of the pillar to the 
Plaintiffs in an effort to induce them to participate in the project. Plaintiffs were told that the 
pillar was "safe" from further risk of rock bursts. Specifically, they were told that a consultant 
had informed them that another rock burst would not happen for "five years" into the future and 
that the pillar was being "continuously monitored" for increased pressures. 
68. Despite a consultant's indication that additional stress was being caused to the 
5900 pillar from mining below the pillar, Hecla continued its mining operations right up until the 
date the Plaintiffs were injured. 
69. Despite a mandatory 103K order requiring that Hecla cease further mining at the 
mine until the repairs were completed, Hecla continued mining operations. 
70. Despite a mandatory 103K order requiring that Hecla continuously monitor the 
pillar at multiple locations including the East wall of the pillar, Hecla knowingly, wilfully, 
wantonly and intentionally, failed to monitor the pillar in accordai1ce with the mandatory order. 
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71. could be 
due to the steel being installed over the preventing them from reading 
When making such statements, Defendants knew that the stress gauges were installed with 
extended lead wire to allow continued reading of the gauges. 
72. Defendants knowingly, wilfully, wantonly and intentionally lied to Plaintiffs to 
induce their cooperation, by stating that the pillar was safe, was not presenting with increased 
pressures, that pressures were being continuously monitored and that a consultant had 
represented that a further rock burst in the area would not occur for another "five years." 
73. Defendants knowingly, wilfully, wantonly and intentionally concealed material 
information from Plaintiffs to induce their cooperation, by failing to disclose that the pillar was 
not being monitored, was presenting with increased pressures and was being compromised by 
further mining activities below the pillar, and by failing to disclose that a consultant had advised 
them to proceed with "extreme caution" in further activities within the pillar. Defendants knew 
that had the true condition of the pillar and the lack of monitoring activities been disclosed, the 
Plaintiffs would not have agreed to perform further work within the pillar. 
74. On December 14, 2011, a rock burst occurred at the same level as the November 
16, 2011 rock burst resulting in the Plaintiff miners being trapped in the mine at 5900 feet below 
the surface with no ability to escape resulting in substantial injuries to the Plaintiffs. 
75. Following an investigation, MSHA found Hecla engaged in "aggravated conduct 
constituting more than ordinary negligence" and that conduct constituted an 
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to 
were not #8565565, 
8559615. 
• Continuing mining activities above and below the pillar despite knowing 
that continued mining operations would cause added stress to the pillar 
and by ignoring a consultant's warning that rehabilitation should "proceed 
with caution" and that "a better understanding of cause of the previous 
burst was needed." Order #8559614. 
• Failure to perform torque testing on bolts installed into pillar to provide 
short term support following the November 16, 2011 rock burst as 
mandated within the 103K order. 
76. Despite the scrutiny ofMSHA and the Defendants' acute, continued knowledge of 
this incident and the illegally unsafe mine conditions, most recently evidenced by the fatal 
incident at the Lucky Friday mine in April of2011, the Defendants continued to allow the Lucky 
Friday mine to be operated illegally, in noncompliance with safety regulations. 
77. When the Defendants attempted to downplay the significance of this event and 
shift blame away from Hecla's operations by taking the stance that rock bursts are simply a part 
of mining, MSHA stated that taking the position that such incidents and injuries were 
unavoidable was unacceptable. The MSHA Closeout Conference Report summarized this 
discussion as follows: 
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I . 
! 
a miner with more than 20 years' experience at mine). Explained to 
Mr. Hogamier that the mine is aware of seismic events which occur at this mine 
exceeding 2.8, and that engineering controls to handle 5 seismic events is 
inadequate. Mr. Hogamier stated that "rock bursts are just part of mini.11g." While 
I agreed they couldn't be stopped, I explained to Mr. Hogamier that I did not 
believe the mine was doing an adequate job of containing the aftermath of such 
and was needlessly endangering miners. 
78. The Defendants again tried to blame the incident that injured Plaintiffs on matters 
outside their supposed control as they did in response to the November 2011 rock burst. 
79. Defendants attempted to blame the rock burst on seismic activity; however, the 
seismic activity recorded came from the rock burst itself, according to the director of Earthquake 
Studies Office at the Montana Bureau of Mines. 
80. MSHA once again immediately dispatched an inspection team to the Lucky Friday 
mine to investigate the incident and conduct a special impact investigation and on December 15, 
2011, ordered the mine closed until MSHA determined work conditions were safe. Specifically, 
an MSHA spokeswoman stated on December 15, 2011, in regard to the Lucky Friday mine that 
"we've issued a closure order so the entire mine is shut down." The spokeswoman elaborated 
that MSB..A "would conduct a thorough investigation and we will not allow it to reopen until we 
are sure it is safe." 
81. A special impact investigation was conducted from December 16, 2011 through 
December 23, 2011. The series of incidents at the Lucky Friday mine also led MSHA to conduct 
a series of accident responses and special impact inspections of all aspects of mine operations. 
Specifically, accident responses and special impact 
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were the 
at a "high" of negligence on part management, for which the Individual 
Defendants were responsible. Further, several of the violations were categorized as "significant 
and substantial" by MSHA. 
82. In Citation No. 6483334, issued on December 16, 2011, MSHA stated "mine 
management engaged in an aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence in 
that they recently had a fatal accident relating to fall protection and should have had a heightened 
awareness [sic] of this hazard, this was also an obvious condition at the shaft station." The 
citation went on to state that "[t]his violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a 
[mandatory standard]." 
83. Overall, as a result of the December special impact inspection at the Lucky Friday 
mine, Hecla was issued citations for safety violations relating to ground control and ground 
support on: (i) December 16, 2011 (two citations); (ii) December 18, 2011 (nine citations); and 
(iii) December 19, 2011 (seven citations). MSHA's findings for several of these citations found 
that Hecla acted with at least a "high" degree of negligence. 
84. Upon information and belief, Defendants actions leading up to the December 14, 
2011 rock burst are the source of a criminal investigation and likely charges by MSHA W. 
COUNT ONE 
Knowing, Intentional, Willful and Wanton Injury to Plaintiffs 
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vJ.\.,UU<U.UI.J acts 
and were undertaken intentionally and 
circumspection, resulting in substantial, permanent injuries to the Plaintiffs. 
87. As a direct result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiffs suffered severe physical 
injuries. Plaintiffs have been forced to incur necessary expenses for medical as well as 
therapeutic treatment, and will continue to incur expenses for such care, together with present 
and future pain, suffering, physical stress, and impairment. Plaintiffs also lost wages because of 
the injuries sustained during the accident. The specified amount of these damages to be proven 
at trial in excess of $1,000,000.00. 
88. Plaintiffs have been compelled to employ the services of the Rossman Law Group 
to institute and prosecute this claim. Barrett, Hammerberg, Tester and Williams are, therefore, 
entitled to reasonable attorney fees for the services of said attorneys under Idaho Code§§ 12-120 
and 12-121. 
89. Barrett, Hammerberg, Tester and Williams reserve this paragraph for the inclusion 
of a claim for punitive damages under Idaho Code § 6-1604. 
COUNT TWO 
Respondeat Superior Liability 
90. Barrett, Hammerberg, Tester and Williams reallege and incorporate by this 
reference all the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 89 above as if set out in full. 
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were course and 
employment with at the time aforementioned events. 
93. As Jordon, Bayer, Hogamier, and Does I-X's employer at the time of the 
aforementioned events, which occurred while Jordon, Bayer, Hogamier, and Does I-X were acting 
within the course and scope of their employment, Hecla is liable for the damages caused to Barrett, 
Hammerberg, Tester and Williams by Jordon, Bayer, Hogamier, and Does I-X's negligence and/or 
intentional and willful conduct under the theory of respondeat superior. 
94. Hecla was fully aware of, and in fact approved, the actions taken by Jordon, Bayer, 
Hogarnier, and Does I-X in knowingly, willfully, and intentionally, placing Plaintiffs in a highly 
dangerous situation while misrepresenting the safety of the mine to the Plaintiffs and otherwise 
engaging in acts constituting willful or unprovoked physical aggression against the Plaintiffs, 
undertaken intentionally and fraudulently, without due caution and circumspection, resulting in 
substantial, permanent injuries to the Plaintiffs. 
95. As a direct and proximate result of Jordon, Bayer, Hogamier, and Does I-X's 
conduct, as imputed to Hecla pursuant to the theory of respondeat superior, as set forth above, 
Barrett, Harnmerberg, Tester and Williams suffered injuries and damages. As a result, Barrett, 
Hammerberg, Tester and Williams have been forced to incur necessary expenses for medical as 
well as therapeutic treatment, and will continue to incur expenses for such care, together with 
present and future pain, suffering, physical stress, and impairment. Barrett, Harnrnerberg, Tester 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 20 
Barrette, Mining 
Rossman Law Group to institute and prosecute this claim. Harnmerberg, 
Tester and Williams are, therefore, entitled to reasonable attorney fees for the services of said 
attorneys under Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-121. 
97. Barrett, Hammerberg, Tester and Williams reserve this paragraph for the inclusion 
a claim for punitive damages under Idaho Code§ 6-1604. 
COUNT THREE 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against all defendants 
98. Barrett, Hamrnerberg, Tester and Williams reallege and incorporate by this 
reference all the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 97 above as if set out in full. 
99. The injuries and damages to Barrett, Hammerberg, Tester and Williams by Jordon, 
Bayer, Hogamier, and Hecla at the times and places in question were intentional, unlawful, 
harmful and offensive. 
100. As a direct and proximate cause of the injuries by Jordon, Bayer, Ho gamier, and 
Hecla, Barrett, Hammerberg, Tester and Williams has suffered severe emotional distress. 
101. As such, Barrett, Hamrnerberg, Tester and Williams are entitled to recover 
monetary damages from Jordon, Bayer, Hogamier, and Hecla representing fair and reasonable 
compensation for the emotional distress suffered by Barrett, Hammerberg, Tester and Williams 
as a result of the wrongful conduct allegedhereinabove in an amount in excess of$10,000.00 to 
at trial. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 21 
vs 
under Code§§ 12-120 and 121. 
103. Barrett, Hammerberg, Tester and Williams reserve this paragraph for the inclusion 
a claim for punitive damages under Idaho Code§ 6-1604. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Barrett, Hammerberg, Tester and Williams demand a jury trial of this cause of action 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedures 38(b): 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Barrett, Hammerberg, Tester and Williams pray for judgment against 
Hecla as follows: 
1. For a money judgment against Hecla for Barrett, Hammerberg, Tester and 
Williams' medical costs/expenses, future medical costs/expenses, pain and suffering, emotional 
distress, as well as lost wages in a sum to be proven at trial in excess of$1,000,000.00; 
2. For reasonable attorneys fees to be determined by the Court; 
3. For costs of suit; 
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CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
RONNEL BARRETT, an individual; 
GREGG HA.Ml\1ERBERG, an individual; 
ERIC J. TESTER, an individual; and 
MATTHEW WILLIAMS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HECLA J\1INING COMP ANY, a 
Delaware Corporation; JOHN JORDAN, 
an individual; DOUG BA YER, an 
individual; SCOTT HOGAMIER, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 13-8793 
ANSWER 
The defendants Hecla Minii1g Company, John Jordan, Doug Bayer, and Scott 
Hogamier answer the complaint as follows: 
l. As to paragraph 1 of the complaint, admit. 
2. As to paragraph 2 of the complaint, admit. 
3. As to paragraph 3 of the complaint, admit. 
to paragraph 4 
to paragraph 5 of the complaint, admit. 
0 
9. to paragraph 9 complaint, does not an admission 
or and defendants neither admit nor deny. 
10. As to paragraph 10 of the complaint, admit. 
1 L As to paragraph 11 of the complaint, acL."'nit as Hecla's principal place of business 
is in Kootenai County, Idaho. 
12. As to paragraph 12 of the complaint, admit that plaintiffs were employed by 
Hecla Limited as miners at the Lucky Friday mine and deny the remainder of the allegations in 
the paragraph. 
13. As to paragraph 13 of the complaint, admit. 
14. As to paragraph 14 of the complaint, deny. 
15. As to paragraph 15 of the complaint, admit that the Lucky Friday mine is near 
Mullan, Idaho and as part of the mine there are two shafts, the Silver Shaft and the #2 Shaft and 
deny the remainder of the allegations in the paragraph. 
16. As to paragraph 16 of the complaint, admit that the Silver Shaft is the primary 
route of access to the underground mine workings at the Lucky Friday mine and has been since 
its completion. Admit that the Silver Shaft is an eighteen-foot diaiueter concrete lined shaft 
used to transport ore, miners and materials. Admit that the #2 Shaft is timber framed. Admit 
that the #2 Shaft is a designated escape route when the Lucky Friday mine is engaged in mining 
operations. Deny the the 
18. paragraph 18 of the complaint, admit that the Lucky Friday is located 
the Coeur d'Alene Mining District in northern Idaho. Admit that Hecla Limited has owned 
and operated the Lucky Friday mine since 1958, and that it is one of the deepest underground 
silver, lead, and zinc mines in the nation. Deny the remainder of the allegations in the 
paragraph. 
19. As to paragraph 19 of the complaint, admit that John Jordan was employed by 
Hecla Limited and was the general manager of the Lucky Friday mine and was responsible for 
safety and operations at the Lucky Friday mine. Deny the remainder of the allegations in the 
paragraph. 
20. As to paragraph 20 of the complaint, admit that Doug Bayer was employed by 
Hecla Limited and was the Mine Superintendent of the Lucky Friday mine and was responsible 
for safety and operations of the underground workings of the Lucky Friday mine and deny the 
remainder of the allegations of the paragraph. 
21. As to paragraph 21 of the complaint, admit that Scott Hogamier was employed 
by Hecla Limited as the Safety Foreman at the Lucky Friday mine and responsible for safety at 
the Lucky Friday mine and deny the remainder of the allegations in the paragraph. 
22. As to paragraph 22 of the complaint, deny. 
23. As to paragraph of the complaint, deny. 
24. to paragraph 24 of complaint, deny. 
on 
independent was killed admit that on 
l 2011, seven miners were involved a rock burst at Lucky mine and 
have claimed worker's compensation benefits for injuries they allege to have sustained in the 
incident. Deny the remainder of the allegations in the paragraph. 
27. As to paragraph 27 of the complaint, deny. 
28. As to paragraph 28 of the complaint, admit that a rock burst is a spontaneous, 
violent fracture of rock and that rock bursts may occur underground mines and deny the 
remainder of the allegations in the paragraph. 
29. As to paragraph 29 of the complaint, admit that rock bursts are of concern in 
underground mines and deny the remainder of the allegations in the paragraph. 
30. As to paragraph 30 of the complaint, deny. 
31. As to paragraph 31 of the complaint, admit that the Lucky Friday mine is subject 
to federal regulations administered by MSHA and EPA and deny the remainder of the 
allegations in the paragraph. 
32. As to paragraph 32 of the complaint, admit that MSHA is an agency of the 
federal government and deny the remainder of the allegations in paragraph. 
33. As to paragraph 33 of the complaint, deny. 
34. As to paragraph 34 of the complaint, it calls for a conclusion of law and not an 
nor deny. 
to paragraph 37 complaint, deny. 
38. As to paragraph 38 of the complaint, admit. 
39. As to paragraph 39 of the complaint, admit that Hecla has issued statements 
regarding its low cost production in 2003, 2005, and 2008. Admit that the Lucky Friday mine. 
located adjacent to Interstate 90 in north Idaho, has lower production costs than the Greens 
Creek mine, located on an island off the coast of southeast Alaska. 
40. As to paragraph 40 of the complaint admit that Hecla was aware for years that it 
had reported being a low cost producer of silver and deny the remainder of the allegations in the 
paragraph.. 
41. As to paragraph 41 of the complaint, admit. Rock bursts of any dimension are a 
daily occurrence at the Lucky Friday mine. 
42. As to paragraph 42 of the complaint, admit 
43. A.s to paragraph 43 of the complaint, admit 
44. As to paragraph 44 of the complaint, admit that references to the allegations in 
paragraphs 42 and 43 were among the information listed on MSHA's Mine Data Retrieval 
System. 
45. As to paragraph 45 of the complaint, deny. 
46. As to paragraph 46 of the complaint, deny. 
As to paragraph 4 7 of the complaint, admit. 
with 
of rock to fall with the 
paragraph. 
causing an approximate 8 
blasted rock. Deny the remainder of the allegations in the 
51. As to paragraph 51 of the complaint, admit that on March 4, 2011, miners were 
relieving a large piece of loose rock, and it ultimately fell during the process. Admit the 
measurement of the fallen rock was approximately 10 feet, by eight feet, by six feet. 
52. As to paragraph of the complaint, admit that the incidents recited in 
paragraphs 52, 53, and 54 of the complaint occurred and deny the remainder of the allegations 
in the paragraph. 
53. As to paragraph 53 of the complaint, admit that Larry and Michael Marek were 
miners assigned to fix a spray chamber in 6150-15 slot. Larry Marek was watering a muck pile 
in the 6150-15-3 stope when a fall of rock occurred. Deny the remainder of the allegations in 
the paragraph. 
54. As to paragraph 54 of the complaint, adinit that rescue crews were mobilized to 
find Larry Marek and worked round the clock until Larry Marek's body was found nine days 
later. Admit that Larry Marek died from blunt force trauma from the fall of rock and deny the 
remainder of the allegations in the paragraph. 
55. As to paragraph 55 of the complaint, admit that MSHA investigated and issued a 
report Deny the remainder of the allegations in the paragraph. 
to paragraph 57 of the complaint, admit that MSHA issued a 
has disputed. Deny the remainder of the allegations in the paragraph. 
which 
58. As to paragraph 58 of the complaint, admit that MSHA issued a citation and 
order, which Hecla has disputed. Deny the remainder of the allegations in the paragraph. 
59. As to paragraph 59 of the complaint, admit that MSHA issued a..11 order, which 
Hecla has disputed. 
60. As to paragraph 60 of the complaint, deny. 
61. As to paragraph 61 of the complaint, admit that there was a rock burst at the 
5900 foot level of the Lucky Friday mine on November 16, 2011 and deny the remainder of the 
allegations in the paragraph. 
62. As to paragraph 62 of the complaint, MSHA issued a 103(k) order and deny the 
remainder of the allegations in the paragraph. 
63. As to paragraph 63 of the complai.rit, admit that Hecla submitted a plan to 
MSHA, which MSHA approved and deny the remainder of the allegations in the paragraph. 
64. As to paragraph 64 of the complaint, admit that Hecla engaged a consultant to 
review the November 2011 rock burst, and the consultant advised, among other things, that 
rehabilitation needs to proceed with caution. Deny the remainder of the allegations in the 
paragraph. 
to paragraph 66 complaint, admit. 
to paragraph 67 of complaint, admit that the plaintiffs were assigned to 
work on the construction of the tunnel liner and deny the remainder of the allegations in the 
paragraph. 
68. As to paragraph 68 of the complaint, deny. 
69. As to paragraph 69 of the complaint, deny. 
70. As to paragraph 70 of the complaint, deny. 
71. As to paragraph 71 of the complaint, deny. 
72. As to paragraph 72 of the complaint, deny. 
73. As to paragraph 73 of the complaint, deny. 
74. As to paragraph 74 of the complaint, admit that on December 14, 2011 a rock 
burst occurred at the 5900 foot level in the area of the tunnel liner installation. Admit that the 
plaintiffs were involved in this incident. Deny the remainder of the allegations in the paragraph. 
75. As to paragraph 75 of the complaint, admit that :tvfSHA. did an investigation and 
issued citations, which Hecla is disputing. Deny the remainder of the allegations in the 
paragraph. 
76. As to paragraph 76 of the complaint, deny. 
77. As to paragraph 77 of the complaint, deny. 
78. As to paragraph 78 of the complaint, deny. 
to paragraph 79 of the complaint, deny. 
81. As to paragraph 81 of the complaint, admit that MSHA conducted an inspection 
the Lucky Friday mine between the dates of December 16, 2011, and December 23, 2011. 
Admit that multiple citations and orders were issued, many of which have been contested by 
Hecla. Deny the remainder of the allegations in the paragraph. 
82. As to paragraph 82 of the complaint, admit that on December 16, 2011, MSHA 
issued Citation No. 6483334 as stated in the paragraph, and that Hecla has contested the 
citation. Deny the remainder of the allegations in the paragraph. 
83. As to paragraph 83 of the complaint, admit that MSHA conducted an 
investigation of the Lucky Friday Mine and issued citations, which Hecla is disputing. Deny 
the remainder of the allegations in the paragraph. 
84. As to paragraph 84 of the complaint, deny. 
85. As to paragraph 85 of the complaint, admit and deny as aforesaid. 
86. As to paragraph 86 of the complaint, deny. 
87. As to paragraph 87 of the complaint, deny. 
88. As to paragraph 88 of the complaint, deny. 
89. As to paragraph 89 of the complaint, this paragraph requires neither a.11 admission 
nor denial. 
90. As to paragraph 90 of the complaint, admit and deny as aforesaid. 
92. As to paragraph 92 complaint, admit that defendants Bayer. and 
Hogamier were acting in the course and scope of their employment at the time the incident 
December 14, 2011 and deny the remainder of the allegations in the paragraph. 
93. As to paragraph 93 of the complaint, deny. 
94. As to paragraph 94 of the complaint, deny. 
95. As to paragraph 95 of the complaint, deny. 
96. As to paragraph 96 of the complaint, deny . 
. 97. As to paragraph 97 of the complaint, thls paragraph requires neither an admission 
nor denial. 
98. As to paragraph 98 of the complaint, admit and deny as aforesaid. 
99. As to paragraph 99 of the complaint, deny. 
100. As to paragraph 100 of the complaint, deny. 
101. As to paragraph 101 of the complaint, deny. 
102. As to paragraph 102 of the complaint, deny. 
103. As to paragraph 103 of the complaint, this paragraph requires neither an 
admission nor denial. 
As to the prayer for relief, deny. 
AFIRMA TIVE DEFENSES 
FJRST DEFENSE 
fails to state a upon which relief can granted. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' injuries, any, were due to a pre-existing condition and the plaintiffs' 
damages, if any, are subject to apportionment. 
FOlJRTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs were employees of defendant Hecla Mining Company acting in the course of 
their employment at the time of and in connection with the matters alleged in the complaint. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-209, and other law or statute, plaintiffs' exclusive remedy is 
limited to the remedies set forth in Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law, Idaho Code§ 72-101, 
et seq. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs failed to give notice to the defendants and bring this action within the time 
limits provided by the Employer's Liability Act, Idaho Code§ 44-1407. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' clain1s are barred by the i...nJury by a fe!lovv servant doctrine. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Defendants were the fellow servants of plaintiffs and are immune from suit under the 
Employer's Liability Act, Idaho Code§ 44-1401, et seq. and the Idaho Worker's Compensation 
Law, Idaho Code§ 72-101, et seq. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Defendants assert 1401 
TENTH DEFENSE 
Defendants reserve the right to amend this answer to supplement or add any defenses 
indicated by the law or facts as developed. 
DATED this 12th day of May, 2014. 
~};;J;)EN & L /ONS, LLP /z/ (I 
By /~l_----
Michael E. Ramsden, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of May, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Eric S. Rossman 
Rossman Law Group, PLLC 
717 N. 7th Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Michael R Christian 
Marcus, Christia.ii, Hardee & Davies, LLP 
73 7 N. i 11 Street 






__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile 
Michael E. Ramsden 
of 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
RONNEL E. BARRETT, an individual; 
GREGG HAMMERBERG, an individual; 
ERIC J. TESTER, an individual; and 




Delaware Corporation; JOHN JORDAN, 
an individual; DOUG BA YER, an 
individual; SCOTT HOGAMIER, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
Michael E. Ramsden states: 
Case No. CV 13-8793 
DECLARATION OF MICHAELE. 
RAMSDEN IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the defendants and make this declaration based on personal 
knowledge. 
2. I have attached to this declaration as Exhibit A, plaintiff Ronnel E. Barrett's answer to 
Interrogatory No. 9. 
3. I have attached to this declaration as Exhibit B, pages 1 11, 52, 61, 70-73, 103-108, 
1, 
as received 
byme the court reporter. 
5. I have attached to this declaration as Exhibit D, deposition Exhibits 13 and 18 of the 
deposition of John Jordan taken in this action as received by me from the court reporter. 
6. I have attached to this declaration as Exhibit E, the Affidavit of Wilson Blake, dated 
November 8, 2013. 
I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of Idaho that the foregoing 
statements are true and correct. 
DATED this 29th day ofMay, 2015. ?Et-S,LLP 
Michael E. Ramsden, Of the Firm 




717 N. 7m Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Michael R. Christian 
Marcus, Christian, Hardee & Davies, LLP 
737 N. 7th Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 




__ Facsimile (208) 342-2170 




Erica S. Phillips, ISB #6009 
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com 
Kimberly L. Williams, ISB #8893 
lruri 111 ~m <!frn-rf'\CC1'Y't t').1'\ 1 <".l1'I.r r<A't'Y"l 
J:.'l... T 1 .:..1. ... .i;,....i...1.A.l.W\t;";.l VIJU..1..J.,LU.LJ.l(...t. YY .,VVJ..ll. 
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC 
737 N. i 11 Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-2030 
Facsimile: (208) 342-2170 
Michael R. Christian, ISB #4311 
mchristian@mch-lawyer.com 
MARCUS, CHRISTIAN, HARDEE & DA VIES, LLP 
737 N. 7th Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: (208) 342-3563 
Facsimile: (208) 342-2170 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
( '·. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
RONNEL E. BARRETT, an individual; 
GREGG HAMMERBERG, an individual; 
ERIC J. TESTER, an individual; and 












HECLA MINING COMPANY, a Delaware ) 
Corporation; JOHN JORDAN, an individual; ) 
DOUG BA YER, an individual; SCOTT ) 
HOGAMIER, an individual; and DOES I-X, ) 
CASE NO. CV 13-8793 
PLAINTIFF ERIC J. TESTER'S 
ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO 
DEFENDANT HECLA MINING 
COMP ANY'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS 
PLAINTIFF RONNEL E. BARRETT'S ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT 
I-IECLA MINING COMPANY'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 1 
in full 
and/or duty were directed to undertake by defendants or any of them on December 14, 
2011, including, the name of the person directing you, the location the job or duty that was to be 
performed and whether such job or duty was performed. 
ANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory on the basis that it is vague and to the 
extent that it seeks information and/or documents invasive of the attorney client privilege and/or 
work product doctrine and to the extent that it seeks information already in the possession of 
Defendants and/or information to which Defendant has equal access. Subject to and without 
waiving these objections, see the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on file herein. 
Matt Williams was installing a tunnel liner on the 5900 level of the Lucky Friday Mine. 
A rock burst had previously occurred in November of 2011 in the same area and this was the 
final step in repairing the area. Rick Newell was the shift supervisor on the evening of December 
11, 2011. Orders were provided by Doug Bayer and a briefing had occurred prior to the shift to 
review the process. Matt Williams was working on the ground with Ron Barrett, Walt Lambott 
and Geoff Parker. Greg Hammerberg, Eric Tester and Jason Chambers were in the man-basket 
on the opposite side of the drift. The crew was bolting sections of the liner together at the time of 
the rock burst. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Have you ever, before or after the date of the rockburst of 
December 14, 2011 at the Lucky Friday mine, suffered from any debilitating condition or disease, 
or been involved in any type of accident or occurrence resulting in any injury of any kind to your 
PLAINTIFF RONNEL E. BARRETT'S ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT 
HECLA MINING COMPANY'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 20 
EXHIBITB 
RONNEL E. BARRETT, an individual; 
GREGG , an 
ERIC J. TESTER, an individual; 




HECLA MINING COMPANY, a Delaware 
Corporation; JOHN JORDAN, an 
individual; DOUG BAYER an 
individual; SCOTT HOGAMIER, an 
individual; and DOES I-X, unknown 
ies, 
De s. 
Case No. CV 13-8793 
DEPOSITION OF DOUG BAYER 
TAKEN ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS 
AT COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 
APRIL 6, 2015, AT 1:30 P.M. 
REPORTED BY: 
PATRICIA L. PULLO, CSR 
Notary Public 
A 












8 For the Defendants: 
9 MICHAELE. RAMSDEN, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
10 700 Northwest Boulevard 
P.O. Box 1336 































MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form, assuming 
tot extent as whether ever told anybody at 
But you can go ahead and answer to your 
knowl 
10 THE WITNESS: Well, I know Wilson agreed with 
11 our approa to repairing the dri after the first 
12 
13 
roe t, the November h rockburst. And he also 
about t a a l rand Tekfoam. 
14 He thought that was a good idea for 1 
15 1 
16 And he also - we worked with Wilson on 
17 designing the ground support that was installed after 
18 the first rockburst. And he gave us some eng ring 
19 analysis of type of support and what type of 
20 energy that support would be able to withstand and a 
21 r of safety that he thought was appropriate. 







Who developed the rehabil ation plan? 
I believe on-site members of management, 
and 









That was the first 
stalled on the st 
it took a 
t 
ct 
to the temperature 

















A. It It ta s a while for the gauge 
to ust to the rock s and It 
needs to sett 
' they say, 
for some pe of time. 
Q. And on east wall you talled on 
r 1st, or Hecla did, a s monitor gauge 
to evaluate stress tor at that icular wall, 
correct? 
A. Yes. There's three led, one 
east and one the west one vertically upwards. 
Q. And you also sented to MS that 







Did you order additional gauges? 
Yes. 
Who ordered them? 
engineering department, but I don't know 
24 who specifically. 
25 Q. s 

















I did not 
ion, full 





the pillar to burst. I had 
stress -- that a second burst 
Q. So you're not conce about safety of 
the employee -- part arly concerned about the safety 
of sat that point int , correct? 
test 
sa 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object, 





THE WITNESS: I'm always concerned about the 
of miners. But I was in that dri for six 
16 hours that morning. I did a workplace inspection. I 
17 looked at shotcrete. I listened to the ground. I 
had data from the morning And there was 18 
19 nothing indicated another rockburst was imminent 
20 or -- there was no indications. 































Q f you look at page 2 under 1 Re s and 
5900 Pil Burst, he s f "From the nnmPri 
model ed out by Itasca it was sumed the 
5900 1 was too and too confined r a pillar 
burst to occur. Because the actual rs to 
have been structurally control , we may want Itasca 
to rerun model with structure running through the 





re ct to min 
to 
has s 
er understand why 
ficant impl 
the main sill, i 
s 
along the 
more burst prone eastern rtion of the sill." 
A. 
Q. 
Did you understand that when you read it? 
Yes. 
you understand that he was calling 
19 or raising concerns about whether or not the modeling 
20 that was done in the spring of 2010 was still accurate? 
21 A. Yes. He is suggesting we rerun model 
22 with structure. 
23 This is Wilson's first visit after the burst. 
24 He, sed on this memo, was theorizing it 
25 was a pillar burst. It wasn't until later that 






So at this point he's 
pil r t, ,,,.:as concern 
pillar wasn't supposed to be able to fail 
the 
e the 
a burst of 
7 that size. And what I understood him to mean is - his 
8 last sentence, "significant implications with respect 
9 to ing sill," I knew that to mean this 5300 





t ked about earlier, when we -- and 
need to rerun model to ma sure 
is still valid is what he's tal 
at the t roughly a ar f 
's saying we 
that 70 foot 
about. So that's 
fore we to 
15 that point. 
16 Q. you unders he was sing concerns 
17 about the validity of the modeling that was carried out 
18 in the spring of 2010? 
19 7\ r-1. No. I don't think he had concern that the 
20 model was ccurate. At that po he still thought 
21 it was a pillar burst, and there must have been 
22 structure for to burst. So he's wondering if we can 
23 rerun the model with structure to see if the model 
24 
25 
could predict such a burst at that magnitude. He 
and t wa st 















bel f was that 
unt a e 
t, correct? 
up until December 14, 2011, his 
s was a llar burst to your 
8 understanding, correct? 
9 
10 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. You're 
asking him to speculate 'sin somebody else's 
11 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
12 Q. No. I sa to your understanding. That's 
what need to know. 
A. My unders was lson thought was 








some point. And I don't know if it was ly after 










You thought it was a pillar t right up 
r December 14, 2011, correct? 
I did, yes. 
And he's indicating "we really need to better 
23 understand why this burst occurred" with further 
24 modeling, correct? 
25 A. For 5300 l. 







Q. you lso bel 
zed, that pil 's l to thstand a 
rockburst up to 2.2 on the Richter sea e was 
upon the liner being stalled, correct? 
A. I believe the amount of ground support we 
nt 
8 installed initially, the bolts and the shotcrete, would 
9 withstand a chter 2.5 at a certain distance. But 










And then the tunnel with the Tekfoam would 
ect the opening from damage if the pil r 
bursting. 
So, yeah, there was -- there was a level of 
afforded by the bolts and shotcrete that was 
16 supposed to withstand a certain amount of energy and 








Q. You understood maximum protection wouldn't be 
provi at the 5900 pil until the l was 
completely tal d, correct? 
That was the final plan, s. A. 
Q. And it's your representation that MSHA 
approved your request to mine during stallation -- or 
24 during rehabilitation, correct? 
25 A. Yes, 
1 












the osure mea urements 
a to MSHA? 
ing some of it out and 
8 handing it to Scott Amos, who was the MSHA inspector on 
9 s e during the the work with the (k) order 






to him or not. I know I provided 






rnon ng data be December 14, 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object to form. Calls for 
17 speculation. 
18 THE WITNESS: I have no idea. 
19 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
10 
20 Q. Okay. Did you communicate to MSHA extent 
21 to ch Hecla intended to during the 









How did you communicate that? 
Through scussions 








would have been 
1 who all was there. 
discus ions. 
1 f and I don 1 t 
But it 1 s a of in rmat wi MSHA 









has to approved. And it 1 s typical for MSHA 
to ask for more 
they have to make the sion. So they requested 
all the a. It was all provided. 
The p was discuss was to resume 
mining but to limit trave through 
travel. Everybody that went through 
and visually examine before proceeding. 
pillar. No foot 
re had to stop 
If re was 
17 any indication of closure or cracking or change in 
18 conditions, we were to stop and remove miners. 
19 But MSHA understood that we were going to 
20 resume mining. And states that in their 
21 modification. 







And a 103 {k) r o be 
0 









Q. Outs the on, the written 
st for modification of the 103(k) order to al 
mining, was re communication with MSHA or 
lanation to MSHA as to the extent of the mining 
ended to conduct? 
10 A. Our discussions were Scott Amos because 




pr to much he was on 





But we dea with Scott Amos. And we 
15 scuss resumption of mining the Gold Hunter. So 









He's inspected there numerous times. And he 
understands where the stopes are located. So I don't 
remember if I named off, you know, the numbers of the 
stopes or the names of stopes. But when we said 
we're go to resume ng, it's implied 
means the Gold Hunter. 
'sonly five stopes there. Okay. So it 
was y well understood that resumption of mining 
25 meant the Gold Hunter st 
06 






e l . J'unos 
other would 









THE WITNESS: Li I already st , I don't 
and remember if I told this stope this s 
t s stope. It meant mining Gold Hunter is what 
11 we discussed. 
12 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
13 Q. 0 So l tell him that Hecla 






Resume production. Do you 
17 anything e e? 
Not in detail. Not ... 




Q. Do you recall telling him how many shifts you 
20 intended to work mining during rehabil ation? 
,..., 1 
L.L A. I don't recall if we discussed, but he 




day. then when I when we were talking about 
resumption of mining, it's mining on two ten-hour 
s s 1 two shi s a f s a week. 




Q. tell Mr. Amos or 
f of MSHA how many shifts you int 
els on 
to work 





answered. Go ahead. 
ect. It's en as and 
THE WITNESS: I think I answe it. Two 
10 s a day. 
11 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
12 Q. Did you tell Mr. Amos how many shifts you 
13 int to work mining Gold Hunter ? 
14 
15 
MR. RAMSDEN: As and answered. Go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: We told him we were -- our 
16 modification request was to resume mining. Resume 
17 normal ng. That means ten-hour fts, two fts 
18 a day, six days a week. 
19 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
20 Q. You say now that you told him you wanted to 
21 resume no Do u recall ifically what 
22 you said? 
23 A. I don't know if I said normal mining to 
24 Scott. But resume production. Resume mining 
25 ions 

















you tell him? 
to resume mining December 6th. 
cont no until 










time was shipped Kentucky, so there's a 
day or two we weren't going to know exactly what day it 
was going to show up. 
So our request was to resume mining 
6 mine until the tunnel 1 r showed 
Q. Did you tell him how many you ended 
to ? 
No. A. 
Q. Did you tell him the parti ar locations you 
18 ended to mine? 
19 MR. RAMSDEN: Object. It's been asked and 
20 answered. 
21 THE WITNESS: I don't recall if I told him 
22 each stope. But mining operations in Gold Hunter 
23 means -- it can only mean f 
24 There's only five there. 








December s the 
r modi cation to , to a ow us to 





Q. Other than that document, did 
communication to MSHA as to extent to 
any 
ch or if 
at all you would mining or wanted to mine? 
A. I don 1 t recall any other documents. 
10 
11 
(Whereupon, Deposition Exhib No. 25 was 
marked for ification.) 
12 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
13 Q. 






Yes. These are 
These are ft 
ing done at parti r 
18 correct? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. If you look at pa 
corner. In rst s 
No. 25. Do you recognize 
on 
ft s. 
ing what is 
at dif rent t 






the p.m. shift on December 12th that 
on both the east and west ends of st 
re was mining 
11? 
A. That's what s would cate that there 
25 was mining in that area. 
1 











ends of stope 
12, correct? 
That 1 s what 
And then 
st. The wa 
11 dur the a ernoon shi on 
s shift report says. 
also s t at st e 14 there 











Which stope are you re rring? 14? 
14. 
Yes, that's what 
And if you look at 
says. 
36, second 






At the t does it indicate in the 









blasting at both ends of stope 11? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does it also indicate in morning of 
December 13th was 11 and at both 
ends of stope 14? 
Yes. A. 
Q. And then if you look at the first of 
ill Exh it 25, does sent there was 
1 4 
WWW. BAYE, /6/ 01 
l 
A. Ye . 
Q. s that were stal 4 
5 r 1st, 2011, those were Geokon 430 
6 gauges, correct? 
7 A. Yes. 
on 
monitor 
8 Q. Those are what you'd used before, correct? 













And you had some 
Yes. 
Isn't rue or 
over from prior use, 
it correct 
had recommended or requested Hecla 
Geokon us a b 1 gauge stead of 




But I don't recall if it was in this application or 
elsewhere in the mine for monitoring. 
Q. Do you know what of mon ors were 
21 red Geo on December ' 
2011 or 
to December 6th, 2011? 22 
23 A. Prior to. I believe the same type of 
24 monitor. 
25 Q. 4300NX? 
or 
1 






i l i at pro ect 
A. I'm not sure. A lot of s rmat 
be on our wall the hal y. But I do not know 
if s was posted or distributed to the miners. I was 
actually not at week. So I'm not sure if 
8 they were handed to them or not. 
9 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibits Nos. 28, 29 
10 and 30 were marked for identification.) 
11 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
12 Q. Show you Exhibit No. 28. Do you 
13 that document? 












Q. And that was submitted to MSHA? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You sent -- and the purpose of sending 
s to MSHA was to st a modi of the 









You understood would be rel ng upon 
whether or not to allow a formation assessi 
.com BAYER, DOUG /6/20 
3 THE WITNESS: 
4 tten re sand 
5 the request or not. 
6 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
re 
to evaluate to 
7 Q. You expected that they would rely upon your 
8 requests in making a decision, correct? 
9 
10 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object, speculat 
THE WITNESS: I just provide whatever 
11 information they request, so ... 






You understood they would 
Yes. 
, correct? 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object, speculation. 
16 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
17 Q. I'm asking your understanding. I'm not 
18 asking what they understood. I'm asking you. Did you 
19 understand that they would read that? Did you 
20 expect --













No, it does not. 
That's the objection. 
I does not at all. He 
BAYER, DOUG 4/6/20 
r 
Doug Bayer 
November 29, 2011 
The pillar surrounding the 5900 main drift at the 30 vein location sustained major damage after 
a large rockburst that occurred at 1:07 a.m. on November 16th. The burst caused approximately 
12 feet of the back to fail and damaged both ribs. 
Repair of the area is planned in 2 stages. The primary or initial stage is to bolt and shotcrete 
the area. The long-term or secondary stage is to install a steel tunnel liner through the vein 
area of the drift and fill the void above and around the forms with Techfoam. 
The initial stage of repair has been completed. 12 ft dywidags have been installed in the back 
on a 4ft x 4ft pattern and 20 foot cable bolts were installed on a 6 ft x 6ft pattern. Wire fencing 
was installed with 4ft and 6ft with splits sets. The ribs have been wired and bolted with 8 ft 
dywidags on a 4ft x 4ft pattern, and 6 ft and 4ft split sets. The entire area was then shotcreted 
to a depth of 2 to 3 inches. The amount of ground support that has been installed is far more 
substantial than the original support installed when the drift was driven in 2005. 
The secondary long term repairs are still being engineered, but in general, a steel tunnel liner 
will be installed through the area (approximately 35 ft in length). The tunnel liner that is being 
considered is typically used for highway construction. Once the liner is installed and the ends 
sealed, Techfoam will be blown in from the ends 9r through ports in the liner to fill the void. 
This Techfoam is a foamed concrete type product that has an approximately 25 psi compressive 
strength. The Techfoam wi!! be able to absorb any wall squeeze and cushion any potential 
damage from rockbursting without compromising the steel tunnel liner. 
The rockburst in the pillar is classified as a foundation failure, and not.a classic pillar burst (See 
Wilson Blake's 5900 Drift Pillar memo). The burst likely caused closure across the 30 vein in the 
mined out areas above and below the 5900 level. The constant stress from closure is the 
contributing factor that is believed to have caused the pillar to burst. Although the pillar is still 
intact and is still carrying some load and stress, it is believe the majority of the stress was 
dissipated with the large rockburst and it will take months or years for the pillar to gain more 
stress that could cause any major rockbursts. In addition, the pillar is now smaller in size so it 
cannot carry the same load that 
The drift was also re-bolted for 40 feet on of the fall to assure areas near 
the rockburst zone are stable. 12 ft dywidags were installed on a 4 ft x 4 ft pattern in the back 
and 8ft dywidags were installed on a 4ft x 4ft pattern in the ribs. 
The area of the rockburst is now stable and the mine would like to resume production. Final 
engineering of the tunnel liner should be complete by December 2nd. Fabrication and delivery 
is expected to take 2 weeks from the order date. Installation is expected to take 2 to 3 weeks, 
depending on Techfoam availability. The stage 2 long-term support should be complete by 
January 7th. 
The stress meters that were originally installed in the pillar are no longer working since the 
rockburst. 6 new stress gauges will be installed1 2 in the back and 2 in each wall. The gauges 
will be installed inside 3 in diameter drill holes. The gauges In the back will be placed at 10 ft 
above the drift and the gauges in the ribs will be at a depth of 20 ft. The gauges are NX4300 
stress meters. We have 3 gauges on site and will be installed by Friday, December 2°d. The 
other 3 gauges are on order and will be shipped December 7th, As soon as the other gauges 
arrive they will be installed. In addition to the stress gauges, closure points will also be re-
established. Closure will be measured east-west across the drift and north-south across the 
vein until the tunnel liner is installed. 
A data collector will be used to gather the data from the stress meters. The original data 
collectors were destroyed in the rock burst and it is unknown at this time when a new data 
collector will be ready. The gauges will be read with a hand held meter once a month until the 
data collector is functional. Data from the data collector will be downloaded and analyzed 
approximately every 60 days. 
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By: Doug Bayer 
December 1, 2011 
5900 Ma Rockburst Repair 
3 NX 4300 stress meters are being installed in the 30-vein pillar around the 5900 
main drift. An initial reading will be taken on dayshift, December 15\ Since the 
stress meters monitor increases in stress, it is expected that the initial reading will 
be zero, or close to zero. Another reading will be taken on night shift December 
1st and again on dayshift December 2nd to establish a baseline. The frequency of 
taking readings can be determined based on the results of the stress meters. It is 
expected the stress will build slowly over time, and may take weeks or months to 
show any measureable increase in stress. 
We request the K order be modified to allow travel through the drift starting 
Friday, December 2nd to allow the services to the mine to be re-established. 
Power cables, water lines and compressed air lines need to be re-installed to 
provide services to the mine. Once the services are reconnected, the mine plans 
to resume production. 
The tunnel liner will be installed as soon as possible after it arrives on site. 
In addition to gathering stress data, the area will be visually inspected every shift 
by the underground supervisors. 
By: Doug Bayer 
December 2, 2011 
5900 Main level Rockburst 
The 3 stress gauges have been installed into the 5900 main drift pillar: Readings were taken 
and the gauges show a small increase in stress, which is expected. We will continue to take 
readings every shift for 1 week. If the gauges indicate no appreciable build up of stress, then 
the gauges will be read once a week. The readings will be reviewed daily by mine personnel 
and our rock mechanics consultant. 
The rockburst area is now secure. Mine services such as chilled water, power and compressed 
air need to be restored through the area so the mine can be properly ventilated and cooled .. 
Once the utilities are in place and operational, MSHA will evaluate the readings again prior to 
using the 5900 main drift for normal travel. 
Because this rockburst was triggered during the designated blasting time, travel through the 
rockburst area will not be allowed until all the rounds have been shot. This is a precautionary 
measure, as we do not expect another rockburst. The mining crews will wait at the 5900 refuge 
chamber, which is on the north side of the rockburst area until 10 minutes after the rounds are 
blasted. There will be no travel through the rockburst area from light up time until 10 minutes 
following the last round. going off. We are also investigating going to a centralized blasting 
system, which would take some time to implement. 
The Con Tech tunnel liner was ordered on December 2 and is expected to arrive in 12 to 14 
days. The process of installing the liner will begin as soon as the materials arrive onsite. The 
T echfoam pumps and product are standing by, and will be ordered 1 week prior to use. 
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Amended Notice of Taking 
Deposition Duces Tecum 
of Scott Hogamier 
Map of 5900 Level 
Mine Citat /Order 8605614 
dated 11/16/2011, 
Letter to John Pereza 
from Scott Hogamier 
dat 5/23/20 




















0 5 at 
Coeur d 1 
LLC, 
Publ w 
Rams & law off 
ene, Idaho, re M & M Court 
Patr ia L. Pullo, Court r 
and for the State of Idaho, to 













for County of Kootenai, said cause being Case 
No. CV 13-8793 in said Court. 
(Whereupon, Deposi Exhib No. 31 was 
marked for ification.) 
MR. ROSSMAN: Record re t and 
14 for the depos ion of Scott Hogamier. Case of Barrett, 
et ., versus Hecla Mining Company, et al.; Case 





rst Judicial District, State of Idaho, County of 
Kootenai. Depos ion pursuant to the Idaho Rules of 
19 Civil Procedure. 
20 
21 
AND THEREUPON, the 
adduced, to t: 
llowing testimony was 
22 SCOTT HOGAMIER, 
23 having been first duly sworn to tell truth, the 
24 whole truth, and nothing but the truth, relating to 
25 said cause, deposes and says: 
www.mmcourt.com SCOTT 4/7/2015 
3 0 i the 
4 Q. Are you still a o the safe 
ssion tee? Excuse me. 
A. Yes, I am. 
5 
6 












responsibil s was to attend meet ? 
A. Correct. 
And to ta 
Correct. 




Q. What was the purpose r taking notes during 
16 meetings? 
A. To capture what was sa and then all 
up, it around to the members and then post on 






Q. And were these minutes verbatim statements or 
were general summaries? 
22 A. Well, we try to capture y much 
23 everything that was sa , you know, within reason. If 
24 someone was (demonstrating) like that, you may not get 
25 the whole thing. But you st of 


























s Steve take the notes. 
So one of you would ta the notes at every 
Correct. 
To what pos ion were you promoted 2010? 
They called it safety 
Are you still a safety 
Yeah. 
What are your respons 
Pretty much the same 
? 
1 ies as sa y 
same kind of 
1 ies. The audits, the safety cormnittee, 
out into the work areas, dealing with MSHA 





18 1 s a weekly staff meeting I attended. I 1 m also 
y 
19 mine rescue. I'm the mine rescue coordinator. So it's 








Q. So you said you started at staff 
24 meetings. What are staff meetings? 
25 A. That is a meeting cal by the general 
www.mmcourt.com HOGAMIER SCOTT 4/7/201 
1 
Q. att 
4 meet ? 
5 A. Chief er, f 11 
6 superintendent, mine superintendent, human resources, 
7 account 
8 Q. How do they meet? 
9 A. Once a week. 
10 Q. Would John Jo be present? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Doug Bayer? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Was someone le taking notes 
15 dur those meet s? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. There were no notes? 
18 A. Uh-uh. 
19 Q. No? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. No es, nothing? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Agenda? 
24 A. No. It was pretty formal. 
25 Q. Was there ever discussion as to why no one 












of talk about 
kind of talk 
? 
eve ta e e meet 
I - no. re were no notes. 
t s of wou scus 
department would just go and kind 
they one or two minutes to just 






Q. Did ever talk about safety ris dur 
meetings? 
A. No, not that I remember. st of my stuff 
14 was talking about things that were upcoming to just 
15 kind of let everybody know what was go on. You 
16 know, if maybe we were in the middle of an inspection, 
17 we had MSHA re or something's going on in mine 
18 rescue. I could let everybody know that would be 







Q. You ever 
A. No, not 
Q. You ever 
A. No. Not 
Q. Were you 
roe st plann 
www.mmcourt.com 
t k about rockburst planning? 
in of meeting. No. 
talk about union concerns? 
that I remember. 
involved at l as sa foreman in 
? 






6 Q. You said one of your respons il ies was to 






Q. If MSHA had issues regarding rockburst 
planning, how would you have handled those? 
A. They would went and ta ked to 
12 management members that de t with 
13 Q. Who parti r? 
14 
15 
A. Mine maybe mine 
f 
endent, mine 
16 Q. Did you have any responsibil y for 
17 development or implementation of the safety manual? 
r 
18 A. That manual was developed I believe 1994. 
19 And in 2009, when I was a safety technician, I rewrote 
20 it and updated it with help from management. So I -- I 
21 would give out certain rts of It was 
22 into dif rent parts. Like the mill had a section in 
23 there, track mining, mechanized mining. 
24 And so I would take that section to, say, a 
25 endent or the reman or the mill 11 





















I rewrote it 
have 
are re. 
2009 -- or 
of ground control p 
A. No, no. 
Q. Have any lvernent in the lopment of 
the rockburst plan? 
A. No, I did not. Those were there before I 
was. 
Q. As of December 14, 2011, had ever 
rockburst plan? 
A. I'd loo at parts of it we had -- you 
know, but yeah, I guess I'd read some of 
Q. So part of your responsibility -- well, in 
your respons ities as sa y manager, you were --
MR. RAMSDEN: Safety 
19 MR. ROSSMAN: Safety foreman. Excuse me. 






Q. (Cont .) -- you were aware there 
was a history of rockbursts at Lucky Friday silver 
mine, correct? 
A. There was a history of rockbursts at the 
Lucky day when we mined the Lucky Fridays When 





















ts were fai uncommon 
Gold Hunter ve ? 
And at the 5900 level, there was a drift 
















A. It came off the 
and 's a -long 
ar extended through the Lucky 
station you go to your 
to Gold 
Hunter. So part of was -- might been the Lucky 
Friday, I guess, original Lucky y workings and 
18 then you got back to the new workings in the back end. 
19 Q. Okay. Were you respons at all for 










Gold Hunter or Lucky 
No. 




Q. Did management communicate the results of 







we my i an 
event was to 1 MSHA. And then would show up 
and I would deal MSHA. I we 
you know, always hear what what millimeter 
was or -- or, you know, where t and f like 
Q. Was there typically any communication by 






I'm aware of. 
ever well, 're aware 







' +-mo ni ~or 
portions of , correct? 
s. 
Were you respons at all for stress 
? 
No. 
Were you aware of the results of any stress 
? 















Q. Do you ever see any stress ing data or 
24 reports? 
25 A. Not that I remember. 










A. Not that I can recollect. 
Q. Do you recall them s sa 
data or rts to on loyees? 
A. I wouldn't be aware of that. 
Q. Are you aware there was closure ing 
going on at certain port of the mine? 
A. 
k --
I had seen it in certain stopes where they I 
, one of them I r them do some 







Q. Do you have any re 
monitoring? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever see any 
closure monitoring? 
A. I may have, but I don't 










Q. Was it a typical practice for you to be 
or rts closure 
No. A. 
Q. To your knowledge were union ernp 
or as a matter of practice provided 



















if snot a note, no. 
Let's look at 19 
(Complying.) 
Do you recognize those documents? 
Yeah. sis what we would put out 




Is this an agenda for safety meet 
Yeah. 




14 to be an agenda a s meet for a meeting 
















Q. This one's from Jeff Hunter. Do know why 
he sent it out of you? 
A. No. I don't know why he -- we re 
responsibilities. After Steve f Jeff came in. Or 
no. After Steve left, I guy come He 
was there about a year. And Jeff Hunter came into 
the safety department. So we share dut s. Whoever 
did it first did it. 
Q. What was Jeff's job t in December 2011? 










Were you ent at meeting on 











I don't know. I don't know if I was or not. 
re was a or rockburst in the --
affected the 5900 drift pillar on November 16, 2011. 





Do you recall a sa 
rockburst? 
y meeting being 
No. I -- I mean, there must have been 
16 cause it's right there. But I don't -- we were 
17 pretty busy at that time, so I don't really remember. 
18 Q. Was still the practice of safety 
19 department to take detailed notes at every one of these 






And they were handwr ten µotes that were 






Did you ever see minutes or notes from this 
0 













You 1 t recall 
Sure. 
Where se minutes or notes be 
They would on server. 
And when those meeting minutes were 
9 developed, they would be posted on a billboard 
10 somewhere? 
11 A. Correct. 
12 Q. Where would that bulletin board be? 
13 A. In the main hallway of the mine. 
14 Q. So all miners, all employees would have 






Q. Do you recall at a safety committee meeting 
in December of 2011 that re was rehabil ation 
19 efforts being made at the 5900 pillar? 
A. 20 Would you repeat that, please. 





ef s made at 5900 pillar De r of 
'11? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. You were aware of that? 









Q. And do recall at 
certain representat 
were involved in that 
express concerns? 
r 8 201 , 
s of rs or ners 
1 ation project 
A. No, 
re or not. 
I don't. I can't even remember if I was 
10 Q. Do you reca any miners ever sing 
11 concerns what they were observing in the --








During repair? No, I not. 






A. Not to me rectly. Didn't talk to me. 
Q. Do you recall Bruce Baraby raising concerns 
to someone e that you aware of? 
A. If he did, I -- I don't know about it. Most 
21 those guys wouldn't come to me. They would go to maybe 
22 mine foreman or mine super , something like 
23 that. They ... 
24 Q. Do you remember having any discussions where 
25 concerns were ssed by k Vale o --






No. I -- I went down. took MSHA 
there. Several times would want to come s it. 
And we wou talk with miners. And I do not 
remember a time in king the miners as they were 
8 working, you know, repa ing that area that there was 





there to find f out. And we did not get 
anything like that, any of comments or concerns. 
Q. 
A. 
You say MSHA. Who's MSHA? 
The one I can remember s Scott 
14 Amos. 
15 Q. many s do you recall going the 
16 5900 1 with Scott Amos a r the November 
17 rockburst? 
18 A. I can remember the one -- well, when he 
19 showed up the first time and we went down, I remember 






ing in they were were advanc towa 
the area that had blown up. 
Q. Okay. Do you know work had been done at 
that point in time? 
A. were - / they started at the 
















like t. s when 
1 t arr ? 
MR. RAMSDEN: Be sure and let him finish his 
question you start your answer. 
MR. ROSSMAN: 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. they alled any s or Dywidags by 









A. Ye were -- they were all split 






Q. When you say the back, what are you 
re rring to? 
A. Ceiling, roof. 
MR. ROSSMAN: Let's lout an re. 
22 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 32 was 
23 marked for identification.) 
24 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
25 Q. Show you Exhibit 32. to be a map of 














took Mr. Amos down 
was not yet, correct? 
A. No. I did not go unde 
showed up. 
your test is 
o the llar 
on the day the 
9 Q. But you said when you arrived with Mr. Amos 
10 on part ar occasion that you recall they had 
11 done some work at the back of the pillar. What are you 








MR. RAMSDEN: Object. It mischaracterizes 
testimony. Go ahead and answer. 
THE WITNESS: So in the back. So we started 
somewhere in here. (Indicating.) 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
19 Q. Okay. 
20 A. And they were working towards the area that 
21 had damag So they were somewhere i s area 
22 (indicating) prior they'd hadn't reached the area 
23 that had -- they had not reached the llar yet. 
24 But when the rockburst occurred, had done some 
25 damage to the -- to the rock strata, I guess, from the 















blown up I on - at or 
night ft, T bel I ..L 
shift. And cons le 
8 damage to the drift. And I called -- when I was 
9 notified I led MSHA. And they shut that section 
10 down. They put a (j) order on it and dispatched one of 











They came over. And we went down and looked 
at He immediate -- well, then modi ed to a 
( k) order. And then that's when the upper management 
would -- we would work MSHA to se a p to 
rehab the area and bring back r. 
Q. Were you involved at all lopment of 
the rehab plan? 
A. Not that I remember, no. 
Q. Were you involved at all in any meetings or 
discussions t development of the 
22 plan? 
23 A. I could have been. That was quite sometime 
24 ago and I don't ... 
25 Q. I'm just aski if recall. 














llar to observe damage? 
A. Not that I recal . I 
ss I did, just to down 
d. I would 
see. Yes. I would 
think I did, just because 
that 
was a y l event 
Q. Okay. When they arrived did you go down in 









l who showed up from MSHA? 
was Scott Amos. 
Was there anyone else? 
No. 
16 Q. Do you recall any discussion with Scott Amos 





Not anything that jumps out at me. 
Okay. So if we look back at Exhib 18, 






To Prevent From Investigat 
Was there an incident 
burst? 
stigation a er the November 
A. 
Q. 
That's what this is right here. 
So that's what the third page is? 









Q. I'm going to hand you Exhibit No. 33. Do you 
8 recognize those documents? 
Yes, I do. 9 
10 
A. 
Q. Those appear to be the original 103(j) order 







Did you have 
15 modifications? 
No. 




Q. Did you have any involvement in carrying out 




If you look at the 8605614-04, whi is about 20 






25 the 103(k) 
I am. 
Do you recall reviewing 
? 
www.mrncourt.com HOGAMIER, SCOTT 











Q. Loo thi s December 
signed by Rodney Gust. Do know who that 
A. I do. 
Q. Did you have any dealings with Rodney 
time period? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What dealings did you have with Rodney? 
A. Rod was there -- Rod showed up for a 



















Do you recall ing involved that? 
I may have been. 
Do you recall being involved in that? 
Nope. 
Okay. This particular modification, the 
20 second paragraph says, "Three of the six stress gauges 
21 have alled where the rock st had occurred. 
22 At least three additional stress gauges are on order 
23 and will be installed as soon as they are received." 
24 Do you recall reading that portion of the modification? 
25 A. I would have, s. 
www.mmcourt.com HOGAMI 4/7/201 
Citation/Order U.S. De10artmsnt of Labor 
Yr 2. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
0225 
5. Operator 
General rm:igr. HECLA LIM1TED 
3. Cltatlon/ 
Order Numbet 
6. Mine 7. Mine ID 10 8 
LUCKY FRIDAY -0008 (Contractor) 
8. Condition or Pmctfca S;l, Wrttlan NoUca (10:ig) l 
At 02:25 p.s.t. the mine safety representative contacted MSHA to inform them 
that a fall of ground had occurred in two separate travelways of the mine. A 
verbal 103(j) order was issued by MSHA Boise f/o supervisor to the mine to 
withdraw miners from the affected areas. 
The affected areas of the mine are hereby withdrawn from service to include 
the 5700 intersection on the #54 ramp from the spray chamber cut out to down 
ramp of the affected area {at the old day box cut out). This order also 
includes the 5900 main haulage which experienced substantial roof fall. The 
5900 main haulage is ordered out of service from the intersection of the 
lateral on the 5900 level to 30 feet before the chevron which is currently 
taped off, 
9. Violation A. Health LJ 8. Section 
SafatyQ of Act 
Otherlj 
s«:non lHnspectors Evafuauon 
10. Gravity: 
A Injury or Inness (has) (!~}: No Likelihocx:l O 
C. Part1Section of 
Tltle30CFR 
Unlikely. 0 Reasonably Likely C::J 
B. lnJuty or il\nae5 could rea-
sonabl be expected to be: No Lost Workdays [J Lost Wo!l'\days Or Restricted Duty 
C. Significant and Substantial: Yes 
H.'r-Jegilgenoo {checfone) . C. Moderate 
12. TypeofAdlon 103j 
see conunuaiion Form (MSHA Form 7000-311) 
Highry Likely 0 Occurred[] 
Permanently Disabling Fatal 0 
O. Number of PerGOnsAffectad: 
Safeguard 
i4. lnil!al Action E:. Cltetlon/ F. Oatlld Mo Da Yr 
A. Citation c: B. Order .·1 C. Safeguard O !J. Wrtlten Notice O Order Numbar 
15.AraaorEquipment The 54 ramp from the intersection of the 5700 at the spray 
chamber tank cut out to the day box cut out near the fall of ground on the 
down ramp side. Also included is the 5900 main haulage to 100 feet from 
16. TerminaUon Due 
A.Data 
Mo Oa Yr 
B. Time {24 Hr. Clock} 
Sectr0n 111-Termlnatlan Acoon 
17. Action lo Te11n!nate-
18. Terminated A. Date Mo da Yr 
B. Time (24 Hr. Clock 
Sedlon IY-AUtomatefJ System Oala 
20. eventNumbe~ 1159234 ~~ .. 
19. Type cf Inspection 
(aciMty code) E08 




23. AR Number 4496 
• ~HA Form 7000-3, Apr oa (revised)· In acairtlanoa wi!h ttis proYialons of ttia Small BUS!nasa Regulatoiy Enforcement Fairness AttJ. c:if 19!18, tha Smalt 8uslne$S /1.dmlnlGl!ation ha$ 
'ablished a Natlona.l Small Business and Agrtwlturi;1 Regula\o,y Ombuda.rm,n and 10 Regklna! Fairness Boards!!! receive comm,mn; from small businesses about federal a~ 
i mment actions. The Ombud:iman annually evaluates anron::anenl acilvitles and rates eacn agency's rasporu;ll/eness to small business Ir yoo wish Ill comment on !he 
';l!fM!lll adlons of MSHA, \"lU may can 1,saS..REG.FAlfi (i..SBE!-7:l4-3247}, er wme !11e Omttudsman al Srnan 6u5lnes& Mmln!Strallon, omca cl tt'lll Nallonal Ombudeman, 409 :iro 
SW MC 2120, Washington, DC 20416. P~sa note, however, thstyovrrlghtfo me a comment 11,ith Iha Ombudsman la In addttJon!o anyo u mayhave, lnc!tml 
to contest cilatl0t1s ancl proposed penalties and obtain a hearing before Iha Federal Miner Saf81\f and Health Review Commission. 
~jAI\IJe~ 
4-7· IS Pf' 
125 of 1 
Continuation 
S!Ned 
John Jordan General mn 
6. Mine 
LUCKY FRJDAY 
SE!Cllort H...Jusffflca1fon for Adlon 









Order is issued to ensure the safety of any person in the mine until an 
examination or investigation is made to determine that the affected areas are 
safe. Only those 
persons selected from company officials, state officials, the minerst 
representative and other persons who are deemed by MSHA to have information 
relevant to the investigation may enter or remain in the affected area. 
Canttnuatlon of Ht Area or Equipment 
the intersection of the 5900 main haulage and lateral and the south side of 
the fall of ground to approximately 30 feet before the chevron. 
Sedlon 111--Subsequent.;.;A;;clio;;' n;;;,T;;;;.llk:,;,;;en:;:;..,. ___________ ,,,_ ...... ....,_,,,.,,...,.. ________________ ,,,_..,... __ 
ate 
Mo Oa Yr 
9. Type oflnspectlon E08 
). · Signature 
·J,.;Qtt G, Am.Qs 
MSHA Form 7000,Sa,. 





C. Vacatad \ .. i D. Terminated __ , E:. Modilie<l 
Mo Oa Yr 
11/16/2011 





John Jordan General mn 
6. Mine 
LUCKY FRlDAY 
Sec!lon 11-JuatiftcaUon for Aelion 
Change 
12. Type of Actloni 
From 
I03j 
U.S. Department of Labor 
Mlne Safety and Heaith Admlnlsiration 
5. Oparatcr 
HECLA 





Reason MSHA has determined the mine operator can institute minimal repairs. 
This action is to modify the.issued 103(j) order to a 103{k} order, 
This action is to modify the order to allow only those miners necessary to 
complete repair work to operate inside the affected area addressed by this 
action. 
Based upon the mine operator's written plan of operation, this order is 
hereby modified to allow miners to conduct work including roof bolting, 
scaling, and removal of pipe to assess damage and clear the way for repairs. 
It allows limited mucking only to build bolting pads from which to conduct 
initial assessments of the damage up to the brow. It is based upon miners 
will work only under supported ground and will not begin mucking operations 
until all repairs up to the brow have been conducted and a representative of 
MSHA has reviewed the activities to ensure mucking can continue safely. 
L11is action does not include any work being done at the 54 ramp. This action 
based upon the mine 1 s stated goals of repairing damage at the 5900 haulage 
to ensure-· needecf ui:ilit .. are- aviifiable-· b-efo:Ce condcicthig·-iepa .. wo:i::k at- 'the 
54 ramp. 
a. Extended To A. Date Mo Da Yr 
Seclkm lV-ln5pecuon Data 
9. Type of Inspection 
Signature 
... ottG. Amos 




I 12_ Date 
I~} C. Vacated [J D. Terminated @ E.Modlfied 
Mo Oa Yr i 3. Time (24 Hr. Cloe.\} 
Continuation 
Served To 
John Jordan. General mn 
6. Mine 
LUCKY FRIDAY 
Sedlon 11-JustlficalJQn for Actfoa 
2. Dated Mo Oa 
(Ofl91nal Issue} 
U.S,DepartrnentofLabor 





Based upon bolting and scaling work conducted by the mine near the 
groundfall 1 and the report by miners that the 12 feet long roof bolts are 
going into solid ground, and a written plan of action submitted by the 
operator to MSHA addressing work to be done, this order is hereby modified. 
This modification allows the operator to follow the plan submitted to scale, 
bolt and repair through the fall of ground at the 5900 haulage way. Only 
persons necessary to complete work in area are allowed to enter the affected 
zone previously established. 
Based upon the written plan submitted to MSHA, this order is also hereby 
modified to allow repairs to be conducted at the 5700 sublevel of the 54 
· ramp. Provided only those miners necessary to complete work travel in the 
affected area. 
The mine operator has established a set bolting, moiling, and scaling plan 
which involves the installation of wire mesh and a minimum of 3 inches of 
f.ibermesh style shotcrete. 
Section l!l-SubseQuent Adion Tak.en 
8. Eldended To A Oats Mo Oa Yr B. 11me (24 Hr, Clock} 
Section IV-lnspeci.'on Oa.ta. 





C. Vacaled ::.1 D. Tenntnated @ E. Modlfied 
12. Date Mo Da Yr 13. lime (24 Hr. Clock} 
ll/17/2011 0922 




5. Operator 4. Served To 
John Jorda HECLA LlMlTED 
6.~ine 7. Mine ID 
LUCKY FIUDA Y 
This 103 {k). order is fiereby modified to allow 
required holes and install 3 stress gauges in 
the rock burst occurred on November 16, 2011. 
stress gauges are on order to install in this 
10-00088 
(Contractor) 
the mine operatoc to drill the 
the 5900 main haulage where 
At least three additional 
location as well. 
The mine operator has rehab bolted the bursted area by following the Lucky 
Friday Mine, 5900 drift pillar rockburst repair plan. The area has been 
bolted with 20 foot cable bolts, 12 foot dywidags, 8 foot dywidags, and 4 & 6 
foot friction bolts. The bolts secured wire mesh and then it was all coated 
with 3 inches of shotcrete. 
At this time, the installation of the stress gauges is the only work that can 
be conducted in the 5900 main haulage burst area. All the areas under the 
original order will continue to be barricaded and remain under the order. 
Sacllon m-Sub~equent Acllon Taken 
B. Extended To A. Date Mo oa Yr 8. Tlme (24 Hr. Clock) 
Seci!on IV-lnip:ecUon Oab, 
9. Type of lnspecllol\ E08 
. 1 i . Signature 
. Rodne D. Gust 
MSHA Form 7000..:'la, Mar 85 (revl5od) 




See Conllnua!lon fllITTI '"'>: 
· 0 C. Vacated LJ D. Terminated ~ E. Modified 
Mo Oa Yr 
11/30/2011 
13. Time {24 Hr. Glock) 
1720 
U.S. Degjartment of Labor 
and Health Administration 
4. Served To 5. Operator 
John Jordan, General mn, HECLA LlMlTED 
6. Mine 
LUCKY FRIDAY 
7. Mine tD 
10~00088 
(Contractor) 
Secllon 11-JusUflcallon lot Action 
This 103(kl order is hereby modified to allow the mine operator to reinstall 
the utilities though the 5900 main drift where the rock burst had occurred. 
Three of the six stress gauges have been installed where the rock burst had 
occurred. At least three additional stress gauges are on order and will be 
installed as soon as they are received. Management has been monitoring these 
gauges on a shift to shift basis, until NIOSH completes the build on the data 
collector. The data collector with take readings every two hours and the 
data and that data will be reviewed weekly, unless the current data dictates 
the readings should be evaluated on a shorter or longer basis. 
At this time, the only work that can be conducted in the 5900 main haulage 
burst area is to re-establish the utilities through this area. All the 
areas under the original order will continue to be barricaded and remain 
under the order 
Soctlon m-Sub•equenl Aciion Taken 
a. Extended To Mo Da Yr 
A Date a. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
Section IV-!nspe<:tlon Oa1a 
9. Type of Inspection E08 
11. Signature 
Rodne D. Gust 
MSHA Form 7000.3a, Mar 85 (revlscd) 




12. Date Mc Oa Yr 
l2/02i201 ! 
see Continualicn Form 
0. Terminated v E. Modified 














This modification is to allow limited travel through the affected area of 
he5900 main haulage and of the 54 ramp at the 5700 level. 
This modification is based upon no movement of the affected area has 
occurred since monitoring began (about four days) after shotcrete and 
bolting following the mine's level three bolting plan were followed. Stress 
monitors indicate the area is destressed as compared to other active areas of 
the mine. 
This action is to allow very limited activities utilizing the 5900 main 
haulage based upon the temporary repairs already conducted by the mine until 
the engineered culvert arrives and more permanent repairs are made. 
Upon arrival of the culvert from the manufacturer, the mine will stop work to 
install the culvert and only those miners working on the culvert will travel 
the affected area. 
~his modification is based upon the mine will conduct two daily surveys at 
,e start and end of the 1st shi to determine whether movement is occuri.ng 
ctt the survey stations of the 5900 main haulage near the chevron. 
This modification is based upon no foot travel will occur in the affected 
area and that each mobile equipment operator will conduct a visual inspection 
of the affected area before travel occurs. 
This modification is based upon the mine has developed a written plan to 
address any cracking or closure of the main haulage, and that the mine will 
stop travel in the affected area should detectable movement, distortion, 
cracking or damage occur. 
This modification is to allow further repair work at the 5700 level of the 54 
ramp to include the installation of utilities through the affected area and 
to allow miners to conduct timber repairs at the 5700 level of the 54 ramp. 
This modification is to allow backfilling of parts of the 5700 level 





. 9. Typ,s cflnapsction E08 110. ::1/sni Numbsr l l 59234 
. _J, ___ ..._,,. ____ ~-----
.· ·. Signature !AR Numbiir / 12. Datil Mo Oa ~ 13. Time (24 Hr. Cloe!~) 




John Jordan General mn 
6.Mine 
LUCKY FRIDAY 
U.S. Department of Labor 
Mine Safety and Heaith Administration 
Mo Oa Yr 3, Cltatlon/ 
1/16/2011 Order Number 
10-00088 
{Contractor) 
intersection at the 54 ramp as to provide strain relief and to prevent miners 
from going into areas unnecessary to their daily work. 
Any significant changes will be reported to MSHA to include additional 
stressing, closure, cracking or squeeze and deformity. 
This modification allows approximately 3 trucks per shift to make 10 rounds 
each per shift.. It allows mechanics/electricians to travel through the area 
if required to repair equipment. It allows only miners necessary to conduct 
normal mining activities to travel through the area. 
Seciklll lV-!nB;llldion Data 




MSHA FOl!TI 7DOO-Sa. Mer 85 {revised} 
Yr 





:J C. Vacated LJ D. Termlnated t;2J E. Moclllied 
Mo O;i. Yr 
12/06/20) 1 






Section ll-Justiocalion ror Adion 
2. Dated Ma Da 
(Original Issue} 
U.S. Department of Labor 




I HECLA LlMlTED 
7. Mine ID 
10-00088 
(Contractor} 
Order #8605614 is terminated. Conditions that contributed to the accident 
(rock burst) have been corrected artd norm.al mining operations can resume. 
SecUQn Ill-Subsequent Action Taken 




Section JV-lnspeclion Data 
9. Type of Inspection EO 1 
l ···.signalllre 
;,rimes E. Stembrid e 
MSHA Form 70.00-3a, Mar S5 (revised) 
Yr B. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 




See conUnuaUon Form 
1 C. Vaca!ed i.V 0.. Terminated E.Modified 
Ma Da Yr 
06/12/20!3 







Wilson Blake, Consultant 
Stabili 5900 Drift Pillar 
rvfodeling of the 5900 drift pillar was conducted in 2004 prior to selecting the dimensions 
for final pillar implementation. 111ese results indicated that a 50 ft pillar would be stable 
with a 1.5 factor of safety. The limitations of this modeling were recognized, mid as a 
result, the stability of the 55 ft circular p[llar surrounding the 5900 level access through 
the orebody has always been of some concern. Therefore, this pillar was instrumented in 
rnicl-2005 to determine stresses in the pillar back and ribs, ns well as closure across and 
along this pillar. Instrumentation readings have continued, with the last l'eadings taken 
08/ 18/20 l l. The stress data basically shows that the stress increased in the pillar rapidly 
after the pillar was formed, but as mining continued the rate of increase decreased, and 
since 20 l O the stress has dropped in the pillar except for a continuing slight increase on 
the east side. The stress gages also responded to bursting in the pillar, the lasl burst 
occurring in 12/09. \Vhile it was clear that nearby mining was no longer stressing the 
pillar, it was known that the pillar was still being loaded by stope closure as a result of 
continued mining in the Gold Hunter. 
Drift closure across and along the 5900 pillar was gradual until the 12/09 burst, and since 
has slowly but steadily increased to the 1.3 inch range. 
Both the stress ,md closure values agreed well with the computer model simulations of 
ffiining from the 5900 level in the Gold Hunter. ltasca concluded that the 5900 pillar was 
stable and too big to fail suddenly and violently, behaving more like a stabilizing pillar. 
This conclusion appeared to be confirmed by the observations al! along the 5900 pillar 
itselt', as well as from inspection of the E and W observation boreholes ddllecl through the 
pillar. While there was apparent stress deterioration at the back edge along the west end 
of the pillar, as well as very minor stress effects around the 5900 drifl, the 5900 pillar was 
basically intact, and its appearance had not basically changed since mining began. 
Two of the three bursts that were located along the back edges of the pillar did nut cause 
observable damage, but the last burst, 1.9 magnitude on l 2/09/10, did minor damage to 
the 5900 level drift along the pillar, as well as the to some sections of the back and left rib 
of the chevl'on dri f\:, just south of the 5900 pillar. This damage consisted of minor 
spalling and shakedown which was nil contained by the instEl!Jed ground support. No 
rehabilitation was required. 
The ground support consisted of a combination of Dywiclag bolts and split sets with chain 
I was bolts in the back of the 5900 
The occurrence of the 2.8 (USGS) magnitude burst in the 5900 pillar during blasting on 
11/16/11, and its resulting extensive and widespread damage, was very much unexpected. 
I made an initial visit to the 5900 pillar on 11/16, and a subsequent visit on l l/23. This 
brief report presents my observations and thoughts regarding the cause of the 5900 pillar 
burst, as well as the present stability of the 5900 pillar. 
Mechanism of 5900 Pillar 2.8 (USGS Magnitude) Rockburst 
At O 1 :07 :26, a 2.8 magnitude rockburst occurred as the last hole of the round from the 
overlying 5500 level underhand stope was blasted. The burst magnitude was determined 
by the USGS national earthquake center, however, on the nearby Montana Tech seismic 
sensors, the burst appeared to be larger, in the 3.0 range. While the damage from this 
burst blocked off the 5900 access drift, there was also extensive damage to the footwall 
access ramp system atl the way up to the 5550 level, but particularly to some of the 5750 
and 5700 sublevel openings. Such widespread damage is not characteristic of a simple 
pillar bmst. · 
The numerical model results did indicate that small b1.1rsts around the edges of the pillar 
could be expected w.ith magnitudes up to 2.0. We did have such bursting, with the lagest 
a magnitude 1.9. The model results also indicated that the only way the pillar could foil 
was if the height to width ratio changed and the pillar lost confinement, in which case a 
foundation failure might occur. The model assumed a 10: 1 width to height ratio. The 
foundation failure would occur out in the walls, rather than in the core of the pillar. And 
further, the model results did not include any geologic structmes intersecting the pillar. 
With the observed stress deterioration along the inner and outer edges of the pillar, likely 
in the IO ft range, the wiclth:height ratio of the in place doughnut shaped pillar is actually 
3 .5, assuming a 10 ft. vein thickness. 
The in situ stress in the 5900 pillar area before mining was some 1.2 psi/ ft of depth for 
the vertical stress, and I .5 times this value for the horizontal stress. The actual .vertical 
distance to surface above the Gold Hunter is in the 7000 ft range, hence the vertical stress 
would be 8400 psi, and the maximum horizontal stress, N40°W direction, is 12,600 psi. 
From the stress gages we know that the stress increase in the pillar from mining off of the 
5900 level, taking into account the ore and waste rock modulus values, was also some 
12,600 psi. Hence, the stress in the pillar was very near the unconfined compressive 
strength of the pillar, and any further loss of confinement could lead to a pillar failure. 
It was initially presumed that the 2.8 rockburst in the 5900 pillar would represent a 
classic pillar since calculations of the energy the piliar, if released 
instantaneously, could generate a burst of this magnitude. However, with a classic pillar 
2 
It is concluded that the most likely mechanism of failure of the 5900 pillar was a 
foundation failure. These type failures occur when the pillar rock is much stronger than 
the wall rocks, as is the case for Gold Hunter. Shear failures in the wall rocks take place 
going out from the edges of the piilar. The Itasca modeling concluded that this failure 
mechanism could occur in the 5900 pillar, as well as the diminishing 5500-5700 sill 
pillar. Favorably oriented structure through the pillar would further reduce the strength 
of either pillar 
A 3.8 magnitude sill pillar burst at the Macassa Mine in 1996 was determined to be a 
foundation failure. There was major damage out in the footwall, and only minor 
observable damage along the pillar or out in the hanging wall. In this case the pillar was 
some 200 ft long by some 80 ft high. There was over 2 inches of closure measured 
across the overcut immediately above the sill pillar. 
Our 2.8 burst did major damage to the pillar, as well as major damage along some 
openings up and to the east along the footwall. The majority of the energy released, as 
well as the resulting damage, was due to instantaneous wall closure over the entire mined 
out area around the pillar, not from the release of all the stored strain energy in the pillar. 
For this reason the 5900 pillar is still somewhat intact and partially loaded. The closure 
process is continuing to load this pillar, thus, there is the possibility of small strain bursts 
still occurring in this pillar. 
We need to measure the closure induced by this burst along the 5900 level dl'ift. If none 
of the existing closure points survived, then we can resurvey existing spads in the back 
along the main drift to determine their displacements as a result of the burst. It is likely 
that several inches of closure across the vein resulted from this burst. 
Stability of 5900 Pillar 
It is apparent that the 2.8 burst in the 5900 pillar did not completely destress this pillar. 
Hence, it is possible that further small bursts could occur in this pillar as it continues to 
be loaded by ongoing wall closure from continued mining off of the 5900 level. It is also 
apparent that the remaining intact pillar has been significantly reduced in hence, the 
amount of stored strain energy now in the pillar has also been significantly reduced. To 
deal with any future bursts, ground support is being installed in and along the 5900 pillar 
to contain the effects of any further bursting. 
In ,tddition to the combination of longer Dywidag bolts, split sets, chain link mesh and 
cable bolts, the back and ribs will be sprayed with 2+ inches of shotcrete. The addition of 
tiie shotcrete adds 2 more kJ/m2 to the 9.3 kJ/m2 to result in a total dynamic supp01t 
resistance of some l l J kJ/m2, which will contain the effects of a magnitude burst at a 
distance of 7 m. Further, after the present rehabilitation is completed, it is planned to 
5900 pillar is I recommend that a 
thxough this pillar be constructed as a longterm solution. 
Summary 
The 5900 Pillar burst, of 2.8 USGS Richter magnitude, was most likely a foundation 
failure since this pillar was not completely destroyed. Deterioration and a few small 
bursts around the edges of this pillar resulted in reducing the pillar confinement, and 
hence, its strength. It is not known whether any geologic structure through the pillar 
contribi1ted to the occunence of this burst. 
The large amount of energy released by this burst, as well as the resulting damage, was 
due to the instantaneous wall closure over the entire mined out area surrounding the 5900 
pillar. Wall closnre will continue to load the remaining 5900 pillar as mining continues 
in the underhand stopes cutTently being mined below, 
The ground suppoii installed during rehabilitation of the 5900 pillar will contain the 
damage from any fuither small bursts that might be induced by continuing closure. 
Installing some type of tunnel sets through this pillar, and isolating them from the pillar 
by something like TechF oam, will insure the long term stability of the access through this 
pillar. While I would conclude that the occurrence of another large 2.8 magnitude burst 
in this pillar is very unlikely, it cannot be totally eliminated. 
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EXHIBITE 
OF IDAHO, 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI, TO-WIT: 
I, Wilson Blake, being duly sworn to an oath, state as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 18 and hereby state that the following is true information and 
known to me first-hand. If called to testify in a proceeding before an Administrative 
Law Judge of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, I would state 
the same. 
2. I obtained a BA in Geology from the University of California, Berkeley, an MS in 
Engineering Science from the University of California, Berkeley, and a PhD in 
Mining Engineering from the Colorado School of Mines. 
3. I have 48 years of professional experience in mining engineering and geology. From 
1965 through 1972, I was employed as a Supervisory Research Civil Engineer by the 
U.S. Bureau of Mines. From 1972 through 1974, I was employed as the Director of 
Mining Research at Gecamines in Lubumbashi, Zaire. 
4. I am currently a Consultant to numerous mining, consulting engineering, and research 
organizations worldwide regarding rock mechanics, mining engineering, monitoring, 
rockburst control, and the design and stability of underground and surface 
excavations. I have been a Mining Consultant since 1974 and have over 80 
publications dealing with rock mechanics and rock burst problems. 
5. I am qualified as an expert by virtue of my knowledge, skill, expertise, training, and 
education regarding the issues addressed in this Affidavit. 
6. I have been a rock mechanics consultant for the Lucky Friday Mine for 
approximately 39 years. 
7. On April 5, 2010, I provided a review to the Lucky Friday Mine of an Itasca 
Technical Memorandum (dated March 22, 2010) and a Draft Report from Itasca 
( dated March 22,2010). This memorandum is hereinafter referred to as the "April 5 
Blake Memo." Itasca Consulting Group was providing consulting services to the 
Lucky Friday Mine to assess the present behavior and stability of the 5900 I-Drift 
pillar. 
{D0875442.l} 1 
-~·~ ...... ~ to gather stress and closure data to 
5 900 I-Drift pillar for purposes of ongoing evaluation and that modeling of the pillar 
be undertaken. However, at that time, I did not expect the 5900 I-Drift pillar to fail 
as soon as 201 L 
9. I visited the Lucky Friday Mine in November and December 2011 to determine the 
cause of the November and December 2011 rock bursts as well as to evaluate 
conditions and provide recommendations regarding the bypass drift for the 5900 
footwall access and ground support for the footwail ramps and future development. 
10. On November 16, 2011, I visited the Gold Hunter to observe conditions after the 2.8 
Richter magnitude rockburst that occurred during blasting. This burst caused damage 
to the 5900 I-Drift pillar, blocked off the main 5900 level drift, and caused damage to 
openings up to the 5500 level. I did not observe any other areas of the mine on this 
visit. 
11. I prepared a memorandum for Lucky Friday Mine management regarding the 
November 16 mine visit, dated November 18, 2011 (the ''November 18, 2011, Blake 
Report"), in which I stated that a better nnderstanding of the cause of the burst was 
necessary in order to relate it to mining the main sill. I was advising mine 
man4igement that a better understanding of the cause of the burst would be helpful in 
modeling the future mining of the main sill pillar to determine whether the previous 
modeling was still accurate as to the long-term mining of the pillar. This statement 
was not an advisory directed at the short-term future mining of the sill pillar. 
MSHA's reliance on this statement to allege that the mine was warned not to mine 
Stopes 11 and 14 is misplaced. 
12. MSHA refers to "previous rock bursts and ground fall conditions [which] had 
occurred along the same affected area near the chevron at the 5900 main haulage" in 
Citation No. 8605620. There were three prior seismic events located along the back 
edges of the 5900 I-Drift pillar prior to November 2011. Two of the three events did 
not cause any observable damage to the pillar. The last burst did minor damage to 
the 5900 level drift along the pillar and to some sections of the back and left rib of 
the chevron drift, just south of the 5900 pillar. The damage consisted of minor 
spalling and shakedown ofloose material, all of which was contained by the existing 
installed ground support and no rehabilitation of the ground support was required. 
13. Following my limited inspection on November 16, 2011, I believed that the burst was 
located in the 5900 pillar and that it was a pillar burst resulting from a foundation 
failure. This conclusion was noted in the November 25, 2011, memorandum 
{D0875442.1} 
of 1 
mid-December 1, I toured the eastern footwall ramp development along with 
Lucky Friday engineers and a geologist, MSHA personnel, and others. After 
observing the footwall openings, it was clear that the November 16 rockburst was not 
a pillar burst in the 5900 pillar as I initially concluded, but rather the rockburst was 
caused by a fault slip event associated with closure of the mined-out zone off of the 
5900 level. The burst was measured at 2. 8 Richter, and its epicenter was between the 
5700 sublevel and the intersection of the 5700 slot access with the 5700 14 stope. 
15. Stope 14 was mined approximately 32 feet on both sides during December 6-14, 
2011. Cut #4 of Stope 14 was at the 5500 sublevel and was directly above the 5900 
I-Drift pillar, 348 feet from the nearest point of the 5900 I-Drift pillar. Mining in 
Stope 14 at the 5 500 sublevel did not transfer any stress to nor did it have any impact 
on the I-Drift pillar because of the stope's distance from the pillar. 
16. Stope 11 was mined approximately 96 feet on both sides during December 6-14, 
2011. Stope 11 was offset from the 5900 I-Drift pillar, was approximately 539 feet 
from the pillar, and the mining done in Stope 11 had no effect on the 5900 I-Drift 
pillar. 
AND FURTHER TIDS AFFIANT SAITH NOT . 
.,,Wilson Blake 
STATE OF IDAHO 









Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
1v1ichael E. Ramsden, ISB #2368 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STAIB OF IDAHO, IN AL'\ID FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
RONNEL E. BARRETT, an individual; 
GREGG HAMMERBERG, an individual; 
ERIC J. TESTER, an individual; and 
MATTHEW WILLIAMS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HECLA MINING COMPANY, a 
Delaware Corporation; JOHN JORDAN, 
an individual; DOUG BA YER, an 
individual; SCOTT HOGAMIER, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 13-8793 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The above defendants Hecla Mining Company, John Jordan, Doug Bayer, and Scott 
Hogamier, move for summa..."}' judgment on the plaL.7ltiffs' complaint. Tiris motion is made 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(b) and is supported by the memorandum filed with this motion and the 
declarations of Douglas C. Bayer and :rvfichael E. Ramsden. 
29th day of May, 2015. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR S~jf. 
etal U fd'i't 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of May, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Eric S. Rossman 
Rossman Law Group, PLLC 
717 N. r1 Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Michael R. Christian 
X US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (208) 342-2170 
X US Mail 
Marcus, Christian, Hardee & Davies, LLP __ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 737 N. 7th Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
~~~~ITnile(208)342-2170 
Michael E. Ramsden 
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Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael E. Ramsden, ISB #2368 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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1N Tiffi DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
Tiffi STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR Tiffi COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
RONNEL E. BARRETT, an individual; 
GREGG HAMMERBERG, an individual; 
ERIC J. TESTER, an individual; and 
MA TTIIBW WILLIAMS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HECLA M1N1NG COMP A_~, a 
Delaware Corporation; JOHN JORDAN, 
an individual; DOUG BA YER, an 
individual; SCOTT HOGAMIER, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 13-8793 
MEMORANDUM 1N SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The defendants have moved for summary judgment of dismissal of the plaintiffs' 
complaint. The motion is based on the exclusive remedy of the Worker's Compensation Law. 
This memorandum shows the court that the defense of the exclusive remedy under the 
Worker's Compensation Law bars this action. This memorandum also shows the court that the 
exclusive remedy rule of the Worker's Compensation Law bars t.lie plaintiffs' claim.s for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, defendants are entitled to summary 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
- 1 
wanton 
l. Hecla Mining Company through its subsidiary Hecla Limited ("Hecla") is 
engaged in the business of mining and owns and operates the Lucky Friday mine in the Silver 
Valley of Northern Idaho. 
2. The individual defendants, John Jordan ("Jordan"), Doug Bayer ("Bayer), and 
Scott Hogamier ("Hogamier") were employees of Hecla on December 14, 2011. Complaint, 
,r,r, 19-21, 74; Answer, ,r,rl9-21. 
3. On December 14, 2011, plaintiffs Ronnel Barrett ("Barrett"), Gregg 
Hammerberg ("Hammerberg"), Eric Tester ("Tester"), and Matthew Williams ("Williams") 
( collectively "plaintiffs") were employed by Hecla as miners in the Lucky Friday mine. 
Complaint, ,r 12; Answer, ,r 12. 
4. On November 16, 2011, a rockburst occurred at the 5900 level of the Lucky 
Friday mine. Dec. M Ramsden, Ex. A (Barrett's Answer to Interrogatory No. 9); Ex. B (Bayer 
depo, p.11, 11. 3-21). The rockburst occurred shortly after blasting at the 5500 level of the 
mine. Id. Ex. D (Jordan depo, Ex. 13). The 5900 drift was blocked as a result of the rockburst. 
Id. 
5. Hecla immediately notified MSHA of the rockburst. Id. Ex. C (Hogamier depo, 
p. 31; 11. 2-16.) On November 16, 2011, MSHA issued a verbal Section 103G) Order requiring 
Hecla to withdraw all miners from the area affected by the rockburst. Id. Ex. D (Jordan depo, 
Ex. 18); Ex. C (Hogamier depo, Ex. 33). 




to MSHA representatives. Id. Ex. D (Jordan depo, 18). 
7. The rehabilitation plan was to take place in two phases. The first phase included 
installing longer Dywidag bolts, split sets, chain link mesh, cable bolts, and spraying the back 
and ribs of the drift with two to three inches of shotcrete. The rehabilitation plan also included 
installing Geokon 4300NX stress gauges in the walls of the 5900 pillar to monitor stress levels. 
Id Ex. B (Bayer depo, Ex. 23); (Bayer depo, Ex. 28; p. 52; 11. 2-5). 1 The second phase of the 
rehabilitation plan included installing a steel tunnel liner in the drift at the area of the rockburst 
and filling the area between the tunnel liner and the walls of the drift with Tekfoam.2 
8. Hecla also engaged an independent professional consultant, Dr. Wilson Blake3 
("Blake"), to evaluate the cause of the rockburst, assess the present stability of the 5900 pillar, 
and to assist in designing a rehabilitation plan and developing safety protocol for the 
rehabilitation process. Id. Ex. B (Bayer depo, p.11, 11. 3-21); Ex. D (Jordan depo, Ex. 13). 
9. Blake inspected the 5900 pillar on November 16 and 23, 2005. Id. Ex. D (Jordan 
depo, Ex. 13). Blake also performed an engineering analysis of the rehabilitation plan. 
1 Hecla read and collected stress readings from the stress gauges twice a day from December 1, 
2011 to December 14, 2011. Dec. M Ramsden, Ex. B (Bayer depo, Ex. 28); 
2 Tekfoam is compressible concrete foam, capable of being sprayed. 
3Dr. Blake has a BA in Geology, an MS in Engineering Science and a PhD in mining engineering. 
Dec. M Ramsden, Ex E. (Aff. Wilson Blake). Dr. Blake has 48 years of professional experience 
in mining engineering and geology. He is a "consultant to numerous mining, consulting 
engineering, and research organizations worldwide regarding rock mechanics, mining engineering, 
monitoring, rockburst control, and the design and stability of underground and surface 
excavations." Dr. Blake has been a rock mechanics consultant for the Lucky Friday mine for 
approximately 39 years. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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1 l a 
5900 drift Id. Blake agreed that Heda's rehabilitation presented adequate safety 
measures for the miners conducting the repairs. Dec. lvi Ramsden, Ex. B (Bayer depo, p.11, 11. 
3-21; Ex. 15).4 
11. MSHA approved Hecla's rehabilitation plan. Id. Ex. C (Hogamier depo, Ex. 33). 
12. On December 1, 2011, Hecla completed the first phase of the rehabilitation plan, 
including installation of the stress gauges, and began taking daily readings and monitoring the 
stress gauges. Id., Ex. B (Bayer depo, Ex. 23-LF 5900 Rockburst Repair-November 29, 2011.).5 
6 
4 After the December 14, 2011 rockburst, which was considered a strain burst in the east wall of 
the 5 900 drift, Blake and another consultant Dr. Mark Board toured footwall openings of the 5 3 00-
5900 sill pillar above the 5900 drift pillar. Blake revised his opinion that the November 16, 2011 
rockburst was a pillar burst in the 5900 pillar; instead he concluded that it was a fault-slip event 
associated with closure of the mined out zone off of the 5300-5900 sill pillar above. The damage 
to the 5900 pillar now appeared to be the result of the seismic shockwave from that fault-slip event 
impacting the stressed back of the 5900 pillar. Dec. M Ramsden, Ex. E (Aff. Wilson Blake); Ex. 
B (Bayer depo. pp. 70-72). 
5 Hecla installed 12 foot Dywidags on the back of the drift in a 4 foot by 4 foot pattern, 20 foot 
cable bolts installed on a 6 foot by 6 foot pattern. Wire fencing was also installed with 4 foot and 
6 foot with split sets, the ribs of the drift were wired and bolted with 8 foot Dywidags on a 4 foot 
by 4 foot pattern, and 6 foot and 4 foot split sets. The entire area was then shotcreted to a depth 
of 2 to 3 inches. Dec. M Ramsden, Ex. B (Bayer depo. Ex. 23-LF 5900 Rockburst Repair-
November 29, 2011. 
6 The rehabilitation plan was approved by MSHA through a series of modifications to the Section 
103(k) Order. 
On November 17, 2011, after inspection of the fall area, MSHA modified the Section 
1030) Order to a Section 103(k) Order, " ... to allow miners to conduct work including roof 
bolting, scaling, and removal of pipe to assess damage and clear the way for repairs." Dec. M 
Ramsden, Ex. C (Hogamier depo, p. 31; 11. 2-16; 56, 10-25, 57, 1-5; Ex. 33). Hecla mir1ers 
inspected the fall area and completed initial repairs to secure the area. Id. (Hogamier depo, Ex. 
33). 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
2 11, sent to to 
operations. 7 Id. B (Bayer depo, 28; 103-108; 110; 121· 122). 
In support of the requested modification, Hecla submitted the monitoring data from the stress 
monitors. Id. Ex. B (Bayer depo, p.103-106).8 
14. On December 6, 2011, MSHA again modified the Section I03(k) Order 
allowing Hecla to resume mining production and operations at the Lucky Friday mine until the 
arrival of the tunnel liner. Id. Ex. C (Hogamier depo, Ex. 33). 
15. On December 6, 2011, Hecla resumed mining operations and production in the 
Lucky Friday mine. Dec. Bayer, p. 5. 
16. From December 6, 2011 until December 14, 2011, no rockbursts occurred. Id. 
17. Hecla complied with the directives of the Sections 103(j) and (k) Orders in place 
from November 16 until December 14, 2011. Id., p. 6. 
18. From November 16 until December 14, 2011, Hecla management, employees 
and independent consultants and MSHA representatives inspected and worked in the area of 
the November 16, 2011 rockburst without incident. Id., p. 5. 
19. The tunnel liner components arrived at the mine on December 12, 2011 and the 
On November 30, 2011, MSHA again modified the Section 103(k) Order to allow 
Hecla to install three stress gauges. Id. (Hogamier depo, Ex. 33). 
7 Notably, Hecla represented to MSHA that it did " ... not expect another rockburst." Dec. M 
Ramsden, Ex. B (Bayer depo, Ex. 28). 
8 On December 6, 2011, MSHAmodified the Section 103(k) Order allowing Hecla to allow limited 
travel through the affected area and allow further repair Dec. M Ramsden, C (Hogarnier, 
depo Ex. 33). 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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vs Mining 
underground. All production work in the mine had ceased at the 
December 1 2011. Id. 
next 
of evening shift on 
20. On the morning of December 14, 2011, Bayer and other Hecla employees were in 
the 5900 drift for approximately six hours installing the liner. Id; Dec. M Ramsden, Ex. B (Bayer 
depo, p. 61; 11. 14-20). During which time, Bayer conducted a workplace inspection, evaluated 
the shotcrete, listened to the ground and evaluated the morning readings from the stress gauges. 
" ... [T]here was nothing that indicated another rockburst was imminent.. .. " Id. 
21. On December 14, 2011, the plaintiffs were directed by Bayer to work on 
installation of the tunnel liner at the 5900 pillar as part of the rehabilitation plan. Dec. M 
Ramsden, Ex. A (Barrett's Answer to Interrogatory No. 9). 
22. Hecla representatives briefed plaintiffs and other miners on safety protocol and 
the installation process. Dec. Bayer, pp. 5, 6. Hecla also supplied plaintiffs and other miners 
with proper safety equipment for installing the tunnel liner. Id 
23. On the evening of December 14, 2011, plaintiffs began their shift at the Lucky 
Friday mine. Complaint, ,i 74. 
24. At approximately 7:40 prn on December 14, 2011, a rockburst occurred in the 
5900 drift where the plaintiffs were installing the tunnel liner. Id.; Dec. Bayer, p. 6. 
25. Prior to the December 14, 2011 rockburst, Hecla management had no reason to 





fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence an element 
essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 
trial." Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 806, 229 P.3d 1164, 1168 
(2010) (quoting Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 
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322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265,273 (1986))). 
Asbury Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 338, 342, 271 
P.3d 1194, 1198 (2012). 
If the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact then the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56(c). In determining whether there is a genuine issue 
of material fact the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable 
inferences, in favor of the non-moving party. If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of 
material fact, then only a question of law remains. Conner v. Hodges, 157 Idaho 19, 23, 333 
P.3d 130, 134 (2014). "Statutory interpretation is a question oflaw subject to free review." J 
& MCattle Co. v. Farmers Nat'!. Bank, 156 Idaho 690,692,330 P.3d 1048, 1050 (2014). On 
discretionary matters, "[a] district court does not abuse its discretion when it (1) correctly 
perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the 
correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason." 
Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903,914,332 P.3d 815, 826 (2014) (internal citations 
omitted). Golub v. Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC, 2015 WL 527849, 2 (Idaho 2015). 
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Fleming, 116 Idaho 523, 525, 777 P.2d 1196, 1198 (1989); Butters v. Valdez, 149 Idaho 764, 
770, 241 P.3d 13 (Ct.App.2010); Verbillis v. Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335, 
337, 689 P.2d 227, 229 (Ct.App. 1984). Summary judgments are to be decided on facts 
actually shown in the record. Lind v. Perkins, 107 Idaho 901, 903, 693 P.2d 1103, 1106 
(Ct.App. 1984). A court will not hypothecate facts to forestall a summary judgment. Eimco 
Div., Envirotech v. United Pacific, 109 Idaho 762, 764, 710 P.2d 672,674 (1985). Further, it 
is well settled that a mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is 
insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 
85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986). 
The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid useless trials. When there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw, a trial court is justified 
in denying a trial on the merits. McKinley v. Fanning, 100 Idaho 189, 194, 595 P.2d 1084, 
1089 (Idaho, 1979); Sandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 340, 563 P.2d 395 (1977). 
THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION, IDAHO CODE § 72-209(3). 
The complaint is based on the defendants' alleged willful and intentional conduct for 
each of plaintiffs' claims for relief. 9 For the reasons set forth in this memorandum, these claims 
are subject to the exclusive remedy of the Worker's Compensation Law. 
9 Complaint, Count One "Knowing, Iritentional, Vlillful and Wan.ton lrljuzy to Plaintiffs," 
,r,r 85 89; Complaint, Count Two- "Respondeat Superior Liability," «j[«j[ 90 - , Complaint, 
Count Three -Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, ,r,r 98 - 103. 
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1084, 1088 (2005). Furthermore, the legislature intended only provide relief for 
workers but also to protect industry by providing a limit on liability.' Meisner v. Potlatch 
Corp., 131 Idaho 258,262,954 P.2d 676,680 (1988)." Blake v. Starr, 146 Idaho 847, 851, 
203 P.3d 1246, 1250 (2009). Idaho Code 72-201 sets out the legislative purpose of the 
Worker's Compensation Law. 
The common law system governing the remedy of workmen against employers 
for injuries received and occupational diseases contracted in industrial and 
public work is inconsistent with modern industrial conditions. The welfare of 
the state depends upon its industries and even more upon the welfare of its 
wageworkers. The state of Idaho, therefore, exercising herein its police and 
sovereign power, declares that all phases of the premises are withdrawn from 
private controversy, and sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their 
families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and 
to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation, except as 
is otherwise provided in this act, and to that end all civil actions and civil causes 
of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state 
over such causes are hereby abolished, except as is in this law provided. 
Idaho Code § 72-209(3) provides for an exception to the exclusive liability of the 
employer in worker's compensation "in any case where the injury or death is proximately 
caused by the wilful or unprovoked physical aggression, of the employer, its officers, agents, 
servants or employees, the loss of such exemption applying only to the aggressor and shall not 
be imputable to the employer unless provoked or authorized by the employer, or the employer 
was a party thereto." 
The exclusive remedy also prohibits a civil claim against the plaintiffs' co-employees 
and officers, agents and servants of the employer. I.C. § 72-209. Thus, as shown in this 




The Idaho Supreme Court interpreted what constitutes "wilful or unprovoked 
physical aggression" under the Worker's Compensation law. The cases in-line with the facts 
presented in this case and the controlling authority in Idaho are Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 
755, 760 P.2d 1171 (1988) andDei\1oss v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 118 Idaho 176, 795 P.2d 875 
(1990). 
In Kearney, the Idaho Supreme Court held that negligence by the employer was 
insufficient to overcome the protection of the exclusive remedy. Kearney involved an injury 
to an employee in the course of her employment for a landscaping service. The lawnmower 
she was operating at the time of her injury was made up of a chassis and engine that had been 
acquired separately by the employer. Safety devices came with the chassis: a flywheel safety 
device, a grip that would shut the engine off when the operator's hands came off the 
handlebars, and a grass deflector that would have covered an opening at the rear of the 
lawnmower that would cover this opening when the lawnmower was being operated, came 
with the chassis. The employer did not install these safety devices on the lawnmower. Instead 
the employer prepared the mower so that a grass catcher could be attached that would cover 
the opening, but left it to the discretion of the operator whether to use the grass catcher. 
At the time the employee was injured, the grass catcher was not attached to the mower. 
The employer knew that operating the lawn mower was a hazardous job, because an employee 
might slip while operating it. Some of the lawn mowing was done on hillsides when the grass 
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vv.l'vc"l'-' an employee from recovering damages in a civil action against an employer for injury 
caused to an employee by an intentional tort of the employer while the employee is in the 
course of employment. The employee also asserted that this rule should be extended to include 
negligent acts committed by the employer where there is a substantial certainty that injury to 
the employee will occur. 
The Idaho Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "wilful or unprovoked physical 
aggression" and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the employer. 
The word "aggression" connotes "an offensive action" such as an "overt hostile 
attack." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 41 (1969). To prove 
aggression there must be evidence of some offensive action or hostile attack. It 
is not sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor committed negligent acts that 
made it substantially certain that injury would occur. 
There was no evidence presented to the trial court in this case that the employer 
wilfully or without provocation physically and offensively or hostilely attacked 
the employee. In the absence of this evidence there was no genuine issue of 
material fact, and the trial court was justified in granting summary judgment 
against the employee. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Cope v. State, 108 Idaho 416, 417, 700 
P.2d 38, 39 (1985). 
Kearney at 757-758, 1173-1174. After disposing of the plaintiffs equal protection argument 
the Idaho Supreme Court concluded: "Both LC.§ 72-208 and§ 72-209(3) require an intention 
to injure the employee." Id. (emphasis added). 
The rule in Kearney was reaffirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in DeMoss where the 
court held that an employer must engage in an offensive, hostile act. DeMoss again involved 
the interpretation the or unprovoked physical 
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for assault and battery ( or unprovoked physical aggression under Idaho Code § 72-
209(3)) and not exempt from civil suit. In deciding the case, the Idaho Supreme Court cited 
Kearney and Yeend v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 104 Idaho 333, 659 P.2d 87 (1982) and 
again interpreted § 72-209(3) to require proof of some evidence of some offensive action or 
hostile act. The Court reiterated, "It is not sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor 
committed negligent acts that made it substantially certain that injury would occur." DeMoss, 
at 178, 877 (quoting Kearney at 757, 1173) (emphasis added). 
The DeMoss court also addressed the plaintiffs' assertions that the defendants knew 
that the material they requested the plaintiffs to remove was asbestos; that defendants "lied" 
to the plaintiffs by not telling them it was asbestos; and that the defendants failed to provide 
the plaintiffs with adequate protective gear. 
The city and its supervisory employees may have been negligent, even grossly 
negligent, in not recognizing the danger but there is simply no evidence herein 
that any of the supervisors or the higher city officials ever wilfully or 
intentionally wanted to cause injury to the plaintiffs .... The plaintiffs themselves 
have all testified that they had no reason to suspect that any of the defendants 
wanted to cause them any injury .... There is no showing herein of any hostility 
of any of the defendants toward any of the plaintiffs. 
The record discloses, as noted by the district court, that the plaintiffs all 
acknowledged that they had no reason to believe any of the defendants harbored 
ill feelings toward them or wanted to cause them injury in any manner. The 
record shows further that John Austin, the city welder, told defendant Eastwood 
that he thought the material might be asbestos. The record does not show that 
Eastwood or any of the defendants actually knew that it was asbestos until the 
test results from the laboratory were received. These test results were received 
after the appellants' first exposure to the asbestos had occurred. Moreover, while 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
Kearney and DeMoss, this Court recently remedy 
under the Workers Compensation law in Marek v. Hecla Mining Company. 10 In Marek, the 
plaintiff-miners were working in the Lucky Friday mine when a fall of rock occurred, which 
resulted in the death of one of the miners. The District Court held there was no evidence of 
willful or unprovoked physical aggression on the part of the defendants and therefore, the 
exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs' claims was Idaho's Worker Compensation.11 In granting 
defendants summary judgment the District Court held: 
" ... there is no evidence that Defendants harbored any ill will toward [plaintiffs] 
or that defendants wanted [plaintiffs] to be injured in any manner, in the case at 
bar there are some allegations that Defendants were warned about potential 
1° Case No. CV-2013-2722, Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
11 The case of Dominguez v. Evergreen Resources, Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 121 P.3d 938 (2005) and a 
related bankruptcy case, In re Elias, 302 B.R. 900 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003), are not on point and 
factually and procedurally distinguishable from the present case. In Dominguez, the Supreme 
CoUi-t decided a ju..risdictional issue; holding a defendant that appeals from a default judgment must 
first make an unsuccessful motion for relief from the default in the trial court in order to raise the 
issue on appeal. The Supreme Court also declined to review the trial court's denial of the 
employer's motion for summary judgment. Lastly, and of import here, the Supreme Court did not 
determine what constitutes willful or unprovoked physical aggression under Worker's 
Compensation law. See Marek, Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motionfor Partial Summary Judgment, pp. 5-8. 
(Where the District court interpreted Dominguez, but granted defendants summary judgment 
based upon the holding in Kearny and DeMoss,· holding, "[t]he Court, however, finds Dominguez 
to be readily distinguishable from the case at bar;" "[t]he Court finds that Dominguez is factually 
distinguishable from the case at bar ... ;" and "[j]urthermore, the Court finds that the procedural 
posture of Domingu.ez is distinguishable from the case at 
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potentially hazardous, Kearney and DeMoss demonstrate that knowledge of the 
dangerous condition alone that made it substantially certain that injury would 
occur does not create an exception to exclusivity. The relevant inquiry to the 
Court's determination of exclusivity is whether [plaintiffs' injuries] were 
proxL.111atel;1 caused b~,r v"J1ill:ft1l or u..11provoked physical aggression~. ~the Court 
finds that the burden is on Plaintiffs to establish that this case falls outside of the 
exclusivity exception. The Court finds, from review of the record, that Plaintiffs 
have failed to put forth any evidence the Defendants wanted to cause injury or 
death to Plaintiffs." Id., p. 10. 
Although the exception is written in the disjunctive ("wilful or unprovoked physical 
aggression"), other states apply a conjunctive test ("willful and unprovoked physical 
aggression") which requires an intent to injure. For example, in California, 13 an injured 
employee may bring a civil action against another employee "[w]hen the injury or death is 
proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked physical act of aggression of the other 
12 The District Court also noted that while some facts were disputed, "such as whether Defendants 
received warnings that the mining practices were dangerous and whether it was necessary for the 
chief engineer to approve the mining plan, those disputed facts were not material to the Court's 
determination of whether the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs' claims is Idaho's Worker 
Compensation." Id., p. 10. 
13 The Idaho Supreme Court has on several occasions relied on California authorities to 
interpret similar provisions in Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law. Schneider v. Farmers 
Merchant, Inc., 106 Idaho 241, 243, 678 P.2d 33, 35 (1983), Tucker v. Union Oil Co. of 
California, 100 Idaho 590, 603, 603 P.2d 156, 169 (1979) and Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Adams, 91 Idaho 151, 155-156, 417 P.2d 417,421 - 422 (1966) (interpreting Idaho Code§ 
72-223 to apportion the employers' damages between the employer and third party); 
Horton v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 115 Idaho 912, 954, 772 P.2d 119, 161 (1989) 
(apportionirlg worker's compensation liability between pre-existing impairment and 
subsequent injury); but see Wilder v. Redd, 111 Idaho 141, 142-143, 721 P.2d 1240, 1241 -
1242 (1986) (distinguishing Idaho's "course of employment" standard from California's 
"scope of employment" standard to determine the scope of co-employee immunity under the 
exclusive remedy provision of Idaho Code§ 72-209(3). 




Foreign case authority is also instructive on the meaning of willful unprovoked physical 
aggression. Basing its analysis in part on the holding in Kearney, in Torres v. Parkhouse Tire 
Service, Inc., 26 Cal.4th 995, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 30 P.3d 57 (2001), the Supreme Court of 
California applied this standard in a case where a co-worker had picked up the injured 
employee off the ground several times and dropped him on his knees. The injured worker 
brought a civil action against bis employer and the co-worker for damages. The plaintiff 
alleged that the co-worker's act was a '"willful and unprovoked physical act of aggression" 
against him and that the employer condoned and ratified the co-worker's actions making it 
also subject to suit. The matter went to trial and the trial court instructed the jury that in order 
to impose liability, the jury must find that (1) the injured worker's "injury was caused by a 
willful and unprovoked physical aggression on the part of [the co-worker]." And (2) [the co-
worker] "committed the act with the intent to cause injury." When the jury returned a verdict 
for the defendants, the injured worker appealed contending that the trial court should not have 
interpreted the statute to include an intent to injure requirement. The California Supreme Court 
noted that the statutory language "willful and unprovoked physical act of aggression was not 
specifically defined. The court then interpreted the statute in light of the decisional law of 
California. 
Consistent with these authorities, we conclude an "unprovoked physical act of 
aggression"(§ 3601, subd. (a)(l) is unprovoked conduct intended to convey an 
actual, present and apparent threat of bodily injury. (Matthews v. Workmen's 
Comp. Appeals Bd., 6 100 CaLRptr. , 493 l 972)], 
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ed.1999) p. 1489, col.2.) "unprovoked physical act aggression" 
(§3601, subd. (a)(l)) logically contemplates intended injurious conduct 
Standing alone, "aggression" is itself a powerful term defined as "[ a]n 
ur nr<YvnlrPrl ,;,ff,;,('lr· thP firct ,;,tt,;,r-lr 1r,,;, rnrniTP1· ,:,n <><'<'<>11lt• <>n 1nrr-.,;,rl" /1 ()vf"Arrl iy..1..'-" T '\J.I.')..."-'~ <i,.4.t,,1,..\,,,1,-..l.l..' \..l,A- -L..LLIJ'\. 1,..1.L\..'-""V.l.'\... .LL.l.. (.,I,, '1.'-"~..l.."-'.l, "-1..1.. (,..(.IJ!,Jt.,&.\A<.Ll,.' LL.l..1. .LL.Ll.VL+\,,,i. \.!.. '-J,l.l....L'--1..L.~ 
English Diet. (2d ed.1989) p. 254 ), and as "a forceful action or procedure ( as an 
unprovoked attack) esp. when intended to dominate or master." (Webster's New 
Collegiate Diet., supra, p. 64.) Indeed, at least one out-of-state decision has 
required evidence of "some offensive action or hostile attack" to prove 
aggression. (Kearney v. Denker (1988) 114 Idaho 755, 760 P.2d 1171, 1173-
1174 [citing Idaho Code § 72-209(3): "willful or unprovoked physical 
aggression" exception to workers' compensation exclusivity requires "an 
intention to injury the employee].) The term "aggression," therefore, suggests 
intentional harmful conduct. 
Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc., 26 Cal.4th 995, 1005, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 564,570, 30 P.3d 
57, 60 (2001). 
Like Kearney, DeMoss, Marek, and foreign case authority, in the present case, there is 
no evidence that any of the defendants acted intentionally with the intent to injure the plaintiffs. 
There is no evidence that any of the defendants knew that the rockburst was substantially 
certain to occur. There is no evidence that any of the defendants knowingly ordered plaintiffs 
into a dangerous working environment. 14 Even if such evidence existed, placing plaintiffs in 
a dangerous working environment or mere negligence is not enough; the plaintiffs carry the 
burden of demonstrating that Hecla harbored some ill will towards the plaintiffs or wanted to 
cause plaintiffs injury. No such evidence exists on this record, nor can it. 
14 In fact, the evidence of record demonstrates, members of Hecla management, including one of 
the defendants in this case were in the area where the fall of rock occurred just hours prior to the 
fall of rock. Certainly, Hecla management would not have knowingly or 
miners in an area believed to be unsafe. 
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Plaintiffs assert while the course of employment by Hecla, Jordan, and 
Hogarnier negligently, intentionally or willfully caused injury to plaintiffs and Hecla is 
liable for the injury under the theory of respondeat superior. Complaint, ,r,r 91-97. 
The exclusive remedy of Idaho's Worker's Compensation law prohibits a civil claim 
against the plaintiffs' co-employees and officers, agents and servants of the employer. LC. § 
72-209; Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 Idaho 237, 242, 280 P.3d 740, 745 (2012); citing Wilder v. 
Redd, 111 Idaho 141, 143, 721 P.2d 1240, 1242 (1986); See Marek, Memorandum Decision 
and Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 11 (holding "The Court notes 
that according to the plain language ofl.C. § 72-209, the exception from liability provided by 
Idaho Worker's Compensation exclusivity also extends to officer, agents, servants, or 
employees of the employer."). As set forth above, there is no evidence on this record 
demonstrating plaintiffs' injuries were the result of any wilful or unprovoked physical 
aggression on the part of Jordan, Bayer or Hogamier. Plaintiffs' claim under a theory of 
respondeat superior fails as a matter of law. Plaintiffs' remedy is limited to Idaho Worker's 
Compensation law. 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
Plaintiffs assert they have suffered severe emotional distress as a result of injuries 
proximately caused by defendants. Complaint, ,r,r 9 8-103. 
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Furthermore, even this Court determines the 
does not apply, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to each of the 
requisite elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the plaintiffs' claim fails. 
A claim for intention infliction of emotion distress which constitutes a neurosis or other 
psychological condition traceable in part to an industrial accident is compensable under the 
workmen's compensation scheme and prohibited by the exclusive remedy rule. Yeend v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc., 104 Idaho 333, 659 P.2d 87 (1983) (emotional distress damages 
suffered by worker whose supervisor had ordered worker who had sustained on the job injury 
to continue working is compensable under worker's compensation and the exclusive remedy 
rule applies.) See generally Marek, Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment (dismissing plaintiffs' claims for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress based upon application of the exclusive 
remedy rule.). 
It is undisputed that plaintiffs' claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
arise out of or are traceable to the December 14, 2011 rockburst. The plaintiffs' alleged 
emotional distress arises out of an injury in the course of their employment. The exclusive 
remedy rule applies and plaintiffs' claim fails as a matter oflaw. 
Even if the exclusive remedy rule did not apply, no genuine issue of material fact exists 
on this record as to each element necessary to prove a claim for intentional infliction of 
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and outrageous; (3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongful 
conduct and the emotional distress; and ( 4) the emotional distress must be 
severe." Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prod., 139 Idaho 172, 179, 75 P.3d 733, 
740 (2003). To recover damages for emotional distress, Idaho law "clearly 
requires that emotional distress be accompartlcd by physical injUt~f or physical 
manifestations of injury." Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830, 
835, 801 P.2d 37, 42 (1990). 
Hopper v. Swinnerton, 155 Idaho 801,810,317 P.3d 698, 707 (2013). 
No evidence exists on this record that defendants conduct was intentional or reckless 
or extreme and outrageous. Absent such a showing, plaintiffs' claim fails. 
The plaintiffs' claims also fails because there is no evidence on this record 
demonstrating the emotional distress suffered by plaintiffs was "severe." Idaho courts have 
frequently dealt with what constitutes "severe" emotional distress. For example, testimony 
from a licensed counselor that the plaintiff was seriously frustrated but not depressed was 
insufficient to support an award for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Jeremiah v. Yanke 
Machine Shop, 131 Idaho 242, 953 P.2d 992 (1998). Evidence showing that the plaintiff was 
"upset, embarrassed, angered, bothered and depressed" did not in itself demonstrate a severely 
disabling emotional condition adequate enough for damages for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 741, 682 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Ct.App. 1994), 
appeal after remand, 109 Idaho 1029, 712 P.2d 730 (Ct.App. 1985), cited with approval in Walston 
v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 211, 923 P.2d 456 (1996). 
In Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 Idaho 522, 817 P.2d 188 (Ct.App. 1991), plaintiff's allegations 
of fear and high blood pressure were insufficient to support a claim for severe ~ .... ., .. ~,. distress. 
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court found that was insufficient evidence of extreme knowledge or conduct upon 
part of the defendant causing emotional distress which was "so severe that no reasonable man 
could be expected to endure." 
The court in Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990) stated that 
emotional distress is not actionable unless the emotional distress has in fact resulted and where it 
1s severe. 
Emotional distress passes under various names such as mental suffering, mental 
anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant 
mental reactions such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, 
anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is extreme 
that the liability arises. Complete emotional tranquility is seldom obtainable in 
this world and some degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of 
the price of living among people. The law intervenes only where the distress 
inflicted is so severe that reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The 
intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining 
its severity. 
Id Where the plaintiff's alleged physical manifestation of emotional distress, high blood 
pressure, preexisted the defendant's conduct and was not supported by competent medical 
testimony, it was ruled inadmissible to support an emotional distress claim. Id. 
No evidence exists on this record to create a genuine issue of material fact on each 
element of the plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, even 
if such evidence existed on the record, it is not relevant. The plaintiffs' claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress is compensable under the Idaho Worker's Compensation act 
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granted to defendants on the plaintiffs' The claims fail ( i) 
the want of proof of wilful and unprovoked physical aggression by any the defendants, 
(ii) because the plaintiffs cannot show a triable issue of fact on their claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and (iii) because plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress falls within the exclusive remedy of Worker's Compensation. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 2015. 
?!INS,LLP 
Michael E. Ramsden, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF KOOTENAI 
RONNEL E. BARRETT, an individual; 
GREGG HAMJ\1ERBERG, an individual; 
ERIC J. TESTER, an individual; and 
MATTHEW WILLIAMS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
HECLA MJNING CO:MP ANY, a 
Delaware Corporation; JOHN JORDAN, 
an individual; DOUG BA YER, an 
individual; SCOTT HOGAMIER, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
Douglas C. Bayer states: 
Case No. CV 13-8793 
DECLARATION OF DOUGLAS C. 
BAYER IN SUPPORT OF 




14y name is Douglas C. Bayer. In November and December 2011, I was employed by 
Hecla Limited as the mine superintendent at the Lucky Friday mine. I started as the mine 
superintendent in November 2010. I have been an employee of Hecla for just over 17 years. 
From 2001 to 2006, I held the position of chief engineer. From 2006 to 2009, I served as senior 
engineer at the corporate office. From 2009 to 2010, I served as the mine foreman. When I was 
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Lucky Friday I worked summer jobs while 
attending college and the Coeur Mine and the Galena mine in the Coeur d'Alene mining 
district and for the Cannon mine in Wenatchee. In 1992, I received a Bachelor of Science 
degree in mining engineering from Montana Tech. After graduation I worked for Asarco in 
an open pit mine in Arizona and for Echo Bay Minerals in an underground mine near 
Republic, Washington. I have worked in underground mines 17 of the 25 years of my 
professional career. 
I am generally familiar with the Gold Hunter deposit in the Lucky Friday mine and 
creation of the 5900 drift and the 5900 drift pillar in the Gold Hunter. The Gold Hunter has 
numerous parallel or subparallel veins. The main vein in the Gold Hunter is called the 
number 30 vein. The Silver Shaft of the Lucky Friday mine, which is the main access to the 
mine, lies about 1 mile to the south of the 30 vein. The 5900 drift is the main access from 
the Silver Shaft to the ramp system situated to the north of the 30 vein. 
In 2004 Hecla engaged Pakalnis & Associates consulting engineers to model mining 
of the 30 vein around the 5900 drift. As a result of that modeling a drift protection pillar, 
slightly over 100' in diameter was left in place to provide access to the footwall of the 
orebody from the hanging wall and the Silver Shaft. The circular pillar was created 
incrementally by adjusting the lengths of the adjacent overhand and underhand stopes as they 
mined above and below the 5900 drift. The drift was supported using close spacing resin 
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Hecla also consulted Dr. Mark Board, a 
geological engineer and rock mechanic, on the 5900 drift pillar. In 2010, Dr. Board authored 
a calibration of the 5900 pillar numerical model. The 5900 drift pillar had been relatively 
stable since its creation. 
Hecla employs seismic monitoring to monitor the reaction of the mine to mining. 
Seismic monitoring is conducted in a variety of ways with different monitoring systems. In 
addition, the 5900 drift pillar was monitored with stress gauges since its creation. Generally, 
the stress gauges were installed in the ribs and back of the 5900 drift through the 5900 drift 
pillar. The stress gauges record changes in stress levels. The stress gauges were checked on 
a regular basis and the seismic data was gathered and monitored to determine seismic trends 
within the mine. 
As the mine superintendent, I was responsible for implementing company policies, 
including safety policies, underground safety and overall safety of Hecla employees. I also 
provide input into written safety plans and implementation of safety plans. Hecla has safety 
guidelines and safety plans for rockbursts. 
On November 16, 2011, a rockburst occurred at the 5900 level of the Lucky Friday 
mine. Hecla immediately notified MSHA of the rockburst and MSHA implemented a 
Section 103(j) order requiring Hecla to stop all mining activities in the area. Hecla complied 
with the order and halted mining activities in the area. 
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issues associated with the rehabilitation plan. Based part on Blake's 
consultation, Hecla developed a rehabilitation plan to repair the 5900 drift and pillar. Hecla 
submitted the rehabilitation plan to MSHA and MSHA approved the plan. MSHA converted 
the Section 103G) order to a l 03(k) order and modified the Section l 03(k) order allowing 
Hecla to resume mining activities in the area of the November 16, 2011 rockburst. 
The rehabilitation plan was to take place in two phases. The first phase included 
installing longer Dywidag bolts, split sets, chain link mesh, cable bolts, and spraying the 
back and ribs of the drift with two to three inches of shotcrete. The rehabilitation plan also 
included installing Geokon 43001'.l'X stress gauges in the walls of the 5900 pillar to monitor 
stress levels and survey points in the ribs to monitor closure. The second phase of the 
rehabilitation plan included installing a steel tunnel liner in the drift at the area of the 
rockburst and filling the area between the tunnel liner and the walls of the drift with 
T ekf oai'll. 
Based on my experience with prior rockbursts in the Lucky Friday mine, I believed 
that the November 16, 2011 rockburst had destressed the 5900 drift pillar. I read Dr. Blake's 
reports of his evaluation of the November 16, 2011 rockburst, which were dated November 
18, 2011 and November 25, 2011, his opinion that the pillar had not been completely 
destressed, but that the occurrence of another large burst in this pillar was unlikely, and his 
i,.r1struction that the rehabilitation effort should proceed with caution. When a rockburst has 
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Hecla requested and MSHA granted a modification of the 103(k) 
resumption of mining operations on December 6, 2011. The modification 
to permit 
103(k) order 
permitted vehicular traffic in the 5900 drift through the 5900 drift pillar, until the tunnel liner 
arrived, subject to restrictions and inspection requirements. Mining operations continued 
until the end of the p.m. shift on December, 13, 2011, when the tunnel liner arrived and was 
ready for installation. At that time all mining operations in the Gold Hunter ceased and 
attention was focused on installation of the tunnel liner. There were no rockbursts in the area 
of the 5900 drift pillar from December 6, 2011 until December 14, 2011. 
Rockbursts can be associated with blasting, which is part of normal mining 
operations. The November 16, 2011 rockburst was associated with blasting and was initially 
thought to be a stress burst or foundation failure. Later it was determined that the November 
16, 2011 rockburst in the 5 900 drift pillar was the result of a fault-slip event in the footwall 
oft.lie 5300-5900 pillar above, which created a seismic wave that traveled down to the 5900 
drift pillar. This determination was not made until after the December 14, 2011 rockburst. 
On the morning of December 14, 2011, I spent approximately six hours in the area of 
the 5900 drift and pillar participating in the installation of the tunnel liner. I inspected the 
work area and the progress of the work in installing the tunnel liner. I observed no changes 
in the ribs or back in the 5900 drift through the pillar. There were no cracks in the shotcrete 
that would indicate an increase in stress or closure. I did not think that the 5900 drift or 5900 
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briefed plaintiffs and other miners on the process installing 
tunnel liner and related safety protocol. Hecla also supplied plaintiffs and other miners 
with proper safety equipment for installing the tunnel liner. I believe that Hecla complied 
with the directives of the Sections 103G) and (k) orders in place from November 16 until 
December 14, 2011. 
At approximately 7:40 pm on December 14, 2011, a second rockburst occurred at the 
5900 drift pillar of the Lucky Friday mine. This rockburst was not associated with blasting, 
as normal mining operations had ceased the day before. I had no indication or reason to 
believe that the December 14, 2011 rockburst was going to occur. I did not want any miner 
to be injured at any time during the rehabilitation of the 5900 drift .. 
I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of Idaho that the foregoing 
statements are true and correct. 
DAIBD this ;;f1__ day of May, 2015. a 
--~($--.~"--· _,._,_~ _C_---=-3~&<:J-¥-"t1~ 
Douglas C. Bayer 
DAIBD this JI;· day of May, 2015. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By,i_J__ 
Michael E. Ramsden, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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Rossman Law Group, PLLC 
717 N. 7m Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Michael R Christian 
Marcus, Christian, Hardee & Davies, LLP 
737 N. 7th Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
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kwilliams@rossmanlaw.com 
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC 
737 N. ih Street 
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Telephone: (208) 331-2030 
Facsimile: (208) 342-2170 
Michael R. Christian., ISB #4311 
mcluistian(ci),mch-lawyer. com 
MARCUS, CHRISTIAN, HARDEE & DA VIES, LLP 
737 N. ih Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Tel: (208) 342-3563 
Facsimile: (208) 342-2170 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
RONNEL E. BARRETT, an individual; ) 
GREGG HAMMERBERG, an individual; ) 
ERIC J. TESTER, an individual; and ) 






HECLA MINING COMPANY, a Delaware ) 
Corporation; JOHN JORDAN, an individual; ) 
DOUG BA YER, an individual; SCOTT ) 
HOGAMIER, an individual; and DOES I-X, ) 
unknown parties, ) 
Defendants. 
OF IDAHO ) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV 13-8793 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC S. 
ROSSMAN IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC S. ROSSMAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 




1 I am one attorneys of record for the Plaintiffs in above-entitled matter and 
personal knowledge of the facts contained herein. 
2. A true and correct copy of the Deposition of Wilson Blake is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "1 ". 
3. A true and correct copy of the Email dated April 4, 2011 is attached hereto as Exhibit 
''2". 
4. A true and correct copy of the Deposition of Doug Bayer is attached hereto as Exhibit 
5. A true and correct copy of the Executive Summary, dated March 22,2010, is attached 
as Exhibit "4'2: 
6. true and correct copy of the Technical Memorandum, dated March 22, 2010, is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "5". 
7. A true and correct copy of the November 25, 2011 Blake Memo is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "6". 
8. A true and correct copy of the Email, dated November 17, 2011 is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "7". 
9. A true and correct copy of the Blake Report, dated November 18, 2011, is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "8". 
10. A true and correct copy of the Blake Doctoral Thesis Study is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "9". 
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1 true correct of Bayer 
as Exhibit "11 . 
13. A true and correct copy of the Bayer Update, dated December 2, 2011 is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "12". 
14. A true and correct copy of the Bayer Update, dated December 6, 2011 is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "13". 
15. A true and correct copy of the Deposition of John Jordan is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"14". 
16. A true and correct copy of the Deposition of Scott Hogarnier is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "1 
17. A true and correct copy the Shift Reports is attached hereto as Exhibit "16". 
18. A true and correct copy of the MSHA Modification Orders is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "17". 
19. A true and correct copy of the Memorandum from Wilson Blake and Mark Board, 
dated December 27, 2011, is attached hereto as Exhibit "18". 
20. A true and correct copy of the Stress Monitoring graph, is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"19". 
21. A true and correct copy of the MSHA Order No. 8559615 is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "20". 
AFFIDA YIT OF ERIC S. ROSSMAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
true and correct copy the MSHA Order lS as 
"22". 
24. A true and correct copy of the MSHA Order No. 8605622 is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "23". 
25. A true and correct copy of the MSHA Order No. 8605622-01 is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "24". 
26. A true and correct copy of the Order No. 8559614 is attached hereto as Exhibit "25". 
27. A true and correct copy of the Order No. 8559607 is attached hereto as Exhibit "26". 
28. A true and correct copy of the Order No. 8559608 is attached hereto as Exhibit "27". 
29. A true and correct copy of the Order No. 8690067 is attached hereto as Exhibit "28". 
30. A true and correct copy of the Smith, E.B, COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE MODEL 
CODE WITH IDAHO'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE COMPENSATION., p. 
24 is attached hereto as Exhibit "29". 
31. A true and correct copy of To v. City of Coeur d'Alene, CV 2002 5424, Memorandum 
Decision and Order Denying Sumniary Judgment in Part and Granting Summary Judgment in Part 
(February 5, 2004) is attached hereto as Exhibit "30". 
32. A true and correct copy of Calibration of 5900 Pillar Numerical Model is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "31 ". 
33. A true and correct copy of the Jackson Kelly PLLC letter, dated November 8, 2013 is 
as 
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36. A true and correct copy of the Rock Burst Plan is attached hereto as Exhibit 
37. true and correct copy of the Blake Memo, dated May 10, 2010 is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "36". 
38. A true and correct copy of the Blake Memo, dated November 30, 2010 is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "37". 
39. A true and correct copy of the Geotechnical Characteristics of the Lucky Friday Mine, 
December 2012 is attached hereto as Exhibit "38". 
40. A true and correct copy of the Memorandum Decision and Order in A1arek, Case No. 
CV-2013-2722, is attached hereto as Exhibit "39". 
41. The Affidavit of James W. Dally, Ph.D. in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment has been forwarded to Dr. Dally for his review and signature. Dr. Dally has 
advised that he is not able to sign and return the affidavit until next week. A true and correct copy of 
the unsigned Affidavit of James W. Dally, Ph.D. in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit "40". 
42. The Affidavit of Rick Norman has been forwarded to Mr. Normai.1 his review and 
signature. Mr. Norman has advised that he is not able to sign and return the affidavit until next 
week. A true and correct copy of the unsigned Affidavit of Rick Norman is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "41". 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORt~ to before me this l2-~day of June, 2015. 
Not~ 
Residing at ~ 
1 
r: Jo...~ 
Commission expires: __ 2---1{,_,.1=2,.-+/_,.z,..=o'-"'2-'-o __ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the I ifilay of June, 2015 I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be forwarded with all the required charges prepaid, by the method( s) indicated below to 
the following persons: 
Michael E. Ramsden 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Boulevard 
P.O. Box 1336 








Eric S. Rossman 
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Corporation; JOHN JORDAN, an 
individual; DOUG BAYER, an 
individual; SCOTT HOGAMIER, an 
individual; and DOES I-X, 
unknown parties, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 13-8793 
DEPOSITION OF WILSON BLAKE 
TAKEN ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS 
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REPORTED BY: 







On behalf of the Defendants: 
MICHAEL E. RAMSDEN, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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700 Northwest Boulevard 
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? EXHIBITS REFERENCED: 
No 3 dated 4/412011 
4 No. 4 Map of 5900 Gold Hunter Drift 28 
! 3 November 25, ! Memorandum 
from Wilson Blake, Consultant 
November 
7 Wilson Consultant 
8 15 December 27,201 l Memorandum 
from Wilson Blake and Mark 
9 Board, Consultants 
10 No. 21 Graph of5900 Main Line Pillar 132 
Gagues with attached charts 
No. 24 November 25, 201 l draft 





No 44 E-mail dated l l/181201 l 
112 
13 
DEPOSITfON EXHIBITS: MARKED 
16 
No. 45 Second Amended Notice of 6 
17 Taking Deposition Duces 
Tecum of Wilson Blake 
18 
No. 46 E-mail string dated 16 16 
19 November 26 and 27, 201 l 
20 No. 47 E-mail string dated 20 20 
November 17, 2011 
21 
No. 48 Affidavit of Wilson Blake 44 45 
22 
No. 49 E-mail dated 11116/2011 91 91 
23 
No. 50 Photographs ]40 140 
24 
No. 51 Photographs ]40 141 
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action pending in the District Court of the First A. Okay. 
8 Judicial District for the State ofidaho, in and for the 8 Q. We have a court reporter. Everything you say 
9 of Kootenai, said cause being Case No. CV 13-8793 9 is under oath. All your testimony is subject to the 
0 in said Court. 10 penalties of perjury just as though you're testifying in 
11 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 45 was 11 court. You understand that? 
" " marked for identification.) 12 A. Mm-hmm. -1. L, 
13 MR. ROSSMAN: Let the record reflect this is 13 Q. Yes? 
14 the time and place for the deposition of Wilson Blake in 14 A. Yes. 
15 the case of Barrett, et al., versus Hecla Mining 15 Q. We have a court reporter. If you could keep 
16 Company, et al.; Case No. CV 13-8793. Case filed in the 16 in mind her presence and the process in always letting 
17 District Court, First Judicial District, State ofidaho, 17 me finish my question before you answer. In normal 
18 County of Kootenai. This deposition is pursuant to the 18 conversation we like to talk over each other. That 
19 Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 19 makes it very difficult in a deposition. Okay? 
20 AND IlffiREUPON, the following testimony was 20 A. Okay. 
21 adduced, to wit: 21 Q. All right. And also I always need an audible 
22 WILSON BLAKE, 22 response. An uh-huh or uh-uh or shake of the head just 
23 having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, the 23 doesn't read very well. Okay? 
24 whole truth, and nothing but the truth, relating to said 24 A. Yes. 
25 cause, deposes and says: 25 Q. Perfect We're on good track here. If you 
7 9 
1 EXAMINATION 1 don't understand a question I ask, ask me to rephrase 
2 QUESTIONS BY MR. ROSSMAN: 2 it. I'll be happy to do so. Okay? 
3 Q. Mr. Blake, have you -- is it Mr. Blake or 3 A. Okay. 
4 Dr. Blake? 4 Q. If you go ahead and answer I'm going to assume 
5 A Mr. Blake is fine. It's Dr. Blake, but 5 you understood the question. Okay? 
6 normally in the mining industry people don't use the 6 A. Okay. 
7 formality of being Dr. Blake or this that. 7 Q. All right If you need break at any time, 
8 Q. How about Wilson? 8 please let me know. I don't usually take more than a 
9 A Wilson is fine, yeah. 9 couple hours with depositions. So I wouldn't expect 
10 Q. Let's go with that. Wilson, have you ever 10 this to last much longer than that. Okay? 
11 been deposed before? 11 A. All right 
12 A. Yes. 12 Q. How did you prepare for your deposition, 
13 Q. How many times have you been deposed? 13 Wilson? 
14 A. Once with Sunshine. This was quite a number 14 A I guess I reviewed some reports I'd written. 
15 of years ago. Must have been in the late '70s or early 15 And we discussed some of the responses and issues 
16 '80s. 16 related to some of my reports and ... 
17 Q. W1mt was the nature of that lawsuit; do you 17 Q. Who did you meet with? 
18 know? 18 A. Pardon? 
19 A. They were suing about mining doing damage to 19 Q. Who did you meet with? 
20 the shaft, I believe. 20 A. I met with -- earlier this morning with Mike 
21 Q. So it's been quite a while since you've been 21 and Mike. 
22 deposed? 22 Q. Mike and Mike? 
23 A. It was a long time ago. 23 A. Mike and Mike. 
4 Well, the purpose of a deposition is meas 24 else? 







had you met with 
And that was about a week ago? 
A. I think it was about a week ago. 
0 
6 this 
7 A. This morning I reviewed the two memos, 
8 November 18th, I believe, memos and reviewed an 
9 affidavit I had done for Jackson-Kelly. 
10 Q. Did you review anything else? 















Q. Was anyone else present then? 
A No one else was present. 
Q. How long did that meeting last? 
A I don't think it lasted an hour. 
12 memory is not very good. My long-term memory seems to 
13 be better. But I don't remember if we had looked at --
Q. How long did the meeting this morning last? 
A Little over -- I got here around 7:30 and we 
14 there may have been another memo or a couple of e-mails 
15 or ... 
were about an hour. 
Q. You're not an employee of Hecla, correct? 
A. No. I'm a consultant for Hecla. 
Q. And you've never been an employee of Hecla? 
A I actually was an employee of Hecla's from 
1970 -- late '74 to early '75. I had been working in 
Africa and I came back and I interviewed for a teaching 
job in Arizona and I was vacationing at Hayden Lake. 
And I talked with Hecla. And they wanted me to do a 
16 Q. Do you recall looking at any e-mails in 
1 7 preparing for your deposition this morning? 
1 8 A. There was one or two memos I believe looked at 
1 9 with respect to the memos that I had written. 
2 O Q. Okay. What e-mails did you review in 
21 preparing for your deposition? 
2 2 A. I guess one was the e-mail that I sent when I 
2 3 sent the -- my original September 18 mine visit report 
2 4 to the mine. 
2 5 MR. RAMSDEN: You mean November 18th? 
11 
1 three- or four-month job to put some instruments in the 1 
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THE \VITNESS: November 18th, yeah. 
2 Star Mine. And rather than do it as a consulting basis, 2 
3 they said, well, what abourwe just hire you and 3 
4 you all the benefits. So I was an actual Hecla employee 4 
5 for I think five months from '74 to early '75. 5 
6 Q. Since '75 have you worked for Hecla -- 6 
7 A. Since then -- 7 
8 Q. -- as an employee? 8 
9 A. Pardon? 9 
10 Q. Have you worked for Hecla as an employee since 1 0 
11 '75? 11 
12 A. Only as a consultant. 1 2 
13 Q. All right. Is Mike Ramsden your personal 13 
14 attorney? 1 4 
15 A Pardon? 15 
16 Q. Is Mike Ramsden your personal attorney? 16 
17 A. No. 17 
18 Q. So let's talk about the meeting prior to today 18 
19 that you had in preparing for your deposition. Did you 1 9 
2 0 review any documents? 2 0 
2 1 A. I reviewed a number of memos that I had 21 
2 2 written. 2 2 
2 3 Q. Do you remember which memos you reviewed? 2 3 
2 4 I think the 18th the 25th of 4 
2 November and I think those were the two main memos. 2 5 
BY MR ROSSMAN: 
Q. No. 44 in front of you, Exhibit 44. 
A Pardon? 
Q. Exhibit 44. 
A (Complying.) Okay. 
Q. ls that the e-mail you're referring to? 
A I think I had sent another e-mail to Doug 
Bayer when I -- yeah, it was an e-mail to Doug Bayer. 
Q. What was the subject of the e-mail? 
A It was just a attached mine visit report. 
Q. Okay. That's what the first line of Exhibit 
44 says, isn't it? 
A "Attached brief mine visit report." This was 
to ... 
Q. This is dated November 18, 2011? 
A Pardon? 
Q. This is dated November 18 --
A This is dated November 18th. 
Q. And do you believe this is the e-mail that was 
sent to each of the individuals identified within it 
that contained your memo? 
A. No. My -- my initial e-mail was to Doug Bayer 
with the a the And I think I 
if -- let me know if you want any changes or 
4 (P s 10 1 
8 
9 
distribute the report to those 
were instructing or 
Mr. Bayer to review it and distribute it? 
A It was like a draft report 
10 Was that your typical practice when you 
11 prepared a consultant's memo analyzing rock mechanics at 
12 the Lucky Friday Mine to distribute a draft to tvrr. Bayer 
13 for his input and suggestions? 
A. It wasn't normal. Normally I just send the --14 
15 my mine visit report to whatever. But because it could 
1 6 be -- I knew that this could have implications with 
1 7 respect to MSHA that I thought that he might want to 
18 review it prior to passing it on. 
19 Q. And why because of the potential implications 
1 
7 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
MR ROSSMAN: Thank 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
8 Q. Mr. Blake, you've handed me a document that's 
9 been marked as Exhibit 46. Is this the e-mail you were 
10 referencing earlier? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. This appears to relate to the subsequent 
13 November 25th memo; is that correct? Because it's dated 
14 November 26 and November 27. 
15 A Yeah, this is with respect to the November 25 
16 memo. 
1 7 Q. Okay. Did you send a similar e-mail to this 
18 to Doug Bayer on November 18th? 
19 A. I believe I did when l attached it, but I 
2 0 with MSHA were you concerned enough to have him review 2 0 
21 it before it was distributed? 21 
don't think there was any -- I don't believe the 
November -- I don't know that -- I just said here's the 
2 2 e-mail. 2 2 A Well, obviously there are certain things that 
2 3 can be taken out of context that -- there is -- even 
2 4 though it's -- it's -- you know, rockbursting is a 
2 5 difficult issue and that 
1 wrong way, which obviously apparently has happened. 
2 I was concerned that -- you know, I didn't want to put 
3 the -- have whatever I meant be mistaken. 
4 Q. So you sent an e-mail originally to Doug Bayer 
5 with a draft of the memo, correct? 
6 A. Yes. The original draft of the memo was sent 
7 to Doug Bayer. 
8 Q. Was that e-mail sent on November 18, 2011? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q. And would you have a copy of that e-mail in 
11 your file relating to Hecla? 
12 A I have a copy of that e-mail in my file 
13 somewhere, yes. 
14 Q. Did you bring it with you or is that at your 
15 office? 
16 A. It's in -- it's in my briefcase. 
- '7 J_ I Q. Is your briefcase here? 
18 A It's not in this room, but it's here, yes. 
19 Q. Okay. On the next break can I ask you to pull 
20 that for me --
21 A. Sure. 
22 Q. -- so 1 can have a look at it? Okay. 
23 MR. ROSSMAN: In fact, while we're on this, 
4 let's take a short break and see if we can our hands 




23 Q. Do you know if Mr. Bayer suggested any changes 



























A. I don't recall to the 
17 
November 18th memo. 
Q. Your e-mail on November 26 indicates, 
"Attaching memo on 5900 pillar. If you think changes 
needed I will make them." 
And so you're suggesting to him that if he 
felt there were some changes you would make those into 
the document? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then he, Mr. Bayer, sent you an e-mail the 
next day at 12:00 o'clock p.m. or noon. "We have a few 
suggestions on wording or clarification. Please see the 
document for our suggestions." 
Did he attach a revised memo to his e-mail to 
you? 
A. I'm sure he did. 
Q. Do you have that revised --
A. I don't have that. 
Q. He says, "I know you are on board with the 
idea to use some sort of tunnel liner and techfoam, 
would you be able to say that sort of longterm support 
is preferable to other options. We are looking for you 
to make a recommendation, or at least suggest this 
alternative - based on what you think, you might want to 
another consultant review the pTior to 
implementation." 
es 4 to 1 
18 
6 e-mails. The first from you to Mark Board on 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Did you agree with those suggestions? 
7 November 17, 2011, and the second from Mark Board to you 
B on November 17, 2011? 
9 A. Yes. 9 
10 Q. He says, "You might want to suggest another 10 
11 consultant to review the design prior to 11 
12 implementation." Did you understand what he meant by 12 
13 that? 13 
14 A. I might suggest someone else to look at it 14 
15 I'm not sure that I responded other than may have 15 
16 
17 
suggested again that Mark Board look at it. 16 
Q. Okay. He was indicating that you might want 1 7 

































assume he's referring to the rehabilitation design for 1 9 
the 5900 pillar? Was that your understanding? 2 O 
A. Let's see. I'm trying to get the ... 2 1 
Q. I'm just wondering what he meant -- what you 2 2 
understood he meant by another consultant to review the I 2 3 
design. 24 
A. Well, I'm sure he meant exactly what he said. 2 5 
19 
You might want to suggest another consultant. I'm not 1 
sure that I -- that I -- I don't remember now whether I 2 
did suggest that. But I'm sure that I -- somewhere in 3 
conversations that we may have suggested that Itasca 4 
review the design. c:_ .J 
Q. What design? 6 
A. Well, whatever design. The use ofTekfoam. 7 
Q. So the rehabilitation plan? 8 
A. The rehabilitation plan. 9 
Q. Did you suggest -- 10 
A. Was basically completed expect for -- or was 11 
in the act of being completed except for the Tekfoam. 12 
Q. Did you suggest that another consultant review 13 
the rehab plan? 14 
A. Would I? 15 
Q. Did you? 16 
A. I'm not -- I can't really tell you. I don't 17 
really remember if I suggested that Itasca look at it or 18 
not. 19 
Q. Do you know if any other consultant reviewed 20 
the plan? 21 
A. I don't -- I'm not aware of any other 22 
consultant reviewing. 23 
you aware other consultant 2 
a report regarding the design of the plan? 25 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall sending -- having that e-mail 
correspondence with Mark? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. He says in his e-mail at 9:53 a.m. on 
November 17th, he says -- the last sentence of that 
second to last paragraph. "I haven't heard a word from 
Hecla since I sent that draft report to them that I also 
sent to you. I recommended 60 feet, but if there is a 
structure in there, the thickness is sort of irrelevant 
to a point." Do you know what draft report he was 
referring to? 
A. He's referring to a draft report he sent 
regarding the main sill pillar, the stability of the 
main sill pillar or mining of the main sill pillar. 
Q. Do you know when he sent that draft report to 
Hecla? 
21 
A It was probably at least a month earlier. 
Q. Did you have any discussions with Mark Board 
about consulting with Hecla regarding the rehabilitation 
plan for the 5900 pillar? 
A I don't recall other than infonning Mark at 
this time that there was a burst in the 5900 pillar. 
Q. Do you know if Mark Board ever reviewed your 
memos that were issued in November 2011? 
A I don't really recall that, no. 
Q. Do you recall him ever providing any input to 
you regarding your memos? 
A No. 
Q. Do you recall him ever providing any opinions 
regarding what the cause of that burst was in November 
of 2011? 
A. Not in November of 2011, no. 
Q. So when Doug Bayer was asking you to -- in 
Exhibit 46 -- to suggest another consultant review the 
rehabilitation plan, do you know if they ever did have 
another consultant review that plan? 
A I'm not aware of that. 
Q. So as you sit here today you're not aware of 
any other consultant providing consultation to Hecla 
during the rehabilitation period between 16, 
















































memo on the 18th and then apparently another memo on 7 
the 25th. After that I didn't have as close contact as 8 
I had before. So I'm not sure what went on with respect 9 
to Hecla and any other consultant 10 
You knew that Mark Board had done the modeling 11 
in March of20IO tor the 5900 pillar? 
11~ A. Yes. 
Q. You knew that he had fairly ex.iensive 14 
knowledge regarding that pillar and its stability? 15 
A. Yes. I had recommended to Hecla that Mark 16 
do the -- review the 5900 pillar. 17 
Q. Other than the e-mails that you see in front 18 
of you as Exhibit 47, do you recall having any 19 
communication with Mr. Board about the 5900 pillar or 20 
the rehabilitation plan between November 16 and 21 
December 14, 2011? 22 
A. I don't believe I have any, other than this 23 
when I informed Mark that the -- we had this failure in 24 
the November 16th burst 12s 
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A. I don't recall specifically. Although I think I 4 
the next thing I seem to remember was Mark was coming up 5 
to -- after the November 14th -- or December 14th burst 6 
that Mark was coming up, and we were trying to an-ange 7 
the times so -- to go undergroillld and look at the -- but 8 
I don't recall having any conversations or e-mails with 9 
Mark during that interim time period. Although I'm not 10 
saying that there wasn't one, but I don't recall it 11 
offhand. 12 
Q. Do you recall becoming aware of any efforts 13 
being made by anyone to have l'vf:r. Board go underground 14 
and observe the damage between the November 16 and 15 
December 14 rockbursts? 16 
A Not before the December 14th rockburst. It 17 
was only after the December 14th rockburst. Now, I 18 
could be wrong, but I ... 19 
Q. You said in this Exhibit No. 47, yotu- 20 
November 17th e-mail to Mr. Board, you said -- the last 21 
sentence of the first paragraph -- "Burst came with 5500 22 
blast, and not good location on MP 250 data, but fair 23 
location with the new ESG sys with only 6 stations at 24 
some distance." What does that mean? 25 
A. It means that we have we have two 
monitoring systems at the mine, the MP 250 system and 
they had just put in an ESG system that had only six 
stations. There was no location on the MP 250. As what 
happens during blasting, it somehow it -- it missed it 
The ESG location system picked it up. l don't 
remember the location, but the -- I do remember that the 
error was 141 feet. It indicated that it was near the 
pillar but not -- not in the pillar itself. 
Q. Okay. And what is the significance of that? 
A. The significance would be whether it was a 
pillar burst or whether it was some other type of a 
failure. 
In a pillar burst you expect to see all the 
rock in the pillar -- I mean, all the energy of the 
pillar is being released and the pillar is destroyed. 
Lots of dust, small chunks of rock and the remaining 
portions of the pillar are highly broken up and 
fractured. And that wasn't what was observed in the 
Page 25 
muck pile on my first visit on the 16th or whatever it 
was after the -- that burst when I went I think it was 
the next morning. 
Q. With a pillar burst would you expect that the 
ESG system would isolate the location of the burst at 
the pillar since that's where the release of stress is? 
A. The problem with source location systems or --
the ESG had only six geophones. And I don't remember 
exactly where these geophones were located. But they 
weren't located with respect to the 5900 pillar. They 
were some distance from the 5900 pillar. I think they 
were more up on the 53 to 59 sill. 
And so this was just the initial installation 
of the ESG system. So it wasn't particularly well 
suited to have a accurate location in the 5900 pillar. 
And that's -- the data indicated that it was, I believe, 
60 or 70 feet from the pillar. 
Q. But because there were no geophone --
A. Because they didn't have the sufficient 
coverage to have an accurate location. So we didn't --
we didn't have a good location to say exactly where the 
burst occurred. 
And later when we went underground in December 
the burst and you could see, I think we determined 
a better location of where it would have been associated 
7 (P to 2 
6 
That was your conclusion --
8 A. yes. 
9 -- as to what the cause of the November 16 --
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. -- burst was? 
12 A. Yes, yes, yes. 



















question before you start to answer. Otherwise the 
court reporter is going to have the record kind of 
jumbled up. 
BY NIR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. So is it fair to say that the ESG data, at 
least as of November 16th and November 17th, wasn't 
terribly reliable in isolating the specific location of 
the burst? 
A. No. It wasn't -- it wasn't a reliable 
location. 




Q. Now, you say in the last sentence of the third 
paragraph-- or second to last sentence, "Terry showed 
core from an old hole through there and the rock in the 
FW and up to 30 vein looked like really silicified 
quartzite." 
Do you know what you're referring to there? 
A. This was a drill hole. The cores of a -- a 





11 Q. Do you know when that drill core was taken? 
A. This would have been during exploration for 
13 the -- this would have been off the 4900 level, I 
12 
14 presume. This would have been some years prior, in the 
15 early 2000s. 
16 Q. Oh. So this was something that had been taken 
7 at the 5900 pillar at a previous --
18 A. Well, it was -- it was -- it wasn't 
1 9 specifically for the 5900 pillar. This was something 
2 0 that was exploration for the Gold Hunter with depth off 
21 of the 4900 level. 
2 2 Q. You said, "Needless to say this does not bode 
2 3 well for the sill along this stretch of rock." What did 
4 mean by that? 
2 5 A. Well, it was that one of the 
8 
1 differences between the Gold Hunter and the actual 
more 
7 Friday rock. And this was just pointing out that 
8 there's a stretch between the footwall and the 30 vein 
9 that appeared to be more silicified. 
10 Q. And so you say --
11 A. So the harder the rock is the more prone it 
might be to this rockbursting. 
Q. Okay. Let me try this. Maybe have you look 
at Exhibit No. 4. 
A. Okay. (Complying.) 
16 Q. Does that appear to be some kind of map 
17 identifying the 5900 pillar as well as the sill --
18 A. Mm-hmm. 
19 Q. -- at the Lucky Friday Mine? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. So when you were talking about really 
22 silicified quartzite and that it doesn't bode well for 
23 the sill along this stretch of rock, what area were you 
24 referring to? ls it on this map? 
25 A. I'm not sure that that -- well, actually, 
Page 29 
1 if -- I don't know where the drill hole was. But it 
2 would say that wherever that hole was drilled, which to 
3 intersect the 5900 pillar it also had to go through the 
4 sill, it would be this stretch of rock. (Indicating.) 
5 Q. Maybe show me that 
6 A. It would be somewhere in line with the -- from 
7 the 4900 level down to the 5900 sill. So there must 
8 have been a hole that was from the 4900 that -- down in 
9 that direction towards the -- through the 5900 pillar. 
10 Q. Okay. So you believe there was a hole at some 
11 point from 4900 level directly above the 5900 pillar 
12 down through the pillar? 
13 A. I'm presuming that that's where the hole was 
14 from. I'm sure there were holes drilled all the way 
15 along the 4900 level prior to developing the 5900 level 
16 to determine the depth of the Gold Hunter orebody. So 
1 7 there were a series of holes that were drilled for 
18 exploration. 
19 Q. So when you said that hole, where the rock 
2 0 from that hole appeared really silicified quartzite and 
21 that it does not bode well for the sill along this 
2 2 stretch of rock, what did you mean? 
2 3 A. Well, it would indicate that -- initially we 
2 4 had presumed there be little the 
2 5 Hunter because of the more argillaceous -- and 





has -- its release of order of magnitude more seismic 
energy than the mining does with respect to the normal 
Gold Hunter mining. So, in a sense, the Gold Hunter is 
1 0 much more -- less burst -- much less burst prone than 
11 the actual Lucky Friday Mine. 
1 2 So what I guess I was referring to is that the 
13 fact that this zone may be more silicified than it was 
1 4 initially presumed. 
15 Q. And so what you were trying to tell Mr. Board 
16 at that point in time, if I may summarize, is that the 
1 7 cores from drill holes that had been placed through the 
1 8 5900 pillar indicated that there was significant amount 
l 9 of silicified quartzite which would be more prone to 
2 0 rockbursting? 
21 A. That's correct. 
2 2 Q. Okay. And, in fact, you indicated you believe 




of the whether or 
gradually as opposed to suddenly and violently, depend 
on the stress and the ground conditions. 
9 And so the problem with the rocks in the Coeur 
1 0 d'Alene District, in these hard quartzites, are they 
11 tend to fail violently as opposed to non-violently. 
12 And, of course, it's a -- the potential effects of a 
13 large violent failure can be very devastating and ... 
1 4 Q. And when you say the effects of a large 
15 violent failure could be very devastating, that ... 
16 A Well, to both the mine and people. In fact, 
1 7 there's been 22, I believe, rockburst fatalities in the 
18 Coeur d'Alene Mining District since 1940. So it's been 
1 9 a -- it's a significant problem to all the mines in the 
20 
21 
Coeur d'Alene District. 
And there are a number of other districts in 
2 2 the world that have the rockburst problems. Not every 
2 3 deep mine has them, but it's -- it depends on the 
2 4 which that rock was examined came from 4900 down to the 2 4 geology and the ground conditions. 





A. I believe it was, yes. 
Q. Down through the top of the 5900 pillar? 
A. I'm not sure how close it was to the 5900 
4 pillar. But it was -- it was certainly -- I think it 
5 was above the 5900 pillar. But it -- we really 
6 hadn't -- as I say, it was an old exploration hole. 
7 Q. What's your educational background? 
8 A. I had a BS -- or, no, a BA in geology from 
9 University of California, Berkeley; an MS in engineering 
10 science from University of California, Berkeley; and a 
1 retain rock mechanics experts like yourself to consult 
2 with them to try to predict potential violent failures? 
3 A. That's correct. 
4 Q. And you utilize your education, training and 
5 experience to provide that consultation? 
6 A That's correct. 
7 Q. And you have various skills available to you 
8 that help you predict or try to predict certain factors 
9 that may lead to a violent failure? 
10 A. That's correct. 
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11 Ph.D. in mining engineering from the Colorado School of 11 Q. All right. How long have you been working as 
a consultant with Hecla? 12 Mines. 
13 Q. And have you been -- well, do you hold 
14 yourself out as a person with specialized knowledge 
15 regarding rock mechanics? 
16 A. Yes. I have been a geotechnical and 
1 7 consulting -- mine consultant for -- since 197 5. 
18 Q. What is rock mechanics? 
19 A. Rock mechanics is the science that deals with 
2 0 the behavior of openings under different loading 
21 conditions. So whether it be open pits, underground, 
2 2 it's how the rock behaves due to an excavation and how 
2 3 the rock structure behaves that's surrounding the 
24 
25 Q. And how does that help a mining company such 
1 12 
13 A. Well, I started consulting for Hecla in 197 5 
15 
116 
14 after I -- my employment, my -- I think it was a 
five-month employment period ended, I remained 
consulting for Hecla. But I also consulted for other 
mining companies all over the world. 
I 
17 
18 Q. And I think your testimony earlier was it's 
1 9 been well known within this -- within the Coeur d'Alene 
2 0 Silver Mining District that that district has a long 
21 history of a propensity for very violent failures? 
A. That's co1Tect. 22 
23 Q. And any company mining in that district should 
2 4 be aware of that? 
25 A. That's also con-ect, yes. 











obtained on the deformation of this 5900 pillar as the 
was going on. We had a previous consultant and 
they weren't happy with his work so I suggested Mark. 
I believe there was some rockbursts in 2010 on 
the west end of the mine. And I recall going 
underground then. And I think at that time they had 
maybe two other consultants that came and looked at that 
1 4 on that underground visit. But I'm not sure what 
1 
when an incident would occur --7 
8 A. When an incident occurs, they call me. I go 
9 up and look at it, write a little mine visit report and 
1 O go on from there. 
11 Q. But you haven't had any -- you haven't been 
12 retained to provide consultation regarding ongoing 
13 operational plans for the mine? 
14 A. No. I don't have -- I think I had a retainer 
6 
15 those -- if those consultants did any further work. 15 from Hecla back in the -- at one period from one mine 
16 Q. Okay. I guess let me rephrase the question. 16 manager back in the -- maybe the late '80s or early '80s 
l 7 You understood Mark Board is now an employee of Hecla? 1 7 for a couple years. But other than -- it's basically 
18 A. Yes. 18 been when there's a problem, the phone rings and ... 
19 Q. But in November of201 l he was not an employee 
2 0 of Hecla? 
2 1 A. Mark was an employee of Itasca. 
2 2 Q. And in November 2011 you weren't aware of any 
2 3 rock mechanics experts or specialists that were employed 
2 4 by Hecla? 
2 5 A. No. I'm not -- I wasn't or I'm not. I'm 
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1 still not. 
2 Q. All right And you've been consulting for 
3 Hecla since 1975? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Do you have your own company? 
6 A. Just me, yes. 
7 Q. Are you -- is your company an entity? 
8 A. Pardon? 
9 Q. Is your company an entity or are you a sole 
1 O proprietor? 
11 A. Self-employed. I'm self-employed. I have no 
12 corporation company. 
13 Q. Okay. So you're self-employed as --
14 A. Private individual. 
15 Q. -- as a private rock mechanics or geotechnical 
16 consultant? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And you've been providing that eype of 
19 consultation to Hecla since 1975? 
2 0 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Is Hecla a major client or customer of yours? 
2 2 A. It is -- it is a major. Although some --
2 3 there's been years that I've done very little work. I 
4 mean, as basically when are the 
2 5 rings and I go look at the problem and tell them what I 
1~~ 
21 
Q. So in late 2011 Hecla was a major client or 
customer of yours? 
A. It was significant, yeah. I will say I have a 
22 number of mines -- Canada, Mexico, different mines that 
2 3 I have done more work than other mines. 
2 4 Q. How many clients or customers did you have in 
2 5 November of 2011? 
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1 A. 2011 I think I probably visited seven or eight 
2 mines or maybe more. 
3 Q. How many of those were owned by Hecla? 
4 A. Just one. 
5 Q. And do you have an estimate in November of 
6 2011 as to the amount of revenue you were receiving from 
7 consulting from -- with Hecla? 
8 A. I would say that from 2011 maybe in the --
9 somewhere in the 20 to $30,000 range for the year. 
10 Q. Okay. Was Hecla your largest customer at that 
11 time? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. You had a larger customer? 
14 A. In 2011 it may have been either Goldcorp. 
15 or -- or -- I can't -- this gold mine in Mexico. I 
1 6 can't -- AuRico Gold. 
1 7 Q. Is it fair to say Hecla was an important 
1 8 customer --
1 9 A. Hecla has always been an important customer. 
2 0 Q. And they've been an important customer for you 
21 since 1975? 
22 A. Yes. 
2 3 Q. And you were their primary consultant where 
2 incidents to come in and 
2 5 A. With respect to -- to ground control issues, 
10 ( P s 34 to 37) 
l 
I want to go over few One 
7 already mentioned is that anyone mining in the 
8 d'Alene Silver Mining District prior to 2011 knew 
9 or should have knov,m that because of the properties of 
1 O that district there was a high propensity for 
11 rockbursting? 
1 2 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. And there was a long history of rockbursting 
1 4 at the Lucky Friday Mine, correct? 
15 A. At the Lucky Friday Mine, that's conect 
16 Q. Prior to November of 2011 had you had any 
1 7 involvement with the 5900 drift pillar? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. What involvement? 
2 0 A. I was involved in discussions as far back as 
21 2006 when the size of the 5900 drift pillar was being 
2 2 determined. 
2 3 Q. And what involvement did you have in those 
2 4 discussions? 
2 5 A. The engineering work was done by Pakalnis and 
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1 Associates, evaluating different sized pillars. 
2 Q. So you believe Rirnas Pakalnis did the initial 
3 engineering for --
4 A. They did the initial engineering for -- he 
5 modeled I believe it was a 50-foot pillar then a 
6 hundred-foot pillar and what the stress conditions would 
7 be after mining a hundred foot above it and a hundred 
8 foot below it, 1 believe was the -- and he sent that 
9 report to Hecla. 
10 Q. Did you have any involvement in that modeling? 
11 A. I didn't have any -- I don't do any of the 
12 modeling. He did the modeling. I probably reviewed the 
13 results for Hecla. 
14 Q. Did you have any involvement in recommending 
15 the size of the pillar? 
16 A. I guess my only -- my only concern was the 
17 fact that we were leaving a pillar. And I expressed 
18 that in 2006 or whenever it was that ... 
19 Q. Why was that a concern to you? 
20 A. Well, pillars in any rockburst-prone mine are 
21 always a problem. 
22 Q. Why is that a problem? 
23 A. Because the stress builds up in the pillar and 
24 the pillar can fail and burst. I mean, that's been the 
25 history of all the majority of bursts in the Coeur 
8 A That, well, eventually there's always the 
9 potential to have a burst in the pillar. And that's --
10 that's a concern for any pillar that's left in any 
11 rockburst-prone mine. 
12 Q. And did you express it in that manner to Hecla 
13 that it's a concern anytime you leave a pillar in a 
14 rockburst-prone mine? 
15 A. I think it was just an informal discussion at 
1 6 that time and ... 
1 7 Q. But did you feel --
1 8 A. But my -- my statement was -- would more or 
19 less have been something like, well, if we leave a 
2 0 pillar, we're going to have to deal with it at some time 
2 1 in the future. 
22 Q. Who do you believe you may have said that to? 
2 3 A. I'm sure Doug Bayer was in a meeting with --
2 4 when we were discussing or when we were talking of --
2 5 either with talking about the Pakalnis report or prior 
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1 to the Pakalnis report. 
2 Q. Do you believe John Jordan was involved? 
3 A. I don't even know if John Jordan was employed 
4 by Hecla then, but he might have been. 
5 Q. You said the caution was that if you leave a 
6 pillar, at some point you're going to have to deal with 
7 it? 
8 A. That's ... 
9 Q. What does that mean, you're to have to 
10 deal with it? 
11 A. Well, it means that if the pillar -- if we 
12 start to have rockbursting in the pillar, then it 
13 obviously requires extra precaution. It requires extra 
14 ground support. It requires some form of monitoring. 
15 It's a -- it's a potential problem area. 
16 Q. And your caution was that at some point the 
17 stress levels in that pillar may get to a point where 
18 there's a serious risk of rockbursting? 
19 A. That's always the issue. 
20 Q. Okay. If you look at Exhibit No. 3. 
21 A. (Complying.) 
22 Q. Does that appear to be an e-mail from you to 
23 various management personnel at Hecla on April 4, 2011? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. The first sentence of that e-mail says, "There 




Hunter. In the next -- well, prior -- from 2000 --
8 sometime in 2009 until early 2011, we had, I 
9 four or five significant seismic events that were 
1 0 associated with mining. And I was just pointing out 
11 that, you know, as of we need to be looking at what's 
1 2 causing this and what we need to do to either minimize 
13 the occurrence or you -- the two things you can do is 
1 4 something about some mining change to stop the 
5 occurrence or you can make the openings survivable. You 
1 6 put in sufficient ground support so that the openings --
1 7 the damage to the opening's contained. And this is the 
1 8 strategy that basically all rockburst mines use. 
1 9 You want to eliminate their occurrence, but 
2 0 you also want to put in sufficient ground support such 
2 1 that you make the -- you protect the -~ anyone who 
2 2 happens to be in the opening. 
2 3 Q. And when you talk about an opening, what are 
2 4 you talking about? 
2 5 A. Talking about the opening, access 
2 
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1 openings. You're talking about any opening that's in an 
2 area that could be affected by the seismic events. 
3 Q. Including a drift pillar? 
4 A. Including all the drifts, all the access 
5 openings and the stope itself. 
6 Q. And what you were seeing in April of 2011 was 
7 a correlation between increased mining activity in the 
8 Gold Hunter vein with increased large seismic events at 
9 the mine? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And you were communicating that to Hecla, 
12 correct? 
13 A. I communicated that to Hecla. And it turns 
14 out that these events were in a -- more or less 
15 concentrated along a specific area of the Gold Hunter 
16 vein, not the entire vein, but, I mean, it -- it -- most 
1 7 the activity occurs in -- over a specific zone. 
18 Q. And that was causing you some concern as a 
1 9 rock mechanics consultant? 
2 0 A. Well, I mean, that's my job is to -- to point 
21 out what could happen and what we need to -- that we 
2 2 · need to address that. 
2 3 Q. Did Hecla, following your e-mail on Ap1il 4, 
2 4 2011, address your concerns about seismic 
2 5 activity by either changing mining practices or 
7 support standards that the Canadians developed after a 
8 six-year rockburst research program. And you put in 
9 sufficient ground support to contain the effects of a 
1 O certain size rockburst at a certain distance. And I 
11 think we reevaluated the ground support in all the 
12 openings in the mine. 
13 Q. After April 4, 2011, did you reevaluate or to 
14 your knowledge did Hecla reevaluate the ground support 
15 conditions on the 5900 drift pillar? 
1 6 A I believe we reviewed -- we reviewed the 
1 7 ground support through the 5900 pillar at that time and 
18 determined it to be whatever it was that I believe it --
19 the ground support was sufficient to contain the effects 
2 0 of a nearby burst of a certain magnitude. 
21 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 48 was 
2 2 marked for identification.) 
2 3 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
2 4 Q. Hand you Exhibit 48. Do you recognize that 
2 5 document? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. What is it? 
3 A. It's an affidavit that Jackson-Kelly had me 
4 prepare. 
5 Q. Did you write something for Jackson-Kelly to 
6 them from which they developed this affidavit? 
7 (Exit Mr. Clary.) 
8 THE WITNESS: I believe that -- I'm not 
9 exactly sure whether -- how much I wrote and what fonnat 
10 or whether Jackson-Kelly provided the format and I 
11 filled it out. 
12 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
13 Q. Well, let's look at paragraph No. 7 of your 
14 affidavit. It says, "On April 5, 2010, I provided a 
15 review to the Lucky Friday Mine of an Itasca Technical 
1 6 Memorandum ( dated March 22, 2010) and a Draft Repo1t 
l 7 from Itasca (dated March 2010)." 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. And you indicated, "This memorandwn is 
2 0 hereinafter referred to as the 'April 5 Blake Memo."' 
21 Do you recall writing a memo to Hecla on April 5th, 
22 2010? 
23 A I'm sure I did. I did review the Itasca 
24 
2 5 Q. So is it fair to say that prior to April 5th, 
12 42 0 4 
Page 4 6 
and 
reviewing Go ahead and answer. 
8 THE WITNESS: I believe I -- I think-- and in 
9 the memo I think I agreed with most of the conclusions 
1 O that Itasca reached. 
11 BYMR. ROSSMAN: 
12 Q. Do you recall there being any particuiar 
13 conclusion that you did not agree with? 
14 A. I may have -- I may have disagreed with the 
15 conclusion or the -- the height-to-width ratio of the 
16 5900 pillar. 
1 7 Q. Do you recall disagreeing with the 
18 height-to-width ratio that Itasca developed regarding 
1 9 that pillar in its modeling? 
2 0 A. It appeared to me that Itasca to get the 
2 1 height-to-width ratio didn't take into account the 
2 2 opening that was through the -- it wasn't a hundred-foot 
2 3 solid pillar. It was a 55-foot pillar. 
2 4 Q. When you say it wasn't a hundred-foot pillar; 
2 5 it was a 55-foot what do that? What 
1 dimension is that? 
2 A. The design of the pillar was -- well, what it 
3 turned out to be it was a 55-foot circular pillar 
4 surrounding the 5900 access drift. 
5 Q. So it was doughnut shaped? 
6 A. It was a doughnut. Right Okay. So the 
7 doughnut is 55 feet. 
8 Q. 55 feet what, wide? 
9 A. 55 feet in width. 
10 Q. And you believe Itasca assumed -- made an 
11 assumption that it was a hundred feet? 
12 A. Well, I -- the only way you get a 10-to- l 
13 height-to-width ratio I believe is if you assume it's a 
14 hundred. I don't know that. But, I mean, that's -- it 
15 appeared to me that that's the only way that -- it 
16 wasn't a 10-to-l. 
17 Q. And if it was really 55 feet, what would that 
18 reveal as to the height-to-width ratio? 
19 A. Well, I'm not sure how the height-to-width 
20 thing works on a circular pillar. But, I mean, it's a 
21 very substantial pillar, but it's not a -- it's half of 
22 the height-to-width that -- from my point of view. 
23 Q. So your belief at the time was that if in fact 
2 it was a 55-foot pillar, which is what you thought it 
25 was, that the height -- the real height-to-width ratio 
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than what Itasca 
component of their modeling? 
8 A. I'm not sure it's a -- how important the 
9 component is because it's only when you down to the 
10 failure mechanisms or whatever. 
11 Q. Are larger pillars with higher 
12 A. Well, obviousiy the larger the piilar the more 
13 stable the pillar. 
14 Q. And that was --
15 A. It's -- it's --
1 16 Q. -- a basic tenet of rock mechanics assessment 
1 7 is the larger the pillar generally the more stress it's 
18 able to withhold? 
19 A. Historically in the Coeur d'Alene Districts 
2 0 when pillars get below 30 feet -- 35 feet you tend to 
21 have pillar failures. And this is all pillars. So 
2 2 it's -- we haven't had significant pillar failures in 
2 3 pillars that have been over 35 feet in the pillar height 


























A. A rockburst. 
Q. -- a substantial rockburst that --
A. A substantial rockburst to destroy the pillar. 
Q. And you said historically in the Coeur d'Alene 
District pillars with a width-to-height ratio of three 
or less tend to ... 
A. Tend to become more prone to bursting than a 
larger pillar. 
Q. Not just more prone to bursting, a serious 
risk of complete failure of the pillar? 
A. Yes, yes, yes. That's true. 
Q. And where did you get that data? 
A. A lot of it was based on my Ph.D. thesis, 
which was done at the Galena Mine, in looking at their 
rockbursting -- or rockburst history. They had very 
well-kept maps and burst logs showing the height of the 
pillar with respect to the rockburst. And I think I 
drew a couple of graphs. And it was very obvious that 
once the pillar was reduced below 40 feet, the 
likelihood of a pillar bursting increased. 
Q. When you say below 40 feet that means --
A. 40 feet in thickness. 
Q. -- 4-to-l height-to-width ratio? 
Well 
i\1R. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. 







you look at height-to-
the width of the 
machine. 
once the pillar gets below a certain height, the stress 
goes up exponentially ahnost. And so then the pillar 
fails. And if it fails violently then you have a 
rockburst. If it crumbles, you just have a pillar 
failure. 
MR ROSSMAN: 
Q. But there's a correlation between not just the 
height of the pillar but also the width? 
A Yes, the width. 
Q. And you were seeing from your research at the 
Galena Mine a correlation that when a pillar got to 40 
feet or less, there was a substantially increased risk 






the could mine it 
experiment to drill and blast holes in the pillar to 
make it softer, change its properties. And it turned 
9 out that that -- that was effective. And so mines began 
10 doing that all over. 
1 Q. So when you were consulting with Hecla and 
you're referencing general width-to-height ratio in the 
Coeur d'Alene Mining District, you were basing that 
principally on this research you had done at the Galena 
Mine? 
A. Yes. 
1 7 Q. Where is the Galena Mine? 















A Yes. And this -- this is -- this observation, 2 O Q. And what were the rock properties of the 
I mean, it's used all -- it's obviously clear of any 21 Galena Mine as compared to the Lucky Friday silver mine? 
mine anywhere in the world that is in rock that is prone 2 2 A. The Lucky Friday silver mine and the Galena 
to fail violently. When the mine -- when the mining 2 3 Mine are primarily in Revett quartzite. The Lucky 
gets to a 40-foot pillar then they normally alter their 2 4 Friday was in -- it went through the upper Revett, the 
mining plans on how they're going to remove that pillar 2 5 middle Revett, lower Revett. I believe the Galena Mine 
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1 as opposed to continuing to mine it until it fails. 
2 Q. And at the Galena Mine where you were seeing 
3 these increased pillar failures, did that -- when you 
4 were talking about a 40-foot or less --
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. -- pillar height, did that correlate to a 
7 width-to-height ratio? Because I think you said they 
8 were 40 feet high, but how wide were they? 
9 A. The width is the width of the vein and the 
10 width of the opening. 
11 Q. And so --
12 A. So the opening -- if the opening is -- it 
13 didn't matter if the open -- most of the narrow vein 
14 openings are in the -- say -- say a nominal ten feet. 
15 We mine to basically equipment size as opposed to vein 
16 size. So with a nominal ten-foot width, when the pillar 
1 7 was in 40 feet you had a 4-to- l. And once the pillar 
18 was reduced in size, it was certainly prone to burst. 
19 Q. And so the pillars that were being utilized at 
2 0 the Galena Mine were generally ten-foot-wide pillars? 
21 A. It would be whatever the mining width was. 
2 2 But it's -- the mining generally you wind up with a 
2 3 eight- to ten-foot mining width. 
2 4 you develop many 
2 5 or pillar failures had the Galena Mine had from which 
WWW. 
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1 was primarily in the upper Revett. But the Revett --
2 most of the -- or many of the mines are in the Revett 
3 which is a very hard quartzite. The Sunshine Mine is 
4 partially in -- their burst-prone stopes were in the 
5 Revett quartzite. The Star Mine was in the Revett 
6 quartzite. 
7 Q. Would you say the Galena Mines were comparable 
8 rock properties from a rockburst potential to the Lucky 
9 Silver Mine? 
10 A. The Galena and the Lucky Friday were similar 
11 in rock properties. 
12 Q. Did you write a thesis based on your research 
1 3 at the Galena Mine regarding correlation between the 
14 size of the pillars and their failure potential? 
15 A. Yeah, that -- my Ph.D. thesis I think was 
1 6 rockburst mechanics. 
1 7 Q. And this would have the summary conclusions 
18 that --
19 A. Yes. 
2 0 Q. -- you were utilizing when you were consulting 
21 with Hecla in April of2010? 
2 2 A. Yes. Except that, of course, I will say that 
2 3 all mines are every mine is different; every stope is 
2 4 different. So there are some minor but the principle 
2 5 is the same. When you reach a certain pillar size and 
4 s 50 to 53) 
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9 A. That's absolutely correct. 
10 Q. Okay. Did you provide this thesis to Hecla at 
l l any time? 
12 A. It was published and -- and I'm -- yeah, I 
13 sent copies to -- I'm sure at the time in -- copies were 
1 4 sent to all the mining companies. 
15 Q. Do you peer review that type of research, that 
16 t-;pe of publication? 
1 7 A. It was a Colorado School of Mines Journal. So 
1 8 I -- it wasn't -- it was basically published -- well, it 
1 9 looked to me that it was published intact. 
2 0 Q. You would still have a copy of that thesis? 
21 A. I have a copy, yeah. 
2 2 Q. Can you provide that to Mr. Ramsden? 
23 A. Yes. 
2 4 Q. Okay. Just a copy of it. 
2 5 A. I think it's actually out of print now. But, 
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1 I mean, it's -- I can certainly provide him a copy. 
2 Q. Thank you. Now you say in paragraph 8 -- back 
3 to Exhibit No. 48. · 
4 A. 48. 
5 Q. Paragraph No. 8 says, "In the April 5 Blake 
6 Memo, I stated, 'I do have some doubts about the 
7 stability of the 5900 Drift Pillar."' 
8 Do you recall what the doubt -- what the basis 
9 was for your doubts about the stability of that pillar 
1 O at that time? 
11 A. Okay. Now, the -- I guess my -- I've always 
12 had a concern about the stability of the 5900 drift 
13 pillar in that it was going to continue to be loaded by 
14 mining, and we need to worry about the long-term 
15 stability as the mining in the Gold Hunter -- as the 
1 6 Gold Hunter continues to be mined out. 
1 7 Even though the stress isn't directly 
18 transferred to it, why, the extensive mining area causes 
1 9 this closure. And the closure is what squeezes the 
2 0 unmined portions of the pillar. And so as long as 
2 1 active mining was going on in the Gold Hunter, either 
2 2 below or if the top part was being mined -- although the 
I 2 3 current mining at that time was not -- was above the 
1 2 pillar, which doesn't really affect the mining 
2 5 the 59 -- or doesn't affect the load on the 5900 pillar 
1 
6 But anyway, as that main out 
7 as the mining continues below, the pillar is going to 
8 continue to be loaded, and the potential for bursting is 
9 always going to be there. 
0 Q. And you were communicating that to Hecla as 
11 far back as '06? 
12 A. That was my initial -- I think we always knew 
13 that, yes, that when you leave a pillar, there are 
14 consequences. And we need to address those 
15 consequences. 
16 Q. And continued mining is going to continue 
1 7 to --
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. -- put stress and --
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. -- load that pillar? 
2 2 A. Yes, yes. 
2 3 MR. RAMSDEN: Be sure and let him finish his 
2 4 question before you start your answer. I know you are 
2 5 tracking with him, but I want to make sure you have a 
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1 clean record. 
2 WJTNESS: Okay. I'm sorry. 
3 MR. ROSSMAN: That's fine. 
4 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
5 Q. And that was -- so that was one of the doubts 
6 you had about the stability of the 5900 drift pillar in 
7 April of 2010 was that continued mining was continuing 
8 to load that pillar? 
9 A. The long-term stability of the pillar, yes, 
1 0 is -- was a concern and continued to be a concern. 
11 Q. Did you also have concerns about the size of 
12 the pillar at that time? 
13 A. Well, not really about the size of it because 
1 4 you couldn't -- you couldn't really change -- I mean, 
15 the size of it was predetermined. 
1 6 Q. But as there's continued mining, there's --
1 7 A. The --
18 Q. -- closure at that pillar --
19 A. Well, the --
2 0 Q. -- correct? 
21 MR. RAMSDEN: Be sure and let him finish his 
2 2 question. Go ahead. 
2 3 THE WITNESS: Okay. The continued mining --
2 4 the continued that the continues 
2 5 to load the pillar. 
15 (Pa s 4 5 
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Object to form. 8 A That is correct. 
11IE WITNESS: -- doesn't necessarily reduce 9 Q. As long as there's sufficient substance or 
the width to the height. It's the stress increase owing 10 size to that pillar? 
to closure could cause the pillar to fail around the j 11 A. That's correct. 
edges. And it also couid cause the smaU rockbursts. 12 MK. ROSSMAN: Let's take a short break. We've 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 13 been going for a while. 
Q. So what were the long-term stability concerns 14 (A short break was taken.) 
you had about the pillar? 15 MR. ROSSMAN: Let's go back on the record. 
A The long-term stability was that at some point 
1 
16 BY MR. ROSSJ'vl.AN: 
in time we would have to do something more than the 1 7 Q. So back to Exhibit 48, paragraph 8. When you 
ground support that was in the pillar. 18 talked about long-term stability of the pillar, you 
Q. And did you provide any advice to Hecla as to 19 didn't know -- you hadn't done any analysis or 
when that point of time would occur? 2 0 evaluation to determine when the earliest that failure 
A. I didn't have any advice upon that time. 21 may occur? 
Q. Did you communicate to them how far in the 2 2 A. No. 
future they needed to be seriously concerned about 2 3 Q. And you never communicated to Hecla that you 
additional ground support monitoring at that pillar? 2 4 believed that that failure -- that there was an earliest 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the fonn. Go ahead j 2 5 date at which they could expect that failure to occur? 
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1 and answer. 
2 THE WITNESS: I don't -- I don't believe other 
3 than -- than I believe every memo that I wrote mentioned 
4 the 5900 pillar. I always mentioned a reservation that 
5 the, you know, continuing load on the pillar was a 
6 problem and that we need to make sure that the ground 
7 support was sufficient to contain the effects of a 
8 nearby rockburst. 
9 BY :MR. ROSSMAN: 
10 Q. So you were concerned about long-term 
11 stability. Did you do any analysis to determine what 
12 the stability was of that pillar as of April 5th, 2010? 
13 A. No, I didn't. Itasca apparently had done the 
14 study. I don't -- I'm not a mathematician, and I don't 
15 dabble anymore in these numerical models. So I didn't 
1 6 do any -- any further analysis. 
1 7 Q. But you saw the modeling that had been done by 
18 Itasca? 
1 9 A. I reviewed the modeling results. And, you 
2 0 know, I pointed out that the pillar would -- even though 
21 the -- there would be very little stress transfer from 
2 2 mining on the pillar that the closure was still --
2 3 continued to load the pillar. 
2 4 And you understood the 
2 5 that based upon their assumption of a 1 O-to-1 
1 A. No. 
2 Q. So we're talking about long-tenn stability. 
3 It also could be short-term instability? 
4 l\llR. RAMSDEN: Object, calls for speculation. 
5 THE WITNESS: There could be. But I didn't --
6 my concerns were the Iong-tem1 stability of the pillar 
7 not the short-tenn stability. 
B BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
9 Q. Because as of April 5th Itasca had just 
10 completed modeling of the short-term stability of the 
11 pillar; is that correct? 
1 ') 
.J. L. i\. Yes. 
13 Q. And that modeling had indicated, based upon 
14 its size, it was stable at that point in time? 
15 A. That's correct. 
16 Q. One other thing you mentioned, you mentioned 
1 7 that you did not believe mining above the 5900 level was 
18 causing at least direct stress on the 5900 pillar? 
19 A. That's correct. 
20 Q. You thought most of the direct stress was 
21 coming from mining below the pillar? 
A. That's correct. 22 
23 Q. But on November 16, 2011, there was a 2.8 
4 Richter scale correct? 
25 A. That's correct. 
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A. The blasting was being on 5500 yes. 
8 Q. And up until December 14, 2011, your 
9 assumption or belief was that this was a pillar burst at 
10 the 5900 level triggered by the blasting, correct? 
11 MR RAMSDEN: Object to form, mischaracterizes 
12 his report. Go ahead and answer. 
13 THE WITNESS: That is correct. 
14 BY MR ROSSMAN: 
15 Q. Okay. Let me have you look at Exhibit No. 15, 
16 please. 
1 7 A. (Complying.) 
1 8 Q. This appears to be a memo published by 
1 9 yourself and Mark Board, dated December 27, 2011, to 
2 0 Hecla management? 
21 A. That's correct. 
2 2 Q. What was the purpose of this memo? 
2 3 A. The purpose of the memo was to give Hecla 
2 4 observation and thoughts on what had happened, why it 
1 with -- particularly with respect to how to access the 
2 bypass drift that was going to replace the 5900 access. 
3 Q. So as of that point in time, obvious that the 
4 access to the Gold Hunter vein was going to have to come 
5 from a different location? 
6 A. Yes. That was not going to be rehabilitated, 
7 and they needed a new access. 
8 Q. Who authored this memo? 
9 A. Mark wrote the first -- wrote the first 
1 0 section, and I wrote the second section. 
11 Q. When you say the first section, what does that 
12 include? Up to where it says Introduction Wilson Blake? 
13 A. 1 to 6. And I think I wrote 7 to the end. 
14 Q. Okay. And was this a collaborative effort 











A. I believe Mark was asked to -- to give his 
opinion, and I was asked to give my opinion. And then 
they said combine them in the same memo but just 
separate it rather than his part and my part. 
Q. Looked to me like there was pretty significant 
agreement between you and Mark Board regarding the 
issues addressed in the memo. Is that fair to say? 
A I think that's fair to say. 
Did you provide to his section 
of the memo? 
1 A. No. We both visited the mine whatever 
that 
6 
7 Q. And so is it fair that you one of the 
8 purposes for conducting this investigation and 
9 submitting this memoranda was to come to a conclusion or 
0 opinion regarding the cause of both the November 16 and 
the December 14 bursts? 
12 A. Would you please re ... 
13 Q. Was one of the things you were trying to do 
14 was identify a cause for both of the bursts? 
15 A. I guess, yeah, because it wasn't clear where 
16 the original burst actually was. It was pretty obvious 
1 7 once we toured the -- from 4900 on down that the real 
18 damage and the real burst was not in the pillar itself. 
1 9 It was back up on the structure below the 5700 that 
2 0 failed. And it was just shock wave that had caused the 
21 damage to the 5900 pillar. I mean, that ... 
2 2 Q. So when you inspected from 4900 down, it 
2 3 became quite obvious to you that the source of the 
2 4 November 16th --
1 Q. -- burst was 
2 A Was not in the pillar itself 
3 Q. Let me finish. (Continuing.) -- was 
4 substantially -- was at a level above the 5900 pillar? 
5 A. That's correct. 
6 Q. And you believed it was a fault-slip --
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. -- was the originating cause for that burst? 
9 A. Yes. It was closure on a structure below the 
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1 0 5700 stope access. And I believe that drift was totally 
11 cut off. 
12 Q. Were you aware that there were fault lines in 
13 the mine? 
14 A. There were fault --yes. 
15 Q. You were aware of that all along, correct? 
1 6 A. That there were faults? 
1 7 Q. Yes, faults. 
18 A. The geology of the Gold Hunter was quite 
19 different than the geology of the Lucky Friday. And it 
2 0 wasn't until 2009 when the series of significant bursts 
2 1 stmted to show up that we actually could see where one 
2 2 of these bursts had intersected the access ramps. And 
2 3 this was either the F2 fault or the F3 fault. I'm not 
2 4 sure one it But to that geologists 
: 2 5 hadn't really mapped these structures as faults. 
7 (Pa s 62 0 6 
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not as a 
7 fault. And it took quite a bit of doing to get 
8 geology interested in mapping these structures. And 
9 they're not very prominent in the access openings, which 
1 0 are a hundred or more feet out in the wall -- in the 
11 footwall. 
12 Q. So when were these faults -- when were they 
1 3 mapping these faults? 
14 A. Pardon? 
15 Q. When was geology mapping these faults? 
1 6 A. After 2009 they started -- one of the 
1 7 geologists was trying to map the continuity. See, the 
1 8 problem with the fault is you have to have a number of 
1 9 openings. You have to have an opening here and an 
2 0 opening over here to draw the same line at the same 
2 1 orientation. 
2 2 If this is the -- if this is the orebody and 
2 3 this is the fault, you need a number of points along the 
2 4 fault before you can actually define it as a structure. 
2 5 And so it takes -- it took a little time and a number of 
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1 openings before they started connecting. They were able 
2 to connect the fault and have it be named a specific 
3 fault. 
4 Q. So if you look at page 2 of Exhibit 15, you've 
5 taken a photo of a couple fault planes at the 5700 ramp; 
6 is that correct? 
7 A. I believe Mark took those pictures, yeah. 
8 Q. Okay. Mark took those photos. And those 
9 appear to be pretty clearly fault planes in that photo, 
l O correct? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. It looks like there's an arm right next to the 
13 fault plane on the top photo, correct? 
1 4 A. The fault plane is actually the structure 
15 down -- I believe this is the fault plane here. 
16 (Indicating.) I'm not sure what this -- that's a 
1 7 vertical line that I'm ... 
18 Q. Well, it's referring to dilation of the fault, 
19 top picture, and shear movement at the bottom picture. 
2 0 A. Well, it's opening up above the fault. But 
2 1 the actual fault is down (indicating). 
2 2 Q. Was the fault visible from the 5700 ramp? 
2 3 A. At this point in time it was. It wasn't -- it 
2 4 wasn't identified when it was driven. It wasn't 
2 5 identified until after the bursting. We'd had several 
6 
7 And that paint would have been indication 
8 that -- or an identification of that as a fault plane, 
9 correct? 
1 0 A. Yes, that was identification. And it's also 
11 obvious that after that was painted there had been 
12 subsequent movement on it. 
13 Q. And that paint preexisted or had been placed 
14 there before the November 16th burst, correct? 
15 A. Yes. The fault was identified before the 
1 6 November 16th burst. 
1 7 Q. Had you seen that fault before on 
18 November 16th? 
1 9 A. I had seen the fault previous to 
2 0 November 16th. 
21 Q. How does a fault -- well, does a fault-slip 
2 2 contribute or can it contribute to rockbursting? 
2 3 A. Pardon? 
2 4 Q. Can a fault-slip contribute to rockbursting? 
2 5 A. There are what we call three 
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1 types of rockbursts. 
2 There are strain energy rockbursts which are 
3 small rockbursts which occur on the edge of openings 
4 just due to the stress. There are pillar bursts which 
5 is a specific structure that becomes overstressed. And 
6 then there are these fault-slip bursts which are 
7 movements induced on structures that intersect the mine 
8 or intersect the mined-out areas. And so they have 
9 three distinct mechanisms. 
10 The fault-slip bursts, well, can have 
11 magnitudes up to 5.6 Richter scale. They can displace 
12 over thousands of feet. The pillar bursts are very 
13 local. And, of course, the strain energy bursts are 
14 even more local. 
15 Q. So pillar bursts and strain bursts are a 
16 result of a release of energy at the particular --
1 7 A. At the pru.ticular location. Whereas the 
18 fault-slip bursts are generally a result of a very 
19 extensive mined-out area. And they're driven by this 
2 O mine closure. And as the -- the rocks want to move 
2 1 towards the mined-out opening, sometimes they get --
2 2 they get impeded by locked-up portions across one of 
2 3 these faults. And suddenly it will release, and you'll 
the to 
2 5 Q. So is it difference between release of energy 
18 66 to 6 
1 
transfer 
it over a 6 
much more widespread volume because the -- the energy in A. That's correct 
8 the -- in a small event, as I say, it's very localized. 8 Q. Which did indicate to you that there was not a 
in the fault-slip it can be over thousands of 
10 feet. 
9 complete de-stressing of that pillar? 
0 A. That's correct. 
11 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 11 Q. Whereas a strain burst can cause considerable 
12 Q. So a strain burst results from a release of 12 de-stressing at the location of the pillar? 
1 3 energy; is that correct? 13 A. That's correct. 
1 4 A. That's correct. 14 Q. And obviously a pillar burst is a complete or 
115 substantially complete release of energy? 
1 6 A. That's also correct, yes. 
15 Q. And if it's a strain burst, it can be a 
16 partial release but not complete release of energy? 
1 7 A. Yes. 1 7 Q. Is the type of damage associated with a 
18 Q. And a fault-slip, if I understand this 
19 correctly, can be an impact from a cause at another 
2 0 location of the mine? 
18 fault-slip different in appearance generally than the 
19 type of damage from a strain burst or a pillar burst? 
2 0 A. Very much so. 
21 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the -- 21 Q. In what way? 
22 THE WITNESS: Yes. The fault-slip is 2 2 A. The type of damage is primarily large slabs of 
2 3 basically -- as I say, the driving force is the fact 
2 4 that we've created this -- this huge mined-out area of 
2 5 the mine. And so all the rocks out here want to --
2 3 rock ejected off the walls, a lack of dust. And when I 









want to fill that opening. And as they slowly try to --
as we continue to mine and they want to come closer 
together, then sometimes that closure is -- is not 
constant and it will hang up and you don't get the 
closure and suddenly you get a fault-slip and it 
releases this large amount of energy because suddenly 
you get a large amount of closure over a large area. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
9 Q. Does a fault-slip at another location that 
10 impacts a pillar, does it necessarily result in a 
11 release of energy at the location of the pillar? 
2 5 don't -- when it's a local strain 
1 burst or a pillar burst, you pulverize the rock and so 
2 that there's a lot of dust. \Vhereas in a fault-slip 
burst, you have large slabs and it's -- they're ejected 
off the wall. And it's a very different type oflooking 







Q. And is fault-slip damage at a remote location 
typically characterized by isolated location like we had 
here just at the top of the pillar? 
9 A. Where it impacts the opening, it would -- you 
10 would normally see rock reflected off of. In the other 
11 areas of the mine, there was no -- we didn't see 
12 A. Generally it doesn't. In this case it 12 anything like we saw at the 5900. 
13 happened to because of the -- the way the wave fonn from 13 Q. And then when -- when you access the 5700 
14 the fault, the location and the way it propagated, it 14 drift after December 14th, were there indications at 
15 had the -- along the fill it can't -- the wave doesn't 15 that location that told you this was a fault-slip --
16 go through the fill. It goes -- the direct path is 16 this November 16th burst was a fault-slip? 
1 7 straight down to that opening. 1 7 A. The November 16th burst? I'm not sure -- I'm 
18 So it was kind of concentrated as opposed to 18 not sure how far we could go up this 57 access ramp. 
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19 you throw a -- drop a rock in the water and you see the 19 The bottom part of the ramp was all broken up and bulged 
2 0 waves ripple out and it goes out. Well, the seismic 2 O and the rock was contained. But I was under the 
21 waves are very similar. But in this case the seismic 21 impression that you could look up and see where the 
2 2 wave was more focused because you can look at the 2 2 fault had actually cut off the 5700 drift, but ... 
2 3 mined-out area as being empty. So it was focused along 2 3 Q. But you were able to inspect above the 5900 
24 
j25 
the mined-out area and until it hit that pillar. 2 4 after the December 14th correct? 
Q. So at 5900 it was a focused release of energy 2 5 A. After the December 14 burst, we inspected the 
19 (Pa 70 
you said one of the drifts was 
8 unusable? 
9 A. Yeah, the 5700 drift was -- the access was 
10 lost. 
11 Q. And you believe that occurred on November 16? 
12 A. That was the -- that's what we believe was 
1 3 the -- where the main slip occurred and cut off that 
14 access. 
15 Q. And that's a strong indication of a fault-slip 
16 is not -- something other than localized damage? 
1 7 A. That's -- that's very -- very widespread 
18 damage. 
1 9 Q. And that's what you observed when you accessed 
2 0 the 5700 level on December 20th? 
2 1 A. That's correct. 
2 2 Q. And then there were also indications by 
2 3 looking at the fault plane that this was, on 
2 4 November 16th, in reality a fault-slip, correct? 
2 5 A. There was movement on structures 
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1 over a fairly widespread area. 
2 Q. And Mark is identifying he's seeing some 
3 dilation in the top photograph of the fault? 
4 A. Yes, where they -- the rocks that look like 
5 they relaxed. 
6 Q. That's consistent with a fault-slip? 
7 A. Yes. And the -- then there was actually shear 
8 displacement along the bottom. Where you could see that 
9 there -- some movement had occurred because obviously 
10 the paint was whacked off indicating that there was some 
11 movement along that -- some motion along that structure. 
12 Q. You could clearly see that by looking at this 
13 fault plane at the 5700 level where it had been painted 
14 that there had been some movement in that location? 
1 5 A. Yes, that's correct I 16 Q. And the understanding or the belief was that 
1 7 that movement occurred on November 16, 2011? 
1 8 A. That's correct. 
19 Q. All right. Now, Mark on page 2 refers to the 
2 0 damage that resulted from the November 16 event 
21 That's --
2 2 A. This damage. 
23 Q. Yeah. (Continuing.) -- "which appeared to be 
2 4 shakedown from the roof of the drift in the orezone. 
2 5 The particle size from this event was large, with no 
6 
7 
8 A. That's correct. 
crushed rock. 
9 Q. But you didn't see that fine rock powder or 
1 0 dust that you would typically see in strain or pillar 
11 burst? 
12 A. That's true. 
13 Q. And you were identifying that early on, even 
14 in your November memos? 
1 5 A. That's correct. 
16 Q. And he also references, "The damage zone was 
1 7 contained within the ore pillar, and appeared to stop 
18 abruptly in the wall rock on the footwall side." 
1 9 That's something that's consistent with a 
2 0 fault-slip as well, isn't it? 
21 A. That's also correct, yes. 
2 2 Q. That's not usually consistent with a strain or 
2 3 pillar burst? 
2 4 A. True. That's correct. 
2 5 Was there else that we haven't 
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1 discussed that you observed from your December 20th 
evaluation or inspection of the mine that caused you to 
3 believe that the November 16th burst was in fact a 
4 fault-slip? 
5 A. Well, primarily the widespread damage as 
6 opposed to the localized damage, the large volume of 
7 rock that was disturbed, and particularly the -- the 





structures crossed the access openings in the -- that 
54 access ramp. 
Q. So when you inspected the 5900 pillar after 
12 the November 16th burst, you saw these large rocks had 
13 come down from the roof of the pillar? 
1 4 A. Yeah. The only access was just standing --
1 5 the day after the pillar burst, you stood there and here 
16 was this big pile of rocks. And, of course, here were 
1 7 the pipes and the cables and all this stuff down. And 
18 all you saw was this pile of rubble but mostly large 






that there was intact rock on the roof. 
Q. And without that powdered rock or that dust --
A. 
Q. it didn't appear that there had been a 
!VI.UlUCvU energy at 
I 2 5 correct? 
20 ( Pa s 74 to 7) 
east 
7 even at the location 
8 largely intact? 
9 A. Very intact. 
10 Q. And very much appeared to be still carrying 
11 load or stress? 
12 A. Correct. Yeah, they did. They looked 
13 unchanged. 
14 Q. Unchanged from before the November 16th--
15 A. Unchanged from before. 
16 Q. There's reference to -- and this is on page 5, 
17 the last sentence before December 14 Event. It says, 
18 "The large size of the ejected blocks and the continued 
19 obvious high stress in the pillar after the event 
20 (evidenced by breakage to a solid, arching back and 
21 popping of the rock) indicate that this event occurred 
22 remotely from the pillar." 
23 What is "arching back"? Do you know what 
24 that's referencing? 
25 A. The of the back after the -- was 
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1 hit by the shock wave, the back had -- it had arched 
2 into a -- into a into an arch. In other words, the 
3 form of the back had resulted into an arch and 
4 indicating that the normally fractured rock above an 
5 opening -- when you create an opening, and particularly 
6 a near-rectangular opening in highly stressed ground, 
7 the rock fractures above it. And it kind of fractures 
8 up to an arch. I mean, arch is the stable -- stable 
9 resistant form. And that -- that's what happened. 
1 O All the loose rock that was -- and broken rock 
11 that was immediately above the 5900 pillar drift was 
12 gone. And it had -- it was left -- you were left with 
13 what appeared to be a stable arch -- arched roof. 
14 Q. And what does that domed appearance indicate 
15 to you from a rock mechanics standpoint? 
1 6 A. It indicates that the back is still stable. 
1 7 And it indicates that it's likely carrying load. 
18 Q. And then it says "and popping of the rock 
1 9 indicate that this event occurred remotely from the 
2 0 pillar." 
21 What popping of the rock is being referenced 
22 there? 
2 3 A. It refers back to, I believe, when they were 
2 4 the 5900 pillar. to it 
2 5 they -- of course, after you remove all the pipes and 
3 
that the actual back 
6 of stuff off 
7 that it's still stressed. 
8 Q. You're saying spalling, s-p-a-1-1 --
9 A. S-p-a-1-1-i-n-g. That's a -- in stressed 
10 ground, the rock could just -- it kind of flakes off. 
11 Q. And that popping sound that they were --
12 A. That little popping sound is the rock popping, 
13 spalling off. It's very typical in deep underground 
14 mines when the rock -- when you're driving any kind of 
15 an opening and the -- there's stress at the face or 
16 there's stress in the back, as when you -- when you go 
17 to drill it, it just pops and spalls. And it's an 
18 indication that it's stressed. 
19 Q. And when rock is popping and spalling when 
120 you're trying to drill it, that's an indication it's 
21 carrying a significant amount of stress? 
22 A. It's -- it indicates -- it's a significant 
23 amount of stress, but it's almost normal. In fact, 
24 there's oftentimes that when that -- in the old overhand 
25 when that didn't when it should have been 
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1 happening, the miners become more concerned than -- it's 
2 kind of a normal consequence of advancing an opening in 
3 stressed ground. That when it's working, it's, you 
4 know, trying to relieve itself. It's when it stops that 
5 and it's kind of storing energy somewhere that this used 
6 to give the old miners an indication that it's time to 
7 get the hell out. 
8 Q. How did you develop the understanding that 
9 there was popping and spalling of rock while bolts were 
1 0 attempting to be drilled --
11 A. I was --
12 Q. -- while bolts were attempting to be drilled 
13 during the rehabilitation? 
14 A. I was told that when I visited the site and 
15 talking to the crew. 
16 Q. That was in November of 2011? 
1 1 7 A. That was in November. 
I 1 s Q. And the crew was telling you when we're trying 
19 to drill these bolts, we're hearing popping, cracking 
2 0 and some spalling of rock from the wall, correct? 
21 A. They said, yes, that it -- it was popping and 
2 2 spalling as they were drilling the holes for the bolts. 
2 3 Q. Do you recall which miners told you that? 
2 A. I can't I don't remember any 
25 names. 
2 (Pa 8 to 81) 
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were several of them that 
there was at I think was 
8 Do you recall Bayer being with you? 
9 A You know, I don't remember if Doug was with me 
10 not. 
11 And do you recall a specific location where 
12 the miners were particuiariy commenting about popping 
1 3 and cracking and spalling? 
1 4 A I think they had -- they had mentioned that 
1 S when they -- when they started drilling it was popping 
1 6 and spalling. 
1 7 Q. There was a particular wall that they were 
18 mentioning was popping and spalling when they were 
1 9 trying to drill, correct? 
2 O MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. 
21 THE WITNESS: I'm -- I'm not sure if it was 
2 2 the whole thing or if it was just the -- immediately 
2 3 above when they started or just to the -- to the west. 
2 4 I don't think it was the east side. I think it was the 
2 5 west then. 
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1 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
2 Q. Do you recall the miners attempting to install 
3 Dywidags in that east wall? 
4 A. Well, I believe that, you know, all work stops 
5 when you go up to look at it. So at the time they 
6 were -- they were drilling holes to install the 
7 Dywidags. And I was only up there probably for, say, 
8 five minutes. And I took a couple pictures and wrote my 
9 notes and then you get out of their way so they can go 
1 0 back to work 
11 Q. Would you still have those pictures? 
12 A. Yeah, I have them somewhere. 
13 Q. And do you recall which wall they were 
14 attempting to drill when you visited the pillar? 
15 A. As I say, I believe it was the west wall. 
16 Although, I think they'd already installed -- installed 
1 7 most of the rock bolts -- the initial rock bolts. 
18 Q. What's a Dywidag? 
19 A. A Dywidag is a like a large piece of 
2 0 grouted rebar. It's steel. It's a thread bar bolt. 
21 And you have to insert resin cartridges into the rock 
2 2 and then you push it in and you break up these resin 
2 3 cartridges and it glues it into the rock. 
2 4 And is a Dywidag than an 
2 5 split set? 
8 
7 A We generally install a combination split 
8 sets and Dywidags. And normally the split sets come in 
9 specific sizes. And in many cases if you want to drill 
10 a long hole, you put two Dywidags together with a 
11 coupling and you'll put this longer support in. 
12 The Dywidags are more permanent support than 
1 3 the -- the split sets are -- are -- can be prone to 
14 rusting and the heads pop off easier than the -- than on 
15 the Dywidags. 
16 Q. Do you know if an 8-foot split set is easier 
1 7 to install in a stressed wall than a Dywidag? 
18 A The installation is -- is pretty -- it's the 
19 drilling of the hole that causes -- that disrupts the --
2 0 causes the popping or spitting. The split sets are 
21 easier to install because you just, boom, they're 
2 2 installed. You don't have to push the cartons of glue 
2 3 up in the hole and then push the drill in and then you 
2 4 have to spin them in and -- and so that the glue mixes 
2 5 and bolts it or -- and cements it to the walls. 
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l Q. And the split set is designed to expand once 
2 it's in the hole? 
3 A. Yeah. You just boom. It's a much easier bolt 
4 to install. 
5 Q. Do you recall if the miners were able to 
6 install any Dywidags on that east wall during the 
7 rehabilitation? 
8 A. They -- yeah, they did. They were -- they 
9 installed Dywidags, I believe, everywhere. 
l O Q. Did you take any pictures of those? 
11 A. I'm not sure what -- if the -- I was mainly 
12 interested in -- my pictures -- I took pictures of some 
13 of the old instrument holes which had actually gone 
14 egg-shaped instead of the round shape, which indicated 
15 that they -- the holes had deformed. 
16 Q. So explain what these holes were. What were 
1 7 they? 
18 A. These were -- they there had been a number 
19 of different holes drilled into the 5900 pillar at that 
2 0 location. The initial ground support. And then when we 
2 1 drilled these instrument holes, we drilled horizontal 
2 2 holes but in addition the Bureau of Mines had put in 
2 3 some instrumented cable bolts, and they had also put in 
J 2 4 instrumented some instrumented rock bolts. So there 
i 2 5 was still some instrumented cable bolt holes. And you 





the "1nT1P.>l'r"1nrP / 
A. No. You -- in November the -- you couldn't 
see the horizontal holes because they were covered up. 
The vertical holes, you could see that the vertical 
1 O holes had become egg-shaped. And it's not clear exactly 
11 when whether that egg-shaping had taken place before 
12 the burst or commensurate with the burst. But 
1 3 presumably before the burst. 
14 Q. And what causes that egg-shaping as opposed to 
5 a dome shaping? 
1 6 A. The actual pressure on the ... 
17 Q. And you noted that when you visited the site 





Q. And your observations were that that looked a 
lot like a strain burst as opposed to something else? 
It looked very much -- very typical of a 
1 0 strain burst. The rock was in small fragments. It was 
11 pushed out against the -- the culvert. And it -- it 
12 appeared to be a close-in strain-type event. 
13 Q. And then on page 6 it says, "This appears to 
1 4 be a typical strain burst mechanism resulting from the 
15 solid pillar in the wall of the 5900 drift reaching its 
1 6 peak strength." Did you agree with that statement? 
17 A. I would agree with that statement. 
18 Q. You believe that on December 14, 2011, the 
19 
20 
A. Yes, standing up on the muck pile. 1 9 wall where the strain burst occurred had reached it's 
Q. Now, if we look at page 6, you're talking 2 0 peak strength? 
2 1 about the December 14th event and what your and Mark's 2 1 A. It certainly reached its strength and failed, 
2 2 opinions regarding the cause of that was, correct? 2 2 yes. 
23 A. Okay. This is... 2 3 Q. Okay. And then it says, "It appears that the 
24 
25 
Q. If you look at the immediate previous page. 2 4 causing mechanism of this event was the November 16 
A. Uh-huh. 2 5 event." Did with that statement? 
1 Q. There's a title called December 14 Event. 
2 A. Okay. 
3 Q. And then if you continue onto page 6, the 
4 first paragraph is identifying what you believe to be 
5 the cause of that rockburst; is that correct? 
6 A. Well, this is Mark's. 
7 Q. Mark's identifying in your collective memo --
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. -- what he believed to be -- what you believed 
1 0 to be the cause of that burst; is that correct? 
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11 A. Okay. "The December 14 event appears to have 
12 occurred directly in the 5900 pillar, in the immediate 
13 east rib of the 5 900 drift." 
14 Q. So as opposed to the November event, it 
15 appeared the damage was isolated at the 5900 level? 
16 A. That's correct. 
1 7 Q. As compared to the November event, it appeared 
18 that the damage was more consistent with a strain burst? 
1 9 A. That's correct. 
2 0 Q. You had the fragmented, the dusted rock? 
21 A. From -- from what you could see, yes. It 
2 2 was -- it was -- because the area was taped off, you 
2 3 couldn't get -- you couldn't really get very close to 
2 4 the I don't know if it the that 
2 5 shows the -- this on page 3. 
WWW. 
1 A. I don't know that I would agree with that 
2 statement that the -- the November 16 event obviously 
3 did result in a reduction in the size of the pillar. 
4 Q. Well, Mark says, "The November 16 event 
5 ejected rock from the 5900 drift, expanding the drift 
6 size, reducing the width:height ratio of the pillar (to 
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7 around 3: 1 ), and increasing the mining-induced stress in 
8 the pillar." Do you agree with that statement? 
9 A. That certainly is true. 
10 Q. And if we look at your section on page 11 
11 regarding the December 14th burst, you say in the first 
12 sentence, "The 2.8 burst shockwave damage to the 5900 
13 pillar reduced the size of this pillar, as well as its 
14 height to width ratio" --
15 A. That's correct. 
16 Q. -- "in effect, increasing the stress in this 
1 7 pillar and making it more burst prone." That was your 
18 conclusion, correct? 
1 9 A. Yes. That is true. 
2 O Q. Did you agree that the November 16 event 
21 reduced the width-height ratio of the pillar to around 
22 3-to-l? 
2 3 A. I would agree that that's probably the case. 
2 4 And in November of 2011 you had read or as 
2 5 of November of 2011, you had read the modeling that had 
( a s 8 6 to 8 9) 
1 
you knew 
7 that that burst had substantially changed the 
8 width-to-height ratio of that pillar? 
9 A. That's correct. 
10 Q. In fact, it reduced the width-height ratio by 
11 about two-thirds? 
12 A. That's right. 
13 Q. And you knew that in November of 2011, 
14 correct? 
15 A. That is correct. 
16 Q. And, in fact, you communicated that to Hecla 
17 through your memos at that time; isn't that correct? 
18 A. That's correct. 
19 Q. By the width-height ratio being so 
20 substantially changed as a result of that November 16th 
21 event, did that affect the validity -- continued 
22 validity of the modeling that had been done? 
23 A. (Nonresponsive.) 
24 Q. In other words, does modeling based upon a 
25 1 O-to-1 width-to-height ratio still carry its validity 
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1 when the pillar has been reduced to a 3-to-1 ratio? 
2 A. No. I don't think those -- the same model 
3 results would -- would apply to the new geometry. 
4 Q. And so, in effect, the November 16th event 
5 rendered the modeling largely invalid at that point for 
6 that pillar? 
7 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. 
8 THE WITNESS: I would have to -- I would agree 
9 with that. 
10 (Enter Mr. Clary.) 
11 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
12 Q. Now, after the incident on November 16th, you 
13 were contacted by Hecla; is that correct? 
1 4 A. That's correct. 
15 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 49 was 
16 marked for identification.) 
1 7 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
18 Q. Showing you Exhibit 49. Exhibit 49 appears to 
19 be an e-mail from jhill@hecla-mining.com to you, cc'd to 
2 O John Jordan on November 16, 2011, at 5:40 a.m. Is that 
21 correct? 
2 2 A. That's correct. 
2 3 Q. And who's Jess Hill? 
2 4 A. Jess was an at the mine. 
2 5 He says, "We have had a substantial rock burst 
you 
7 November 16th? 
8 A. I believe I did. 
9 Q. And did you inspect the damage at the 5900 
10 pillar on that date? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Did anyone at Hecla tell you what they wanted 
13 you to do as a result of that rockburst? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Did you have an understanding as to what your 
16 assignment was as a consultant at that point? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. How did you develop that understanding? 
19 A. Basically, it's over the years they they've 
20 had the problem; I investigate, tell them what I think 
21 caused the problem and tell them what they have to do to 
22 deal with it. 
23 Q. And was that your understanding on this 
24 occasion? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. So do you recall visiting the mine on 
2 November 16, 2011? 
3 A. Correct. 
4 Q. When you first went into the mine, where did 
5 you go? Directly to the pillar? 
6 A. The only place I went was to the 5900 pillar. 
7 Q. Who was with you? 
8 A. I couldn't -- I don't remember. Obviously 
9 someone from the department. I'm not sure 
1 0 who it was or I'm not sure ... 
11 Q. Did Doug Bayer visit --
12 A. I don't believe Doug was with me. 
13 Q. What did you observe when you went to the 5900 
14 pillar? 
15 A. We went out to the 5900 pillar. I guess their 
16 crews were in the process of rerouting electrical -- or 
1 7 doing something with electrical wires and the pipes. 
18 Q. So before you'd even had a chance to inspect 
19 the pillar, they already had crews working in there? 
2 0 A. Well, I think they were trying to take care of 
21 water or electricity, that the live wires I think they 
2 2 were doing something. The mine was there doing 
2 3 something about that. 
2 4 Let me make sure I an answer the 
2 5 question. Before you even had a chance to inspect the 
24 s 0 to 9 
on the floor. I went up to the -- I took 
8 that picture. Looked at the size of the fragments, 
9 looked at the lack of dust. I tried to see as -- get 
1 0 into a position to look up at the -- what was left 
4 
11 intact. I was probably there just four or five minutes. 
12 Q. It appeared that a large piece of rock had 
1 3 come down from the --
1 4 A. You could see --
15 Q. Hang on. (Continuing.) -- a large piece of 
1 6 rock had come down from the roof of the pillar? 
1 7 A. It was apparent that big slabs had -- were on 
1 8 the muck pile. 
19 Q. And the muck pile was isolated at a particular 
2 0 location within the drift? 
21 A. Right at the -- in front of the pillar. 
2 2 Q. And the walls appeared to be largely left 
2 3 intact? 
2 4 A. The walls were largely left intact. 
2 5 Q. And you also referenced "The walls along the 
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1 instrument-" -- this is from your November 18th memo. 
2 And you can certainly look at it It's Exhibit 14. 
3 It's in that pile, Exhibit 14. 
4 A. (Complying.) Okay. 
5 Q. "The walls along the instrument-" -- and this 
6 is the top of the first paragraph on page 2. The first 
7 sentence. "The walls along the instrumentation cut out 
8 appeared to have come in some 10 or more ft." What did 
9 you mean by that, they had come in ten or more feet? 
10 A. It appeared that they had --
11 Q. Squeezed? 
12 A. -- that the size of the opening had been 
13 expanded ten feet and the back had gone up maybe 15 
14 feet. 
15 Q. And what did that to you the fact 
6 that the walls had come in some ten feet or more and the 
17 back had arched up into a dome some 15 feet above the 
18 original back? 
19 A. Well, obviously the size of the pillar was 
20 reduced. 
21 Q. You said, "The back and upper ribs did not 
22 appear to be fractured or broken up as was expected. 11 
23 What does that mean? 
4 Had this been a classic pillar then the 
25 back and ribs would have been highly fractured and it 
wrn1 lrl h,iv£> heen all 
So it did not 
wasn't. If 
but I didn't -- it wasn't obviously a classic pillar 
8 burst. 
9 Q. And there was no dusting or powdering of the 
1 0 rock material at that location consistent with a pillar 
11 or strain burst, correct? 
12 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. In fact, they were large slabs of rock which 
1 4 were inconsistent with a pillar or strain burst, 
15 correct? 
1 6 A. That's correct. 
1 7 Q. And you also concluded from that visit that 
18 the dimensions, the width-height -- width and height of 
1 9 the pillar had substantially changed, correct? 
2 0 A. That's correct. 
21 Q. Did anyone tell you during your visit on 
2 2 November 16th that there was damage in other areas of 
23 the mine? 
2 4 A. Yes. They did say there was damage back up in 



























Q. Did they tell you where in the mine there was 
damage? 
A. They weren't specific about it I can't 
remember. I think I may have asked them to send me 
photos. I don't know if! got those photos. 
Q. Did Hecla ever give you photos of damage at 
any other area of the mine? 
A. I did receive that information. I'm not sure 
if it was later that afternoon or a few days later. But 
I did see the pictures that were taken, I don't know, by 
Doug Bayer or someone who -- who went around the 
backside and -- that initial damage. 
Q. Okay. If you had been sent pictures of damage 
at other areas of the mine, would those pictures be in 
your file? 
A. I'm sure I have those pictures in my file 
somewhere. 
Q. Can you provide those to Mr. Ramsden? 
A. I think I already have provided them. 
MR. RAMSDEN: They've been produced. 
MR. ROSSMAN: If they're already in the 
production, I will look more closely. 
BY MR ROSSMAN: 
What were you able to 
those pictures? 
from at 
2 (Pages 94 to 97) 
as tYnY\n<ct>n 
7 from a fault-slip event. 
8 Q. Your ultimate conclusion, though, in December 
9 was that the November 16th burst was caused by a 
10 fault-slip event, correct? 
11 A. That's correct. 
12 Q. And one of the major things that you focused 
13 on was the amount of damage at areas other than the 5900 
14 pillar, areas above the 59 --
15 A. That's correct. 
16 Q. And did you ask Hecla if you could inspect 
1 7 that damage at the 5700 pillar? 
1 8 A. That -- I never did inspect that damage until 
1 9 later. I'm not sure. There wasn't time that day to go 
2 0 apparently back around. And the next time I went, I 
21 didn't see it either. 
2 2 Q. But you went back to the mine on -- subsequent 
2 3 or after November 16, 2011, didn't you? 
24 A. Yes. 
2 5 Q. And you inspected the pillar again, correct? 
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1 A. That's correct. 
2 Q. And you issued a memo on November 25th, 201 
3 based on your observations? 
4 A. That's correct. 
5 Q. Did you ask to observe the 5700 pillar on that 
6 occasion? 
7 A. I don't recall asking it. I wasn't taken 
8 there. 
9 Q. Did anyone tell you that the damage was so 
10 substantial to the 5700 pillar that it caused the pillar 
11 to actually be destroyed or closed? 
12 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. 
13 Mischaracterizes what the witness has previously said. 
14 Go ahead. 
15 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure that -- I certainly 
16 wasn't aware of the severity of the damage even from 
1 7 looking at the photos. And I wasn't aware that the 
1 8 damage was as substantial as it was. 
19 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
2 0 Q. What causes you to conclude that you weren't 
2 1 aware of that? 
2 2 A. Pardon? 
2 3 Q. What causes you to conclude that you were not 
2 4 aware of the extent damage at the 5700 level? 




wouldn't have done but my idea 
the mechanism of the burst was and where it was. 
8 Q. If you had been able to see the 5700 level 
9 prior to December 14, 2011, you would have concluded it 
1 O was a fault-slip? 
11 A. I would have concluded that the burst was not 
12 a foundation failure of the 5900 pillar, that the burst 
13 was a fault-slip burst off of the 5700 and it was shock 
14 wave damage. 
15 Q. Did you ever ask to go to the 5700 level in 
16 November of201 l? 
1 7 A. You know, I'm not sure that I did. And I 
18 don't -- I'm not sure why we didn't visit that at the 
19 time. 
2 0 Q. Did anyone explain to you that there was 
2 1 enough damage to that drift to cause the drift to close? 
2 2 A. I guess I wasn't -- I wasn't aware of the 
2 3 severity of it. 
2 4 Q. And if you had known the severity of it, would 
2 5 you have wanted to see it? 
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1 1 A. Oh, yes. You -- you really have to visually 
2 
3 
see something. The pictures don't really give you the 
overall flavor of the -- of the extent of damage. 
4 Q. But you believe, based on what you observed on 
5 November 16, 2011, that the damage at the 5900 pillar 
6 looked a lot more like a fault-slip than it did a pillar 
7 or strain burst? 
8 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, mischaracterizes prior 
testimony and his report. Go ahead and answer. 
l lo MR. ROSSMAN: Is that correct? I 11 THE WITNESS: Pardon? 
12 MR. RAMSDEN: I said it mischaracterizes your 
13 prior testimony and your report. Go ahead and answer. 
14 WITNESS: Oh, no. As I mentioned, it 
15 was -- it was curious that the damage did not look like 
1 6 a pillar burst. 
1 7 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
18 Q. And if you look back at Exhibit 47, please. 
A. (Complying.) 19 
20 Q. That's your e-mail correspondence with Mark 
21 Board on November 17, 2011; is that correct? 
22 A. Yes. 
2 3 Q. And in your -- this is after your visit to the 
2 4 on correct? 
2 5 A. Mm-hmm. 


























on November your visit to 
the second paragraph, you say, "MSHA up 7 
and they have started repairing." 8 
You say they have started repairing. Who was 9 
repairing? 1 o 
A. Who is they? 11 
Q. Yeah. They have started repairing. Who was 12 
repairing? 1 3 
A. The mine. 1 4 
Q. What were they repairing? 1 5 
A. They started repairing the 5900 drift. 1 6 
Q. So they had crews in there repairing the 5900 1 7 
drift prior to November 17 at 10: 10 a.m.; is that 18 
correct? 19 
A. That would be correct. ! 2 0 
Q. And you hadn't given them any memos as of that ! 21 
date, correct? 2 2 
A. That's correct. 2 3 
Q. And you hadn't provided them any advice or 2 4 
opinions regarding the stability of that pillar at that 
1031 1 Page 
point, correct? 
A. All I had -- all I had said I said verbally 
that the back appears to be solid and you need to watch 
out that it's likely stressed. I gave them that verbal 
at the mine. And proceed with caution. 
Q. Based on your observations of the walls at 
5700, did it appear that any stress had been released 
from the walls as a result of the November 16th burst? 
\ ~ 
I f 7 
8 
9 A. It didn't appear to be anything released from 






11 Q. And when we -- if we look at your -- the 
12 second paragraph of your e-mail, you say, "will go in 
13 cautiously as the domed back looks almost perfect." 
14 Vi/hat does that mean? 
15 A. Where is this? 
16 Q. This is the second paragraph of your e-mail to 









A. Okay. So what I had told them, as it appeared 18 
1 9 to me, that the back was still stressed and that they / 19 
2 O should proceed with caution. I' 2 0 
21 Q. And you said "will go in cautiously as the 21 
2 2 domed back looks almost perfect" Who are you referring . 2 2 
2 3 to as going in cautiously? I 2 3 
I 
24 A. That's the crews that are to be i 4 
2 5 Hecla doing the rehab. / 2 5 
You say, to see 
rock, like round, but the huge slabs and no dust, as 
well as the back looking intact, suggest fault 
initiation through the pillar"; correct? 
A. That's what I said, yes. 
Q. That was your initial conclusion on 
November 17, 2011, after your visit; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And that ultimately was what you concluded to 
be the cause of the November 16th burst, correct? 
A. That's -- that is true. 
Q. Yet the memo you issued the next day on 
November 18, 2011, didn't indicate the cause of the 
rockburst to be a fault-slip, did it? 
A I mentioned that it suggested fault initiation 
through the pillar. But since there was no fault 
through the pillar, I obviously then suggested it could 
be a foundation failure. 
Q. But fault initiation through the pillar, it 
doesn't have to be a fault through the pillar, does it, 
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for it to cause a rockburst similar to what you saw? 
A It was obviously a fault-slip that caused the 
rockburst. Now -- again, this was my -- my thought at 
the time in this to -- to -- in my memo to Mark. 
Q. Was it obviously a fault-slip on November 17, 
2011? 
A Well, it certainly wasn't a pillar burst. 1 
suggested a fault initiation through the pillar. 
Q. By suggesting a fault initiation through the 
pillar, you're suggesting exactly what you concluded on 
December 27, 2011, isn't it? 
MR. R.Ai\.1SDEN: Object, argumentative. 
THE \VITNESS: Well, except the fault wasn't 
through the pillar. 
MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Okay. 
A. The fault -- it was -- it certainly was a 
fault-slip event, but it wasn't through the pillar. 
Q. Did you conclude that it ce1tainly was a 
fault-slip event on November 17, 2011? 
A But I didn't conclude it on November 17. I 
concluded it was a foundation failure. 
Q. But you were concluding that the damage 
appeared to look a -- the from a 
fault initiation through the pillar? 
27 es 02 to 10 
was extensive as -- was 
7 really looked at it. 
8 Q. But you knew that there was damage at the 
9 5700 
1 0 A. I knew there was damage at the 5700. 
11 Q. And you knew there was fault plates at the 
12 5700 pillar, correct? 
13 A. At that time we didn't know what the -- I 
1 4 didn't realize -- I didn't know what the damage was. 
15 Q. But you knew there were fault plates there, 
16 correct? 
1 7 A. There are certainly faults at the 5700 pillar, 
18 yes. 





Q. That's your November 18th memo. 
A. Okay. 
23 Q. Did you provide any indication anywhere in 
2 4 that memo that the -- that you -- at least your belief 
0 
2 5 was a day before that the damage looked like damage from 
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1 a fault initiation to the pillar? 
2 (Witness examining document.) 
3 THE WITNESS: Okay. Would you repeat the 
4 question again. 
s BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
6 Q. Is there any reference in your November 18 
7 memo to Hecla that your conclusion the day before --
8 your belief the day before was that the damage looked 
9 like a fault initiation through the pillar? 
10 A. There isn't I'm -- I obviously -- in this 
11 memo I'm -- I say we need to understand better why the 
12 burst occurred and the implications. We need to proceed 
13 with caution. We can't assume the pillar is 
14 de-stressed. And we need to better understand the cause 
15 of the burst. 
6 Q. Okay. And that was your communication to 
7 Hecla. Do you know if they made any changes to your 
8 memo? 
9 A. No. I don't think any changes were made to 
0 this memo. 
1 Q. Now, if you look at page 2 of Exhibit 14, 
under Model Results and 5900 Pillar Burst. 
A. Okay. Now we're on page 2. Okay. 
2 4 Second sentence, "Because the actual burst 
2 5 appears to have been structurally controlled, we may 
0 
want Itasca to rerun the model with structure running 
to see 
mean that? 
what I meant was we need 
cause of the burst .And ifit was a 
controlled with a fault 
could they could run that model. 
8 Q. Okay. What does that mean? If it's 
9 structurally controlled with a fault running through the 
10 burst, they could rerun that model; what does that mean? 
11 A. Well, we need to detennine what actually --
12 what the actual mechanism of the failure was. 
13 Q. And you could do that by further modeling? 
14 A. Further modeling would tell us that. 
15 Q. What would be involved in further modeling? 
16 A. They run these models, they put in different 
1 7 parameters for cohesion and flip and all this stuff and 
18 then the model runs in it. It tells you if a 
19 displacement's likely and how much and how much energy 
2 0 is released. It's kind of a complicated procedure. 
21 But it -- my concern was that it really wasn't 
2 2 clear what the actual mechanism of the failure was. And 
2 3 we needed to -- we needed -- before you can fix the 
2 4 problem, you got to understand the problem. 
25 Q. Right. 
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1 A. And that was my concern. 
2 Q. And you didn't really understand what the 
3 problem was at that point; is that correct? 
4 A. No, I didn't. Obviously my guess on the 16th 
5 was better than my thought here on the 17th or the 18th 
6 when I wrote the memo, but ... 
7 Q. Now, you also knew based on your visit that 
8 the dimensions -- the width-height ratio of that pillar 
9 had substantially changed which certainly affected the 
10 modeling that had been done on the pillar, correct? 
11 A. That's correct. 
12 Q. Was that another reason you wanted them to 
13 rerun the model with structure running through the 
14 pillar? 
15 A. Yes. The concern is that -- as I say, is 
16 that we needed to really get a handle on what happened 
1 7 and then -- and until you know really what the real 
18 problem is, you can't really come up with a real 
1 9 solution. 
2 0 Q. Okay. And you also say, "We really need to 
2 1 better understand why this burst occurred, as it has 
2 2 significant implications with respect to mining the main 
2 3 sill." What does that mean? 
2 4 A. m this was associated with the 
2 5 pillar, it was a type of a burst. And the 




7 And your big concern is we need to understand 
8 this burst occurred as it has implications --
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. with respect to continuing to mine the main 
11 correct? 
12 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. And until we understand the cause of this 
14 burst, we don't know what the impact of further mining 
15 may have upon its stability. Is that what you were 
16 communicating? 
17 A. With respect to the main sill, yes. 
18 Q. And what's the main sill? 
19 A. The main sill is this mining that's left 
20 between the mining front from the 4900 level going down 
21 and the mining front from the 5900 going up, where --
22 which is still a significant part of the mining that's 
23 going on today. 
24 Q. You said under 5900 Pillar Instrumentation, 
25 uwe need to recover the instrumentation box since the 
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1 gauge readings up to the time of the burst can likely be 
2 recovered. The tape extensometer should also be 
3 undamaged and recovered." Did you ever see the 
4 instrumentation box? 
5 A. I asked for that, and apparently it was never 
6 recovered. I guess during the rehab, apparently, from 
7 what I was told, that box was run over by loaders or 
8 whatever and destroyed. 
9 Q. Do you know when that occurred? 
1 0 A. It would have been nice to -- because these 
11 readings were taken automatically, it would have been 
12 nice to see if there was any change in reading prior to 
13 the event. 
14 Q. Referring to the stress monitors? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And so you didn't see --you weren't able to 
1 7 see any gauge readings up to the time of the burst, any 
18 stress readings? 
19 A. The last -- I forget when the last stress 
2 0 measurements were taken. But, no, there wasn't They 
21 were taken, I don't know, every six hours or whatever 
2 2 the timing was on it. Those -- those event -- all that 
2 3 data was lost and never recovered. 
2 4 You say, "The tape extensometer should also 





















You saw that either? 
A. I never saw it I mean, I wasn't there. But 
apparently it was never recovered. And what I asked 
about what happened to the box, it was never recovered 
either. So I'm not sure exactly what happened to either 
of those. 
Q. I want you to look at Exhibit No. 24, please. 
A (Complying.) 
MR. RAMSDEN: How much longer are you going to 
go? We're at lunchtime. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. That's a November 25, 2011 memo; is that 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And it indicates you addressed it to Hecla 
management, c01rect? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. I want you to look real quickly at page 3. 
A. (Complying.) 
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l Q. And look down four paragraphs, please. The 
2 last paragraph before Stability of 5900 Pillar. 
3 A. Okay. 
4 Q. You say, "We need to measure the closure 
5 induced by this burst along the 5900 level drift. If 
6 none of the existing closure points survived, then we 
7 can resurvey existing spads in the back along the main 
8 drift to determine their displacements as a result of 
9 the burst. It is likely that several inches of closure 
10 across the vein resulted from this burst." 
11 Did you ever receive any infonnation from 
12 Hecla as to whether they were able to recover any of the 
13 closure points as a result of that burst? 
14 A. I didn't ever -- I didn't know if they 
15 recovered any of the closure points. 
16 Q. Nobody ever told you that they were able to 
1 7 recover closure points? 
18 A. No one told me if they were able to recover. 
19 Q. And what does it mean by "resurvey existing 
2 O spads in the back along the main drift"? 
21 A. Okay. They -- the mine puts in -- has these 
2 2 survey stakes when they survey the opening, when the 
2 3 opening was originally surveyed. So you have those 
2 4 You know the coordinates. you go back in 
2 5 and if you reoccupy those, one on either side, they will 
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an or so 
7 you would have expected to see this closure. 
8 Q. So you would be comparing a survey that was 
9 conducted when the survey points were originally 
1 established to what the closure is at the time of --
11 A. At the time of the resurvey. 
12 Q. Okay. Was that ever done? 
1 3 A. I don't believe it was. 
14 Q. Did you ever receive any information of the 
1 5 amount of closure that existed on November 25th as 
16 opposed to when the original survey was established? 
17 A. No. 
4 
18 Q. So did you ever get an understanding as to how 
1 9 much closure the burst had caused in that pillar? 
2 O A. Never did. 
2 1 Q. Now, I'd like you to compare Exhibit 24 to 
2 2 Exhibit 13, please. 
2 3 A. (Complying.) 
2 4 Q. And just look at the first page of them. They 
2 5 appear to be similar documents in that they're both 
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1 memos dated November 25th, 20011. 
2 A. Oh, okay. Okay. Okay. 
3 Q. But I'll represent there are some differences. 
4 Do you know why there would be differences between two 
5 November 25th, 2011, memos? 
6 A. Yes. As I -- I think as we first started out 
7 with whatever, when I sent this November 25th memo, I 
8 told Doug if you need to make any changes, review this 
9 and make changes before it's finalized. 
10 Q. When you say Doug, you mean Doug Bayer? 
11 A. Doug Bayer. 
12 Q. And so you believe any change -- any 
13 difference between the two documents would be a result 
14 of changes made by Doug Bayer? 
1 5 A. Or recommended by someone at the mine. 
16 Q. Going back to exhibit --
1 7 A. In other words, this would be a draft report. 
18 The one would be the final report. 
19 Q. So let's look at Exhibit 24 which is your 
2 0 original memo before it was modified. 
21 A. This is 24, the original. Okay. 
2 2 Q. The second sentence on the first page, "The 
2 3 limitations of this modeling were recognized and, as a 
4 the stability of the 55 ft circular pillar 
2 5 surrounding the 5900 level access through the orebody 




1 0 A H's a concern to me. 
11 Q. In 2006 you were saying I'm concerned about 
12 the long-term stability of this pillar? 
13 A Long-term stability of leaving any pillar, 
14 right. 
15 Q. And then it says down -- second to last 
1 6 sentence, "The stress gauges also responded to bursting 
1 7 in the pillar, the last burst occurring in 12/09." What 
18 does that mean? 
19 A That's part of this -- after we installed the 
2 0 stress gauges, the stress increase we had this burst. I 
2 1 think it was a 1. 9 burst in 2009 that was in part of the 
2 2 pillar. The stress went down as a result of that burst. 
2 3 It's -- what I was saying is that the stability of the 
2 4 pillar was still a concern to me. 
2 5 Q. And that the stress gauges as it related to 
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1 prior bursts, specifically the December '09 burst, were 
2 helpful in 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. -- identifying changes in pressure? 
5 A. That's correct. 
6 Q. I want you to look at second page, Mechanism 
7 of 5900 Pillar, that section. 
8 A. Okay. 
9 Q. In the second paragraph, third sentence, it 
1 0 says, "The model results." Do you see that? 
11 A. Mm-hmm. 
12 Q. "The model results also indicated that the 
13 only way the pillar could fail was if the height to 
14 width ratio changed and the pillar lost confinement." 
1 5 What does that mean, lost confinement? 
1 6 A. Okay. When the height-to-width ratio changes 
1 7 and the pillar loses confinement, that means when you 
18 have this big solid pillar -- and the interior it's 
1 9 confined three-dimensionally -- as that thing gets 
2 O smaller, you lose confinement. And confinement is a 
2 1 significant factor in overall stability. That's all it 
22 means. 
2 3 Q. And you were saying that the model results 
2 4 indicated that the pillar could fail if the 
2 5 height-to-width ratio changed, correct? 
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18 
fhe outer 
the pillar, likely in the 10 ft range, the width:height 
8 of the in place doughnut shaped pillar is actually 
9 assuming a 10 ft vein thickness"; correct? 
10 A. That's correct 
11 Q. Now, when I looked at the December 27th 
12 memo, it was referenced that the pillar after the 
13 November 16th rockburst was in reality a 3-to- l 
14 height-to-width ratio. So I've seen two different 
15 figures. Which one is accurate or are either accurate? 
16 A. Okay. If--
17 MR. RAMSDEN: Objection to the fom1. It's 
18 compound. Go ahead and answer. 
19 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure -- anyway, what I 
20 was saying is is the -- if you assume that deterioration 
21 on each end of the pillar, for a 55-foot pillar would 
22 then be 35 feet, that's a 3.5 with a 10. Okay. And 
23 then -- so what's the next question? 
24 BY MR. ROSSML\N: 
25 Well, an exact 
19 
1 width-to-height ratio, correct? 
2 A. I wasn't -- unless you know the exact 










ends of the opening, how far the deterioration and how 
far that fracture zone is, it's somewhere in the -- you 
know, up to ten feet. It could be three feet. It 
could -- we don't know that. So it's assuming. So I 
don't know what that exact dimensions are. But it does 
change the height-to-width ratio. 
Q. And there was a range at which the actual 
height-to-width ratio was? 
A. Yes, yes. 
13 Q. And that range could be less than 3.5 or 
14 greater than 3. 5? 
15 A. That's correct. 
16 Q. You said, "The pillar is borderline stable 
1 7 based on mining history at Lucky Friday/Gold Hunter." 
18 
19 
When you say borderline stable, that's based on your 
Galena research, correct? 
A. Well, that's based on pillar failures in most 
21 mines. As I say, once that pillar becomes less than 35 






Q. And that's what you were trying to tell Hecla 
1s borderline --
Q. What you're saying is is correct 
8 pillar is borderline stable? 
9 A. If that's correct the pillar is borderline 
10 stable. 
11 Q. What does borderline stable mean? 
12 A Borderline stable is being that if it gets any 
13 smaller, it becomes much more burst prone. 
14 Q. Okay. And were you reaching a conclusion that 
15 it was in fact stable as of November 25th, 2011? 
16 A. Well, the -- up until this time, the pillar --
17 the pillar had been stable up until the time of this 
.18 burst on the 16th. 
19 Q. But now the width-height ratio has been 
20 reduced by --
21 A Now it's--
22 Q. Hang on now. Now the width-height ratio's 
23 been reduced by two-thirds, correct? 
24 IVIR. RAMSDEN: Object to fonn. 
25 IVIR. ROSSML\N: At least by approximately 
Page 121 
1 two-thirds. 
2 IVIR. RAMSDEN: Object to the fonn, lacks 
3 foundation. 
4 THE WITNESS: Well, I'm not sure it's been 
5 reduced by two-thirds. It's reduced by whatever. It 
6 certainly has been reduced, so ... 
7 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
8 Q. And it's --
9 A By conclusion would be the pillar is less 
10 stable. 
11 Q. And from your research, pillars 40 feet or 
12 smaller in height are -- have a history in the Coeur 
13 d'Alene silver district of failing, correct? 
14 A. When the size is reduced beyond that, the 
1 5 history has been you can expect rockbursting. 
16 Q. And so when you're saying it's borderline 
1 7 stable, were you saying that there is a serious risk of 
18 failure in this pillar? 
19 MR RAMSDEN: Object to the form. 
2 0 THE WITNESS: I'm saying that, yes, the 
21 pillar -- the stability of the pillar has been reduced 
2 2 as a result of this rockburst and ... 
2 3 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
4 
25 A. 
3 18 121) 
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1 says, "The actual vertical distance to above the 
Gold in the 7000 ft range, hence vert1ca1 
be 8400 maximum horizontal 
7 into account the ore and waste rock modulus values, was 
8 A. 8 also some 12,600 Hence, the stress in the pillar 
Q. That language "this pillar is borderline 
10 stable based on mining history at Lucky Friday/Gold 
9 was very near the unconfined compressive strength of the 
10 pillar, and any further loss of confinement could lead 
11 Hunter" has been removed, hasn't it? 
12 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. And Doug Bayer would be the person who would 
14 have removed that, correct? 
15 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to form. 
1 6 THE WITNESS: Doug Bayer didn't remove it. 
1 7 removed it. 
18 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
19 Q. At Doug Bayer's request? 
2 0 A. Well, I looked at what was given to me, and I 
2 1 decided that that's a comment that probably is -- is 
2 2 inappropriate. 
2 3 Q. Doug Bayer asked you to remove it, correct? 
2 4 A. He didn't ask me to remove it. I mean, he 
2 5 that that was and I removed it 
11 to a pillar failure." 
12 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. That was your communication to Hecla, correct? 
14 A. That's correct. 
15 Q. So your belief was that prior to the 
16 November 16th burst the stress in the pillar had reached 
1 7 its unconfined compressive strength, correct? 
18 A. It was close to it. We don't know exact 
19 stress values. 
2 O Q. But you knew it was very close to its maximum 
21 confinement strength, correct? 
2 2 A. That's correct. 
2 3 Q. And you were communicating that to Hecla, 
24 correct? 












Q. Well, you sent him Exhibit 24 for his review, 1 Q. What stress gauges did you rely upon in 
correct? 2 f mming that statement? 
A. That's right. 3 A. The stress gauges that NIOSH installed and 
Q. And then you created a final memo, which is 4 that were in that pillar. 
Exhibit 13, correct? 5 Q. If you look at page 4 of Exhibit 24, please. 
A. That's correct. 6 A. (Complying.) 
Q. And Exhibit 13 does not have language that 7 Q. At the end of the first continuing paragraph 
says this pillar is borderline stable, correct? 8 at the top, it looks like there's a question in 
A. That's correct. 9 parentheses at the top. Do you see that? 
Q. And the removal of that sentence would have 10 A. Okay. 
11 come at the suggestion of Hecla, correct? 11 Q. Where did that question come from? 
12 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. 12 A. Whoever reviewed it. 
13 THE WITNESS: I did remove it. 13 Q. So someone actually entered that information 
14 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 14 into this document, correct? 
15 
16 
Q. At the suggestion of Hecla, correct? 15 A. That's not my no, someone did enter that. 
A It would have to be the case. 16 That was ... 
17 Q. Okay. And you knew that this memo, once it 1 7 Q. So you would have sent your memo to Hecla in a 
18 was completed, was going to be sent to MSHA, correct? 18 Word format that they could add additional information 
19 A. That's correct. 19 to or remove information, correct? 
2 0 Q. If you look back at Exhibit 24, please. 2 0 A. That's correct. 
21 Fourth paragraph down under Mechanism of 5900 Pillar. 21 Q. Do you know for a fact that it was you that 
22 A. Now which one are we on? 2 2 removed the "borderline stable" language? 
23 Q. 24. The fourth paragraph down under Mechanism 2 3 A Yes, yes. 
2 4 5900 Piliar. The fourth paragraph down under that 2 4 How you know that 
2 5 title. Do you see down -- the second sentence? It 2 A. I just -- I deleted it. 
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it was you who deleted it 1 
sentence? 
8 A I can go through and look at my electronic 
9 version and tell you that. And I'm sure that that's --
1 0 I would -- I would take any money to the bank that that 
1 1 was deleted by myself and not someone else. 
12 MR. ROSSMAN: I'm going to move to strike, 
1 3 speculation. 
1 4 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
15 Q. Can you print off the electronic screen shot 
1 6 of who made that deletion --
1 7 A. I can do that. 
18 Q. -- and provide that to Mr. Ramsden? 
1 9 A. I can do that. 
2 0 Q. TI1ank you. 
2 1 A. Just as long as we have a list of things I 
2 2 have to provide. 
2 3 You might have it all -- all those -- you 
2 4 might have all that in that -- that little electronic 
2 5 thing that I included. 
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1 Q. Okay. Maybe you could -- you could probably 
2 find it faster than --
3 A. I could find it faster than you can. But I 
4 can -- I can do that. 
5 Q. Last sentence under the second paragraph under 
6 Summary says, "Wall closure will continue to load the 
7 remaining 5900 pillar as mining continues in the 
8 underhand stopes currently being mined below." 
9 A. Yes. 
1 O Q. What did you mean by that? 
11 A. Wall closure will continue to load the 5900 
12 pillar as continued mining below takes place. 
13 Q. So continued mining will continue to --
1 4 A. Load the pillar. 
15 Q. -- will continue to load the 5900 pillar? 
16 A. Yes. 
1 7 iv1R. RAMSDEN: Continued mining below. 
18 THE WITNESS: Continued mining in the 
19 underhand stopes below. 
2 O BY iv1R. ROSSMAN: 
21 Q. And as of November 25th, 2011, your belief, or 
2 2 at least what you're representing to Hecla, is that you 
2 3 thought that the November 16th burst was a strain burst, 
2 4 correct? 
2 5 A. A foundation failure I think I said. But 
wry ~a~ oo 
blast at point A triggers something at point B. 
8 Generally the only way you load the pillar is by 
9 closure. 
0 Q. Okay. Well, do you --
11 A. But it's -- it's -- it was coincident with 
12 blasting. I couldn't -- I personally don't believe that 
13 it was caused by the last blast of the -- I believe it 
14 was coincident with the last blast. 
15 Q. But you knew that it was in close proximity, 
16 time proximity, temporal proximity to blasting that had 
1 7 occurred? 
18 A. In my experience I have -- and I've looked for 
1 9 this at bursts at all the mines I've ever worked at. 
2 0 I've looked for an incident where blasting in one stope 
2 1 has caused a burst in another stope. And even stopes 
2 2 that were -- particularly at Galena that were 
2 3 ready to -- presumed to be ready to fail. And I have 
2 4 never-- I have never been able to satisfy myself that 
2 5 there's a connection when that shock wave travels from 
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l point A to point B that that shock wave has caused --
2 been the additional stress that's caused a burst at 
3 point B. 
4 Q. I'm just asking you to agree with me that the 
5 November 16th burst occurred shortly after blasting had 
6 occurred? 
7 A. It is a fact that the November 16th burst 
8 caused right at the end of -- the tail end of the 
9 blasting off of the 5500. 
10 Q. And the blasting off of 5500 was al] conducted 
11 above the 5500 level, correct? 
12 A. It was above the 55. It was in that -- above 
13 the sill pillar, yes. 
14 Q. Did you know that Hecla was going to restart 
15 mining prior to completion of the rehabilitation at the 
l 6 5900 pillar? 
1 7 A. I knew they were going to start mining above 
18 the -- off of the 5500 level, yes. 
19 Q. Okay. Did you have concerns about them 
2 O starting --
2 l A. No. 
2 2 Q. -- to begin -- hang on. 
2 3 MR. RAMSDEN: Let him finish his question. 
4 MR. 
2 Q. Did you have concerns about them mining before 
33 s 26 to 2 9) 
4 
7 That's correct 
8 But you didn't know -- you didn't know for 
9 sure, as a matter of certainty, that blasting remote 
1 0 from a pillar can't cause a rockburst at the pillar, 
11 correct? 
12 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, argumentative, calls for 
13 speculation. Go ahead and answer. 
14 THE WITNESS: I don't believe that blasting, 
1 5 as I say, at one location has has -- in my experience I 
1 6 have never seen blasting in one location cause a 
1 7 rockburst in another location. 
18 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
1 9 Q. When you're talking about sending people into 
2 0 a pillar that had just had a major rockburst, is there a 
21 concern for the lives of those miners? 
0 
2 2 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, argumentative. Go ahead 
2 3 and answer. 
2 4 THE WITNESS: Yes, there is. And it's always 
2 5 my concern is -- is the safety of the miners. 
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1 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
2 Q. Okay. Could Hecla have waited until the liner 
3 was installed to restart mining off of the 5900 pillar? 
4 A. Obviously they could have waited. 
5 Q. Did Hecla -- anyone at Hecla tell you why they 
6 needed to start mining before the liner was installed? 
7 A. I don't recall anyone. My opinion would have 
8 been they could start mining because the -- the stress 
9 transfer from mining above the 59 -- above the 55 pillar 
1 O absolutely will not transfer stress to the 5900 pillar. 
11 Q. Even though the November 16th burst occurred 
12 right at the end of blasting at the 5700 piilar? 
13 A. That's correct. 
14 Q. Were you aware that during the rehabilitation 
15 process Hecla had installed monitoring gauges at the 
16 5900 pillar? 
1 7 A. Beg pardon? 
18 Q. Were you aware that during the rehabilitation 
1 9 process Hecla had installed stress monitoring gauges at 
2 0 the 5900 pillar? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Were you seeing any of the stress data? 
2 3 A. I was sent stress data, yes. 
2 often were you sent stress 
2 5 A. I received the initial data. And I don't -- 1 
1 think I received data for the first three 
that 
"'"''""'"" and then 
7 I saw the initial -- after the first few days I believe 
8 the curve went up and leveled off. And I don't believe 
9 I saw any more data until after the burst. 
10 Q. So you believe you saw data for three or four 
11 days --
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. -- and then received no further data? 
14 A. I don't believe I received further data. 
15 Q. Let me have you look at Exhibit 21, please. 
16 A. (Complying.) 
1 7 Q. I'll represent the first page of Exhibit 21 
18 is a graph of the stress monitoring readings from 
19 December 2nd to the December 14th. And you believe you 
2 0 would have -- well, strike that. 
21 You said you received data for the first three 
2 2 or four days. Would it have come in a spreadsheet fonn 
2 3 or were you actually seeing graphing like this? 
2 4 A. I believe I was sent a graph and a 
2 5 spreadsheet. 
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1 Q. Did the spreadsheet look like the second page 
2 of Exhibit 21? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And if you look at the graph on the first page 
5 of 21, you said you thought that there was some leveling 
6 off of the stress readings? 
7 A. Well, this appears to go up and then it's 
8 starting to -- it's leveling off. 
9 Q. Talking about the blue one? 
1 O A. It's increasing but it's not -- it's not going 
11 like this. (Indicating.) 
12 Q. You're talking about the blue line which is 
13 the west low psi? 
14 A. The blue line or the green line. 
15 Q. Will you agree that from December 2nd through 
16 December 14th the west low pressures increased every 
1 7 day -- every reading on every shift until December 14th? 
18 A. (Nonresponsive.) 
1 9 Q. You can look at the data on the second page. 
2 0 A. Yes, they did increase. 
21 Q. Every shift of every day during that time 
2 2 period, correct? 
2 3 A. That's correct. 
2 4 you agree stress readings on 
2 5 the top psi increased every shift of every day between 
34 es 130 to 133) 
4 
you 
were you seeing the east low psi 
8 area? 
9 A. It never changed. 
10 Q. Were you seeing it in negative readings when 
11 you received three or four days' worth of data? 
12 A Whatever I received was in the same -- always 
13 the negative. 
14 Q. Did you draw any conclusions about why that 
15 was showing negative readings? 
16 A. I presumed that the -- if you know how these 
1 7 gauges work, they're a point gauge. And you stick them 
18 in the hole. And they're round like this (indicating), 
1 9 or you have pictures of it somewhere. And you put a 
2 0 wedge on top of it to hold it in the hole. 
21 Q. Okay. 
2 2 A. And you -- you keep driving that wedge in and 
2 3 you pre-stress it. I presumed that in order to get the 
2 4 negative readings where that gauge was sitting where 
2 5 that the rock around it was broken 
1 And the rock never did get confined or -- and so what we 
2 saw was the actual gauge itself reducing in stress. 
3 Q. So you didn't --
4 A. So I discounted the gauge. 
5 Q. You didn't believe it was accurate readings? 
6 A. I believe it's reading accurately, but I 
7 believe that the rock immediately above that gauge was 
8 not carrying stress. 
9 Q. So you believe the readings that were coming 
1 0 were not an accurate reflection of the amount of stress 
11 in the --
12 A. I -- no. The bottom gauge, there's no ... 
13 Q. Let me ask the question; let me have you 
1 4 answer it. You understood after you received three to 
15 four days' worth of data that the consistent negative 
1 6 readings in that east low gauge were not an accurate 
1 7 reflection of the stress changes on that wall? 
18 A. That's correct. 
19 Q. Thank you. Now, you said there was some 
2 0 leveling off of stress changes. Where are you seeing 
21 that in this document, in the first three to four days? 
2 2 A. If you look -- if you look at this curve, the 
2 3 stress is -- is starting out going up. It's the rate of 
4 increase is decreasing. The curve is like this. 
2 5 (Indicating.) It's still increasing, but it's -- it's 
WWW. 
not a dramatic increase as we often see to 
6 
7 correct -- unconfined strength? 
8 A. They're certainly close to the unconfined 
9 strength. 
1 0 Q. So they were close to their maximum strength, 
11 correct? 
12 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. 
13 THE Wl1NESS: The maximum unconfined strength, 
14 yes. 
15 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
1 6 Q. And now you're seeing and receiving stress 
1 7 gauges after that rockburst increasing sh·ess levels on 
1 8 two of the three walls, correct? 
1 9 A. The stress was increasing. 
2 0 Q. And you would expect the stress to be 
2 1 comparable between both the east and west walls, 
22 correct? 
2 3 A. CoITect. 
2 4 Q. And you knew that as a result of the 
2 5 November 16th burst that the walls of the pillar had 
1 been left largely undamaged? 
2 A. Correct. 
3 Q. And you knew that they were still carrying 
4 considerable stress? 
5 A. That's correct. 
6 Q. Did you ever tell Doug Bayer or anyone at 
7 Hecla that you believed that as a result of the 
8 November 16th burst that a majority of the stress at the 
9 5900 pillar had dissipated? 
1 0 A. I never said that. 
11 Q. You didn't believe that either, did you? 
12 A. I didn't, no. I -- I believe I said the 
13 pillar was still stressed. 
14 Q. And you didn't believe that as a result of the 
15 November 16th burst it had lost a majority of its 
l 6 stress, correct? 
l 7 A. I never said that. That's true. 
18 Q. Were you aware that MSHA had ordered Hecla to 
19 install three additional stress monitoring gauges at the 
2 0 5900 pillar after the November 16th burst? 
21 A. I believe I heard that, but I wasn't -- I 
2 2 was -- unfortunately during this period is when I was 
2 3 getting all this pre-cancer treatment, and so I 
2 4 wasn't -- I was kind of out of the with a 
2 5 lot of the day-to-day activity that went on. 
3 s l to 137) 
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you ever hear from anyone that Hecla had 
those monitors? 
don't know that 
4 that had them. 
from you dated 
Exhibit but you don't 
7 have to pull it out you recommended to 
8 Bayer that the monitoring gauges that were 
9 installed in November of 2011 could be installed with a 
10 jumbo. That the holes could be drilled with a jumbo. 
11 A. Yeah. Uh-huh. 
12 Q. Why did you recommend that? 
13 A. Only for quickness of installation. The jumbo 
14 is there on site. A diamond drill may not be anywhere 
15 near or may be off -- because a lot of their diamond 
16 drilling is done with contract drillers. Very often you 
1 7 have to get a diamond drill, mobilize it, get it to the 
1 8 mine, get it underground. 
19 It -- it's the smoothness of the hole. If you 
2 0 take your time with a percussion drill, you can -- for a 
21 short hole you can drill a fairly smooth hole. 
2 2 Q. Had you read the installation instructions 
2 3 associated with the 4300 Geotech (sic) monitoring gauge? 
2 4 A. Pardon? 
2 5 Had read the installation instructions 
1 that came with the monitoring 
2 A The instructions I'm sure recommend a diamond 
3 drill. 
4 Q. Why do you think the instructions recommend a 
5 diamond drill? 
6 A For the smoothness of the -- the smoothness of 
7 the hole. But if you look in the hard rock, if you look 
8 at the -- we have installed any number with percussion 
9 drills and have had good success as long as the driller 
10 takes his time and he doesn't try to push the -- like 
11 under contract they'll push the drill as fast as they 
12 can to get the hole in because they're not wo1Tied about 
13 the hole. They're worried about the footage. 
14 Q. You were aware that Hecla had had a high 
15 failure rate with stress monitoring before November 16, 
16 2011, correct? 
17 A We had a very high failure rate. And those 
18 holes were mostly -- I'm not sure what the -- if those 
19 were all diamond drill holes or whether they were 
20 percussion holes. 
21 Q. You also were aware that for an extended 
22 period of time one of -- some of the pressure monitoring 
23 gauges had been reflecting negative readings in the 
24 correct? 
25 A. We had a lot of trouble with -- with -- as 
1 most 
gauges. 
with single-point stress measurement 
stress 
Never. 
7 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 50 was 
8 marked for identification.) 
9 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
1 O Q. Mr. Blake, if you could take look at those and 
11 tell me what those photographs are. 
1
12 A. This looks like a photo of a drift with some 
13 ladders on the side and a scoop or something. 
14 Q. These were taken from your file. Would you 
15 have taken these photos? 
16 A. Well, I could have taken it. I'm not -- I 
1 7 can't remember when it would have been taken. 
18 Q. Well, if you look about five pages in, it 
19 looks like a crushed tunnel liner in there, isn't it? 
2 O A. I don't believe I took these. These may have 
21 been photos I received from someone. But I don't 
2 2 believe these are -- any of these are my photos. 
23 MR. ROSSMAN: All right. 
2 4 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 51 was 


























BY :MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Show you Exhibit 51 Do you recognize those 
photos? Particularly the second one. 
(Witness examining photographs.) 
(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 52 was 
marked for identification.) 
BY :MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Start with 51, if you would. Do you know what 
those photos are? 
A Boy, I can't even tell from this -- this photo 
is so bad. 
Q. ls that your picture on the second page? 
A That's not my picture. 
Q. Do you know who that is? 
A I know the person, but I can't tell you his 
name. 
Q. Let's look at Exhibit 52. Do you know if you 
took those photos? 
A I think I took these photos. 
Q. When did you take those photos? 
A These photos would have been taken on 
November 16th. 
Q. And that would be photos of the 5900 pillar on 
that 
A. Yes. 
6 38 to 1 1) 
11,1R. ROSSiviAN: Than_l<: you. 
A. Yes. 
8 Q. Is that your handwriting? 
9 A. It is my handwriting. 
10 Q. Because your handwriting is somewhat similar 
11 to mine and largely unreadable, can you read that first 
12 page into the record for me, at least what you can see. 
13 A. Okay. 12/16 DB Tuesday 6 am OK. 
14 THE COURT REPORTER: Read it slowly, please. 
1 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
16 Q. Yeah, real slowly, please. And who is DB? 
17 A. Doug Bayer. Tuesday 6 am OK. 
18 12/16. Karl Hartman -- or KH ZT, Karl 
19 Hartman, Zac Thomas, solution for burst. 
20 12/15 Ask for closure data. 
21 12/15 Read burst paper can come up; can get to 
22 mine by 3 pm. 
23 12/8 Zac Thomas gauges in front wall will 
24 work. 
25 12/7 use 6 -- use 6 for 
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1 factor not 12. 
2 12/7 Doug Bayer -- I can't -- boy, I can't 
3 even read my writing there. 
4 Q. Do you know what any of those words say? 
A. It could be something Galena something. 
6 12/6 JJ re visit, later cancelled. 
7 11/30 Doug Bayer read put in Irads -- or no, 
8 need put in Irads. 
9 11/30 Doug Bayer really need diamond drill 
10 core. 
11 Q. Let me -- before you go to the second page, 
12 let me ask you. The 12/15 "ask for" something? 
13 A. Closure data. 
14 Q. Do you know if you ever received closure data? 
15 A. I probably did. 
16 Q. Do you know -- do you recall seeing closure 
17 data? 
18 A. Yeah. If I asked for it, they probably sent 
19 it on 12/15. 
20 Q. When I hear "probably" that's telling me that 
21 you're make an assumption. 
22 A. As I say, my ... 
23 Q. Do you recall receiving closure data? 
24 I did closure data. I'm not sure 














































front will work 
gauges 
center of the m any 
pillar. So I think someone may have asked me about if 
gauges are in the front part of the pillar will it work. 
Q. And then it says JJ, which is John Jordan --
A. Yeah. 
Q. -- on December 6th regarding visits? 
A. I think there was a -- I was supposed to 
have -- to come up to the mine for some reason. And 
then that was cancelled. I didn't go up on the 6th. 
Q. Do you know who cancelled? 
A. Uh ... 
Q. I'm just asking if you know. 
A. I -- now this -- again, this is -- it could 
have been to come up and see someone from MSHA, but the 
guy left, I think. 
Q. Let's go to the next page, have you read 
those. 
A. Karl Hartman will be up Wednesday. 
Q. That's November 21st, right? 
A. That's November 21st. JJ send mine visit 
145 
report. 
Q. So on November 18th John Jordan you sent him 
your mine visit report? 
A. So send mine visit report. 
Q. Do you know where Karl Hartman was supposed to 
be up on Wednesday, November 21st? 
A I think I was -- I may have been up on 
Wednesday the 21st. And that was referencing told Karl 
Hartman that I would be up, I believe. 
Q. Okay. Can you read the next page? 
A. 11/21. I have Karl Hrutman will be up --
okay. You're going to go over here. 
Q. On the left side. 
A. Underground. Go up Lucky Friday. Visit 10. 
Q. 10 till 4 p.m., right? 
A. Visit 10 to 4 p.m., that's what it looks like. 
E-mail Mark, mine visit report, underground 5900 pillar. 
Go underground. Meet with the guys, I guess. Memo mine 
visit report. Stress meter data. Meet with MSHA. 
Something -- go up tomonow or not ... 
Q. Let's go to the next page. 
A. 12/15 Karl Hartman pillar -- pillar blew 
again. Okay. 
What's the next one 
A 12/15 J process raw. That's -- J process is 
3 (Pages 14 o 145) 
1 
8 A. No. I don't -- J process. It could be 
9 "never" -- I think it could be the coordinates from the 





But it won't what? 
MR. ROSSMAN: Pardon me? 
MR. RAMSDEN: He said two inches per second 





next one? 112 THE WITNESS: Pardon? 
A. JJ pursue NIOSH. 
Zac Thomas closure readings. 
13 MR. RAMSDEN: You said two inches per second 
1 4 will crack concrete, but --
And I don't know what the last one. I can't 1 5 THE WITNESS: Two inches per second is a 
16 see. 
1 7 Q. Let's go to -- do you know what Zac Thomas 
1 8 closure readings he was getting? 
19 A. Those would be whatever closure readings Zac 







21 Q. Okay. Do you know why Zac Thomas was getting 21 
2 2 closure readings at that point in time? 2 2 
23 A. I don't at this time. Maybe it's get old 2 3 
2 4 closure readings. 2 4 




1 just tell me what you were doing there. It looks like 1 
2 some calculations or numbers. 2 
3 A. On this? 3 
4 Q. No. Exhibit 54. The next exhibit. Oh, it's 4 
5 this one. I'm sorry. I didn't give it to you yet. 5 
6 Sorry. 6 
7 A. Okay. These are calculating distances to 7 
8 different locations. The first is burst best guess, an 8 
9 actual location for the probably the 12/18 rockburst, 9 
1 0 then X, Y, Z. And this is the distance to the pillar 1 0 
11 would have been 66 meters. The intersection on 5900 I ~ ~ 
12 would have been 70.9 meters. The connection -- the new 1 1-"' 
building guide when for blasting around structures. 
And when you blast them and the blast exceeds two inches 
per second, it can cause -- start to cause damage to a 
concrete structure. 
MR. RAMSDEN: All right 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Let's look at Exhibit 55, please, and if you 
could read that first page in. 
A. 12/20/11. 5700, 54 ramp, rehab done timber 
and more on the F3. Bagged roof. Took pictures. F2 
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something not -- not any or F -- real movement, shake. 
Areas 5714 cut off. Have done a lot ofrehab above 57 
the same. Floor heave. Just -- they're just 
observations. 
Q. Let's skip the second page. Go to the third 
page and maybe you can read that into the record. I'm 
just trying to get you out of here by 1 :30. 
A. 12:26:08 bump. I felt a bump in my feet. 
5850 not much, :fresh loose or -- 5900 pillar, see how 
machine held muck South wall only, really short 
distance. Don't think pillar without first burst, 
nothing -- boy oh boy. Boy, that's a mystery to me as 
13 connector drift locator or something would have been 115 
14 meters. 
13 well. 
15 Q. r don't need you to read all those. What are 
16 you trying to do with this -- with this calculation 
1 7 here? What are you trying to demonstrate? 
18 A. I was calculating distances. And then you can 
19 go through and calculate what the peak particle velocity 
2 0 is of the shock wave that impacts it. 
21 
22 
Q. Did you come to a peak particle velocity? 
A. I see something. It says 570 millimeters per 
23 second. 
4 Is that 




Q. What does it mean "bump feet"? 
A. Oh, while we were in the mine, there was a 
bump, and you could feel it in your feet. 
1 7 Q. Do you know when it was that you were at the 








A. It was 12:26:08. I mean, I -- it was the time 
and ... 
Q. Let's go to Exhibit 56. These appear to be 
notes from January 23rd, 2011. If you could read the 
first page. 
A Underground up brow. 
Muck filled. Bolted back. 12-foot Dywidag screen. 
38 s 4 to 14 
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0 
Let me ask you some before you go on 
8 to the next page. 
9 A. Okay. 
10 Q. You said get geo cable through, reconnected? 
11 A. Well, we need -- in other words, when -- the 
l 2 seismic system was not -- when this drift was cut off, 
13 the -- all the geophone sensors that were located off of 
14 the 5900 were disconnected because the cable's cut So 
15 they needed to -- they need to get that geophone cable 
1 6 tb,rough to reconnect up their seismic system. 
1 7 Q. Do you know whether that was ever done? 
18 A I'm sure it was done. When, I couldn't begin 
1 9 to tell you. 
2 0 Q. Well, don't speculate. Do you know whether or 
2 1 not that was done? 
2 2 A I don't know -- oh, I'm sure it was done. But 
23 when. 
2 4 Q. You're saying I'm sure. Do you know whether 
2 5 or not that was done? 
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1 A. Eventually they connected them because the 
2 seismic system was back working. 
3 Q. You saw seismic data after November 23rd, 
4 2011? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Okay. Then it says back spitting when 
7 drilling. What does that mean? 
8 A. That's what -- the back was spitting. It 
9 was -- when they were drilling, the back was popping and 
1 0 spitting. 
11 Q. What does spitting mean? 
12 A. Spitting means little bits of spaiis. Littie 
13 bits of rocks are flaking off. 
14 Q. It says -- and when you say back wall, what 
15 are you referring by "back"? 
1 6 A. The back is -- is -- anything that's above you 
1 7 is the back. The roof. 
18 Q. Then what's -- the next one said sloughing 
1 9 something. What is that? 
2 0 A. Sloughing now. It looked like it was peeling 
21 off. 
2 2 Q. What does that mean? 
2 3 A. Again, it demonstrates that it's acting like 
2 4 it's loaded. It's demonstrating that the back was 
2 5 loaded, was stressed. 
7 Q. 
8 A. Doesn't -- boy oh boy. Cable for dead load 
9 but not burst. 
1 0 I'm just making notes about the use of cable 
11 bolts. They're good for dead load but not for a burst. 
12 Could put timber caps on hangers, bulkhead to the back, 
13 like they did at the Star, steel sets then Tekfoam. 
1 4 Miners leery of cables as they see the cables hanging 
1 5 down after a burst. 
1 6 Q. What's the next page say? 
1 7 A. Going in 5900 pillar, huge slabs ran way up, 
18 smooth arched up. Huge opening. Good ore. Really 
1 9 doesn't look like pillar burst. Huge slabs, big chunks, 
2 0 not much dust, arched up dome smooth, cables hanging. 
2 1 These are just all --
2 2 Q. Next page. 
2 3 A. The next page? 
2 4 Q. Yes. 
2 5 A. Doesn't look like broken up back typical of 
1 pillar burst. Walls blew out then up. 
2 
3 
Q. What does that mean? 
A. Well, it looked like the walls -- the sequence 
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4 was the walls blew in first and then the back came down. 
5 Q. Okay. Look at Exhibit 57 and just tell me 
6 what you're trying to calculate there. 
7 A. Okay. This is just with respect to the 
8 seismic times on the machine. I guess these were the --
9 something about the last event only four geophones. The 
10 geophones were too spread out to really use the 
11 location. 
1 ,., 
J.L lvfR. ROSS!\1AN: This should be the last one. 
13 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 58 was 
14 marked for identification.) 
15 THE VlITNESS: Okay. This is just with respect 
16 to just some calculations and times of different dates 
17 and ... 
18 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
19 Q. Let me show you Exhibit 58. Can you read that 
2 0 into the record? 
21 A. Okay. Really faulted fractured broken up. 
2 2 Hit by big burst. Have pictures. Long -- okay. Long 
2 3 Dywidag cables. Span needs to be cut down. Shotcrete 
2 4 or -- shotcrete or timber pillars. Steel sets still 
2 5 below mining front, so will still ... 
39 s 1 0 0 15 
A Something still 
8 
It could be 8 
9 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
time any witnesses were 
That the and all 
were recorded stenographically by me and were thereafter 
transcribed by me or under my direction; 
9 Do you know when you took this note? 
0 tell from reading it? 
Can you 10 
11 
That the foregoing is a true and correct 
record of all testimony given, to the best of my 
ability; 
11 A It was on whatever underground visit it was 
on. 
Q. What do you believe you would have been 
referencing to have been moving? 








can't -- unfortunately when I don't have my glasses and 
writing and -- my writing's bad enough. But 
particularly if I'm underground and writing, it's a 
1 9 mess, as you can see. 
2 O MR. ROSSMAN: All right. Wilson, that's all 
2 1 the questions I have. Thank you. 
2 2 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
2 3 (Vv'hereupon, the deposition was concluded at 
2 4 1 :30 p.m.) 
1 CERTIFICATE OF \VITNESS 
2 
3 I, WILSON BLAKE, being first duly sworn, 
4 and say: 
5 That I am the witness named in the foregoing 
6 deposition; that I have read said deposition and know 
7 the contents thereof; that the questions contained 
8 therein were propounded to me; and that the answers 
9 therein contained are true and correct except for any 
10 changes that I may have listed on the Change Sheet 
11 attached hereto. 
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14 attorney or of any of the parties, nor am I financially 





IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 
hand and seal this 24th day of April, 2015. 
20 PATRJCIAL. 
Notary Public 
2 1 816 Sherman A venue, Suite 7 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
22 
My Commission Expires 11/13/2018. 
23 
24 
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There is no question that the large seismic events have really picked up over the last couple of years. Cindy 
came up with the number times the total mm amplitude to give a flavor for the event size. We have the 
seismograph mm/month since we started mining in the gold Hunter, and should continue with that plot. We can 
easily calculate the seismic energy per month if we want to get better handle on the effect of the big events. 
1 
It first appeared that the culprit for the increase was the 14 overhand stope, but since have now only been 
mining underhand we have to discount that. Clear that the big events are occurring on the north dipping 
structure since they seem to be favorably oriented. Just why the increase is not obvious. Does seem too early 
to be pillar, but something has to be driving. Don't know ifwe can determine how close we are to instability on 
those structures, but it is clear that we are not getting the usual similar type events in the 1.0 range - just the big 
hits. 
Wilson 
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8 Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for 
9 the County of Kootenai, said cause being Case 
1 0 No. CV 13-8793 in said Court. 
11 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 20 was 
12 marked for identification.) 
13 MR. ROSSMAN: Let the record reflect this is 
14 the time and place for the deposition of Doug Bayer, 
15 case of Barrett, et al., versus Hecla Mining Company, 
16 et al.; Case No. CV 13-8793. Case filed in the 
1 7 District Court, First Judicial District, State of 
18 Idaho, County of Kootenai. 
19 AND THEREUPON, the following testimony was 
2 0 adduced, to wit: 
21 DOUG BA YER, 
2 2 having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, the 
2 3 whole truth, and nothing but the truth, relating to 
2 4 said cause, deposes and says: 
25 
l EXAMINATION 
2 QUESTIONS BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
3 Q. Mr. Bayer, have you deposed before? 
4 A. Yes. 
on 
7 
5 Q. I know you were deposed in the Marek MSHA 
6 proceedings, correct? 
7 A. Correct. 
8 Q. Were you also deposed in the Marek civil 
9 case? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Have you been deposed other than those two 
12 occasions? 
13 A. Those are the only two I can think of right 
14 now. 
15 Q. All right. Well, from your prior experience 
1 6 from your dealings with counsel, I'm sure you 
1 7 understand the purpose of a deposition is for me as the 
18 attorney for the plaintiffs in this case to ask you 
19 questions, find out what, if any, relevant knowledge 
2 0 you may have at trial. Okay? 
21 A. Okay. 
2 2 Q. You are under oath just as though you're 
2 3 testifying in court before a judge and jury. Do you 




8 me know and I'll certainly 
A. Okay. 
10 Q. If you don't understand one of my questions, 
11 just ask me to rephrase it. I'll be happy to do so. 
12 Okay? 
3 A. Okay. 
14 Q. All right. How did you prepare for your 
15 deposition? 
16 A. I reread a couple memos from Wilson Blake and 
1 7 Mark Board. I reviewed a letter prepared by 
18 Jackson-Kelly in response to MSHA's citations and 
19 orders related to the rock -- both rockbursts. Just 
2 0 kind of a chronology of events. So I reread that. And 
21 I reviewed some of my prior testimony or deposition or 
2 2 briefs, I guess. 
2 3 Q. Anything else? 
24 A. Nope. 
2 5 Q. What prior testimony or briefs did you 
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1 review? 
2 A. I read through my deposition of the Marek 
3 case. That was related to the fatality in 15 stope, so 
4 I didn't read much of it because it wasn't really 
5 relevant to this. 
6 Q. Okay. If you'll look at Exhibit 10 of those 
7 exhibits in front of you. 
8 A. (Complying.) Okay. 
9 Q. Is that Jackson-Kelly letter that you 
1 0 reviewed? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And then you reviewed memos from Wilson Blake 
13 and Mark Board. Are those memos that were issued back 
14 in 2011 relating to the rockbursts at the 5900 pillar? 
15 A. There were two memos from Wilson Blake and 
16 then one combined memo Blake and Board wrote Lv"'·i;:;tw;:;1 
1 7 Q. The two memos from Wilson Blake were 
18 November 18 and November 25th? 
19 A. Yes. 
2 0 Q. And the one from Wilson and Mark was 
21 December 27th? 
22 A. Yes. 
2 3 Q. Okay. Had you reviewed those back in 2011 
2 4 when they were prepared? 
25 A. Yes. 
( Pa s 6 to 9) 
8 several times, so we met and talked and discussed 
9 what he what his observations were. I don't 
1 0 remember specific questions I might have had, but I 
11 certainly did talk with Wilson about it. 
12 MR ROSSMAN: 
13 Q. Wilson Blake was not an employee of Hecla at 
1 4 the time, correct? 
15 A. No. He's a consultant. 
16 Q. And not an employer of the individuals who 
1 7 are plaintiffs in this case, correct? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. He was retained as a consult-- independent 
2 0 consultant by Hecla, correct? 
21 A. Yes. 
2 2 Q. And he provided some consultation after the 
2 3 November 16th burst, correct? 
24 A. Yes. 
2 5 Q. And he also provided some consultation after 
11 
1 the December burst? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. After the November 16th burst, did Wilson 
4 Blake ever tell you or anyone at Hecla that he approved 
5 of the rehabilitation plan for that pillar? 
6 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form, assuming --
7 to the extent it asks whether he ever told anybody at 
8 Hecla But you can go ahead and answer to your 
9 knowledge. 
10 THE WITNESS: Well, I know Wilson agreed with 
11 our approach to repairing the drift after the first 
12 rockburst, the November 16th rockburst. And he also 
13 agreed about the idea of a tunnel liner and Tek:foam. 
14 He thought that was a good idea for long-temi 
15 stability. 
1 6 And he aiso -- we worked with Wilson on 
1 7 designing the ground support that was installed after 
1 8 the first rockburst. And he gave us some engineering 
1 9 analysis of that type of support and what type of 
2 0 energy that support would be able to withstand and a 
2 1 factor of safety that he thought was appropriate. 
2 2 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
2 3 Q. Who developed the rehabilitation plan? 
2 4 A. I believe on-site members of management, 
2 5 engineering and production people. 
A. V/ith 
But 
8 because the pillar was still intact, meaning we lost 
9 some of the back in the first rockburst, but the pillar 
0 itself was still intact so it can still carry load. 
11 Q. Okay. 
12 A So he wanted us to proceed with caution, 
13 which we did. 
2 
14 Q. Did you ever ask him what he meant by proceed 
15 with caution? 
16 A. Yes. And so he thought it would be important 
1 7 to use a jumbo when -- when we started the 
18 rehabilitation efforts to drill -- drill the area with 
19 a jumbo. If it was stressed, it would -- and it did 
2 0 have some sort of spalling that the miners would be 
2 1 protected because they would be away from the face or 
2 2 area. But that's all I recall as far as what he meant 
2 3 by proceed with caution. 
2 4 Q. Did you ask him what he meant by proceed by 
2 5 caution? 
13 
1 A. Don't know if I asked him -- I don't remember 
2 specific questions and answers. But what I understood 
3 him to mean was the use of a jumbo, to monitor --
4 obviously pay attention to the seismic monitors, make 
5 sure we're paying attention to all the things we do 
6 when we're around a rockburst repair, which is 
7 listening to the rock, you know, looking at conditions, 
8 visual inspections. 
9 As you're repairing, you pay attention to 
10 what you're doing so if you --you see something that's 
11 out of the ordinary, you stand back and reevaluate. So 
12 all those things we understood to be part of the p Ian. 
13 Q. Okay. You mentioned a jumbo. \Vhat's a 
14 jumbo? 
15 A. Jumbo is a rubber-tired drill. So it has an 
1 6 operator's compartment and a boom that sticks out 
1 7 it's 12 foot long. So the operator would back from 
18 the area that's not bolted. And you scale with it We 
19 actually drilled holes and blasted part of the brow 
2 O that failed to make it safer to repair. 
21 Q. Did you use the jumbo to drill the boreholes 
2 2 for the monitoring gauges? 
2 3 A. Yes. 
2 4 Q. Did you use the jumbo to drill the boreholes 
2 5 for all of the monitoring gauges? I think there were 
4 s 10 to 13) 
from Montana Tech in Butte in I 
9 When did you start work with Hecla? 
10 A ln August of 1997. 
1
11 Q. Do you have any particular training, 
12 education or experience in rock mechanics? 
13 A. Other than what you get in college for 
14 classes. But at Lucky Friday my first job as a -· my 
15 title was a senior mine engineer. And one ofmy 
16 responsibilities was doing some of the rock mechanics. 
17 So I have a fair amount of experience at the mine with 
18 rock mechanics. 
19 Q. Do you consider yourself to be a specialist 
20 in rock mechanics? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Did Hecla during any period of your 
23 employment between '97 and December of 2011 ever employ 
24 a rock mechanics expert or specialist? 
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1 Q. Yes. 
2 A. Not full-time. Not until we hired Mark Board 
3 and Bob Golden. 
4 Q. When were Mark and Bob hired? 
5 A. I don't recall the exact dates. They -· it 
6 would have been in 2011 after the 15 stope accident, 
7 so ... 
8 Q. Mark Board an employee on December 14, 2011? 
9 A. He was still a consultant at that time. So 
10 he came on probably in 2012. 
11 Q. All right. So as of December 14, 2011, Hecla 
12 did not employ a rock mechanics expert, correct? 
13 A. Correct. 
14 Q. Hecla utilized consultants for rock 
15 mechanics, correct? 
16 A. Yes. 
1 7 Q. Principally Wilson Blake and Mark Board? 
18 A. Yes. And we've employed other modeling rock 
19 mechanics experts. One was Rimas Pakalnis or Pakalnis. 
2 0 I forget the correct pronunciation. He was retained in 
21 2005 or '6 to do some modeling of 5900 pillar and the 
2 2 5300 sill pillar. 
2 3 Q. Vv'hen was the 5900 pillar created? 
2 4 A. Could you repeat that? 



















A. drift to the Gold I1untcr vvas driven 
2004 or 2005. And we started 
back and dates. 
But it's probably around 2008 before the whole 
was established. 
Q. What was your job title in '04? 
A. I believe I was chief engineer. 
Q. \X.T.here did you go from chief engineer? 
A. I went to corporate to the Coeur d'Alene 
offices as a mine engineer to do project work in 2006 
and then returned to the mine in 2009 as mine foreman. 
Q. How long did you work as mine foreman? 
A. Until I became mine superintendent in 
November of 2010. 
Q. And are you still the mine superintendent? 
A. No. I'm back at the corporate office in 
technical services. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Doing engineering work. 
What were as mine 
6 
17 
1 A. Well, the mine foreman's responsible for the 
2 day-to-day operations underground of the production and 
3 development 
4 Q. ls there a particular stope or area of the 
5 mine that you were a mine foreman at? 
6 A. The entire mine. 
7 Q. And how did your responsibilities change as 
8 mine superintendent? 
9 A. One of the bigger differences is at the time 
1 0 the mine superintendent is then also responsible for 
1 maintenance, underground maintenance. So as a 
12 superintendent you're over production and maintenance. 
13 And as superintendent your duties expand somewhat where 
14 you're more responsible for union issues, grievances, 
15 more of the hiring, more of the discipline. 
16 Q. Did you have any responsibilities for policy 
1 7 such as when and where to mine? 
18 A. I don't consider that a policy as so much as 
19 when and where to mine. But the engineers would come 
2 0 up with short-term and long-term plans. So engineering 
21 develops the mine plan, and it's the production 
2 2 department, the superintendent and foreman's job to 
2 3 implement the plan. I certainly had input on where to 
24 mine. 
2 Q. Vv'hat as mine superintendent 




9 And did that include of a 
O plan? 
1 A. I did put into that, yes. 
12 Q. Did you have any involvement in developing a 
13 safety plan? 
1 4 A. Can you be more descriptive? What do you 
15 mean by safety plan? 
16 Q. Did the company have a written safety plan 
1 7 for its employees? 
18 A. We have standard operating procedures. We 
19 have a safety manual that gives general safety 
2 0 guidelines, what's required of employees underground. 
21 We have a rockburst plan; ventilation plan, which has 
2 2 safety implications. So, yeah, I had involvement or 
2 3 familiarity with all of those. 
2 4 Q. Did you have any involvement in developing 
2 5 the rockburst plan? 
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1 A. I would say no. I was responsible to update 
2 the plan when changes -- when required when I was in 
3 engineering department. The plan was developed 
4 somebody else, not myself. 
5 Q. I'll have you look at Exhibit No. 2. Are you 
6 familiar with that document? 
7 A. Yes. This is the rockburst plan as it was 
8 in -- I believe this is the version that was current up 
9 through 2011. 
10 Q. It's got a date at the bottom of April 1st, 
11 2011. On the second page, if you look at the bottom. 
12 A. (Complying.) 
1 3 Q. Third page. Excuse me. 
14 A. Yes. That's correct. 
15 Q. Did you have any involvement in creating this 
1 6 document? 
A. I didn't create it. All I would have done is 17 
18 if there was a change in some of the monitoring methods 
19 or updates to parts of it, I would have provided some 
2 0 updates. But I didn't create it. 
Q. You agree that -- well, strike that. 21 
22 If you look at page 3, 0580 of Exhibit No. 2, 
2 3 first full paragraph says, "A monitoring program is 
2 4 being conducted on the 5900 level where the main access 





several different \vhere 
the 2005 
8 the first stressmeters. 
Q. Do you recall 
10 stressmeters in '06? 
the company installed 
A. There were two main reasons to install the 
stress gauges. One was to monitor the response of the 
pillar as we mined around it, you know, as we created 
it because at that time the pillar was still -- wasn't 
created yet. And the other part that we were 
16 interested in was the monitoring response of that 5900 
1 7 pillar, the intent was to help us calibrate the model 
18 for the 5300 sill pillar. So by getting the response 
19 from the 5900 drift pillar, it would help calibrate and 
2 0 make the other -- validate the models we did for the 
21 5300 drift pillar -- or 5300 sill pillar. 
2 2 Q. Okay. Look at Exhibit No. 13, please. Do 
2 3 you recognize that document? 
24 A. Ido. 
2 5 Q. That's a memo from Wilson Blake, dated 
21 
1 November 25th, 2011? 
2 A. Correct. 
3 Q. And that was he prepared following 
4 the November 16th rockburst, correct? 
5 A. Correct. 
6 Q. Was one of the purpose of preparing this an 
7 effort to try to determine or understand why that 
8 rockburst occurred? 
9 A. Yes. Why it occurred, the mechanism of the 
10 burst and the stability of the pillar. 
11 Q. And was one of the purposes of having him 
12 provide this memo was to help the company address how 
13 to rehabilitate that pillar? 
14 A. I don't know if this is so much about 
15 rehabilitation as more of an investigation or a memo 
16 onto the the mechanism of the burst. Why did it --
1 7 why did it burst and what is the stability now. I 
18 think it's --
19 Q. And why did you want to know what the 
2 0 stability was now as of November 25th? 
21 A. Well, we were still engaging Wilson to give 
2 2 us input on why did it -- why did the November burst 
2 3 happen when it was supposed to be -- the pillar was 
2 4 supposed to be stable. And what does it mea.11 going 
25 forward. 
6 (Pa 18 to 21) 
22 
9 A. Mm-hmm. 
10 Q. "These results indicated that a 50 ft pillar 
1 would be stable with a 1.5 factor of safety." Do you 
112 know what that means? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. What's that mean? 
15 A. The pillar is 50-foot meaning it's -- there's 
16 a drift through it and it's 50-foot all the way around. 
17 So it's shaped like a doughnut. So it's really 117 
8 feet high, but he calls it a 50-foot pillar because --
19 because that's the shape -- shape of it. It's circular 
20 pillar. 
21 And most of the -- I won't say most. But 
22 it's a standard in rock mechanics to design things with 
23 at least a 1.5 factor of safety. That was our goal. 
24 That was the recommendation from the beginning when we 
25 created the that it had to meet at least a 1.5 
23 
1 factor of safety. 
2 Q. Did you understand that it met a 1.5 factor 
3 of safety as of 2004 when that modeling was done? 
4 A. Yes, it did. 
5 Q. And then he says, "The limitations of this 
6 modeling were recognized, and as a result, the 
7 stability of the 55 ft circular pillar surrounding the 
8 5900 level access through the orebody has always been 
9 of some concern." Do you agree with that statement? 
1 0 A. In general, yes. 
11 Q. And was concerns about the stability of that 
1 2 pillar one of the reasons that Hecla was monitoring --
1 3 stress monitoring at that level prior to November of 
14 2011? 
1 5 A. Well, we wanted -- yes. We wanted to monitor 
1 6 the pillar to see its reaction to mining and also help 
1 7 calibrate the model for other areas, like I stated. 
18 Q. And is the concerns about the stability of 
19 that pillar one of the reasons that there was seismic 
2 0 monitoring going on prior to November of 2011? 
2 1 A. No. Seismic monitoring's been going on at 
2 2 the mine for years, mine-wide. So we've always had 
2 3 seismic. 
2 4 Q. What's the purpose for seismic monitoring? 





A. It's very mnrP/l1r'M 





and an increase which may be leading up to something 
bigger. Sometimes it goes quiet, and you don't get any 
mirms~ismir. ,1r.tivity. And that could be a trend that 
something is loading up. 
14 So there is no set absolute in seismic 
15 
16 
monitoring. You just have to watch what's going on and 










Q. Was there any identifiable seismic trend 
leading up to the November 16, 2011 rockburst? 
A. The November rockburst, no. 
Q. Was there any seismic trend leading up to the 
December 14, 2011 rockburst? 
A. None. 
Q. There were three prior rockbursts at the 5900 
pillar, correct? 
A. There were three in the area. I don't know 
Page 25 
if they detennined they were in the pillar, but they 
2 were nearby. 
3 Q. One of them was 1.9 on a Richter scale; is 
4 that correct? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Was that preceded by any recognizable seismic 
7 trend? 
8 A. Not that I'm aware of 
9 Q. So how did you utilize the rockburst plan at 
1 0 Hecla prior to December 14, 2011? 
11 A. How did I utilize it? 
12 One of the things a rockburst p Ian lays out 
13 is what is a reportable event to MSHA, I believe. So I 
14 utilized the plan in that regard to make sure we were 
1 5 reporting rockbursts to the agency correctly. 
1 6 But, in general, I understand the seismic 
1 7 systems, so I don't have to refer to the plan. I refer 
1 8 to the seismic -- the microseismic information to stay 
1 9 abreast of changes. 
2 0 Q. This particular document, the rockburst plan, 
21 Exhibit No. 2, says in the middle of -- it looks like 
2 2 the third sentence of that middle paragraph on page 3, 
2 3 "The object of this monitoring is to identify the 
2 4 change in load on the walls of the 30 vein as a pillar 
2 around it. This infonnation has 








closure and the microseismic was used to 8 
the model that the rock mechanics models that 9 
created prior for the 5300 sill pillar, which 10 
to. So the pillar between 5900 and 4900 11 
refers to the 5300 sill. 12 
And that model predicted a certain amount of 13 
14 stress and a certain amount of closure. And the goal 14 
15 of that model was to predict how far down we could mine 15 
16 
17 change methods or de-stress or -- we knew we'd have 1 7 
that pillar before we had to do something different, 11 6 
18 to -- based on our experience with mining pillars we'd 18 
19 have to do something different 19 
20 So we were always updating that model or 2 0 
21 having consultants update the model with actual 2 1 
every cut that the pillar shrinks 
ten feet because you're mining whichever direction, 
up or down. So that pillar shrinks ten foot every time 
you make a cut. 
A nli thf' pill'.'lr h'.'1<: <:trf'<::<::f'<: gning thrnngh it. 
So as a pillar becomes smaller, the stresses will 
increase or there will be more stress per square foot 
throughout the pillar. And that usually leads to 
rock bursts. 
Q. Do those cuts affect the width-height ratio 
of the pillar? 
A Yeah, the height 
Q. Is a width-height ratio of the pillar 
important to modeling the pillar? 
22 
23 
measurements to make sure the model was still 
predicting as accurately as can be expected, I guess. 
24 Q. And one of the reasons for modeling -- well, 
2 5 if mining reached a level under the model -- a certain 
A. The 5300 sill was never a width-to-height 
really question. It was just the height, right? Where 
2 4 does it meet the 1.5 factor of safety. What point do 
1 level, is it fair to say that it would create concerns 
2 with Hecla for the stability of the pillar? 
3 A. When you say "level," do you mean 
4 elevation --
5 Q. Yes. 
27 
25 you stop. 
1 Q. You said 5300. Did you mean 5900? 
2 A No. I'm talking 5300 sill pillar. The 5900 
3 drift pillar had a width-to-height consideration in its 
4 design. 
5 Q. Why is that? 
29 




That's why we hire consultants to model the pillar 
because our history at Lucky Friday, in the Lucky 
Friday vein, a different mining area than the Gold 
10 Hunter, but pillars were created all over just by 
11 nature of the method. It was overhand mining then. 
12 And as that pillar shrin_ks the stress increases. So 
13 you have to do -- there's other things that you can do 
14 to minimize exposure to the miners at that point 
15 And there's a critical height of the pillar 
-16 that's important And that's what we were trying to 
1 7 figure out is that thickness or height of that pillar, 
18 but we needed to determine when we'd stop mining and do 
19 a different method. 
20 Q. When you say stop mining, what do you mean? 
21 A The discussions were when the pillar reached 
2 2 about 70-foot in thickness, the factor of safety would 
then go below 1.5. And that's that's our limit So 
at that point we knew we'd have to either so 
there's ways to de-stress the pillar, try to fracture 
7 Blake, the consultants, the experts, studies done 
8 around the world, right, in mining operations, there's 
9 guidelines or there's history on pillars. And nonnally 
1
10 if you have a width-to-height ratio that's really big, 
11 say this one was 10-to- l, that -- and it's confined 
12 that it can't fail. So there's a certain design 
13 criteria there. And that's what we have consultants 
14 study and give us their input on. 
15 Q. And did you understand the width-to-height 
1 6 ratio to be an impo1tant component of Mark Board's 
1 7 modeling of the 5900 pillar? 
18 A It was a component. It's all important, yes. 
19 Q. You said models are continuously updated. 
2 0 What do you mean by that? 
21 A Well, "continuously" is probably not the best 
2 2 term because it wasn't a continuous update of the 
2 3 model. But as we data, stress meter data, 
1
2 4 closure data, microseismic data, all the things, we 
2 5 would have the consultants update model when we 




And we're so the pillar's always 
10 smaller. At the time of November of 2011, the 
11 pillar varied. But it was around 110 to 140 foot in 
12 So we were about halfway to where ·we thought 
13 we, you know, could go to that 70-foot horizon. So we 
14 wanted to always keep the model current as we took cuts 
15 because we're -- it's important to go back and revisit 
16 your model that's giving you good results. Models are 
17 like anything else, they're dependent on the inputs. 
18 Q. And if a model is dependent upon a particular 
19 input and that input changes, the model -- it affects 
20 the reliability of the model, correct? 
21 A. Can, yeah. 
22 Q. And you said in November there was a certain 
23 height to the pillar. Are you referring to November 
24 prior to the November 16th burst? 
25 A. Yeah. I was referring to the 5300 sill 
31 
1 pillar. Sorry. 
2 Q. I'm talking about the -- we're always talking 
about the 5900 pillar in this deposition. 
4 A. All right. Well ... 
5 MR. RAMSDEN: 5900 drift pillar. 
6 BY MR. ROSS.MAN: 
7 Q. Drift pillar. 
8 A. Okay. Well, I'm sorry. I got -- I was 
9 referring to the 5300 because that was part of the 
1 0 modeling we were doing was for the 5300 drift -- or 
11 sill pillar. 
12 Q. Okay. And the other component of the 
13 modeling that was being done in the spring of 2010 by 
14 Itasca was to model the 5900 drift pillar? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Did you understand in December of2011 that 
1 7 the Lucky Friday Mine was particularly prone to 
1 8 rockbursts compared to other mines in other areas of 
19 the world? 
2 O A. I was aware that Lucky Friday is a rockburst 
21 mme. 
2 2 Q. What do you mean by a rockburst mine? 
2 3 A. It's seismically active. I know Wilson 
2 4 Blake, the consultant, travels to many different areas. 



















Q. And as a rockburst you had to be 
conscious taking proactive measures to address 
or predict when a rockburst might occur; is that 
correct? 
predict a rockburst. 
Q. But there are steps --
A. With any -- with any certainty or with any 
accuracy. 
Q. -- steps that can be taken to help determine 
whether or not a rockburst might occur, correct? 
A. Yes. And almost everything we do at Lucky 
Friday is gauged around rockbursts. It's gauged around 
the safety of the miners for rockbursts. 
Q. One of the purpose of all the modeling that 
was done on the 5900 drift pillar was to address 
rockbursts? 
A. The potential for bursting of the pillar, 
Page 33 
1 yes. The stability of the pillar. 
2 Q. Continuous seismic monitoring was for purpose 
3 of addressing potential rockbursts, correct? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And the stress monitoring is to try to keep 
6 an assessment of any stress changes on particular walls 
7 within the pillar, correct? 
8 A. Yes. There's limitations to the stress 
9 modeling -- or stress monitoring. But that's all --
1 0 that's another component of information that we try to 
11 gather. 
12 Q. What are the limitations? 
1 3 A. Stressmeters in my experience or my education 
14 aren't perfect. So they do not read -- I rely on them 
1 5 to give me an indication of a change in stress. They 
1 6 don't tell you the stress that's in the area before 
1 7 they're installed, only what's happened since the 
1 8 installation. So I understand their limitations as far 
1 9 as the data you get is only a change from when they 
2 0 were installed. Plus there's many factors or 
21 components of those that can affect their reliability. 
2 2 Q. So a stressmeter doesn't tell you what the 
2 3 level of stress is in a particular wall at the time 
2 4 it's installed? 
25 A. No. 
0 
A. 
Q. The manner in which the platens are 
installed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The geology of the rock at which -- at the 
























Q. Can there be variability in the rock 
properties at a particular location? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But the monitoring -- stress monitoring gauge 
will only tell you what the stress changes are at the 
particular location of the gauge? 
35 
1 A. Correct. 
2 Q. And so in order to have a more accurate 
3 understanding of whether or not the wall is increasing 
4 in stress is to have more gauges at different locations 
5 to address that variability? 
6 A. That can help. We like to install multiple 
7 gauges usually to give you a check as well. If you can 
8 twin them, that's great. So if one's acting oddly, you 
9 have another one close by to kind of confirm -- or not 
1 0 confinn -- because the gauge is starting to malfunction 
11 or whatever. So having redundant gauges is not a bad 
12 idea. 
13 Q. These gauges aren't expensive, are they? 
1 4 A. I'm not sure what they cost 
1 5 Q. I think I saw a reference to a few hundred 
16 bucks for a 4300NX gauge. 
1 7 A. Yeah, there's -- I don't recall. 
18 Q. Are there ways to -- well, historically the 
1 9 monitoring gauges prior to November of 2011 hadn't 
2 0 always worked correctly; is that fair? 
21 A No. That's not fair. 
2 2 Q. Okay. Did you have concerns or problems with 
2 3 accurate readings from stress monitors prior to 
2 4 November of 2011? 
A. I don't -- my concern wasn't accuracy. 
It was the meters the stress gauges would fail 
2 
back 
i 8 manufacturer to to determine would they fail. 
9 So they're not the best gauge in the world, but 
1 0 probably as good as anything you're going to find on 
1 11 the market. 
I 12 Q. How could you tell or historically how did 
[ 13 you typically tell thata gauge may not be providing 
14 reliable information? 




no reading at all. As far as the readings when they 
were working, I didn't really question was it accurate 
18 or not. I mean, I would have no way to know how 
1 9 accurate the gauge is. 
20 Q. So there weren't things that you would look 
21 for in stress readings relative to what you would be 
2 2 expecting at that particular location? 
23 A. \Vhen I review the data, I look for radical 
2 4 changes or unexpected increases or decreases that 
2 5 are that have no other means to explain it. So that 
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1 would tell me -- that may tell me if a gauge is 
2 malfunctioning or that -- that would give me an 
3 indication that maybe that -- that I would question the 
4 accuracy. But that didn't -- that's a theory. That 
5 didn't happen in practice very often. 
6 Q. What kinds of things would show up on stress 
7 data that would be unexpected for what you would expect 
8 at a particular location? 
9 A. Rapid changes in stress. 
1 O Q. Anything else? 
11 A. The stress gauges also have a temperature 
12 reading. So if a temperature changed radically, you'd 
13 know it's something is out of the ordinary. So it's 
14 just the stress reading itself and the temperatures is 
15 the only two outputs you get out of those. 
16 Q. Okay. And after November 16, 2011, there 
1 7 were continuously negative readings on the east wall 
18 monitor -- east low monitor at the 5900 drift pillar; 
19 is that correct? 
2 0 A. If I remember correctly, I believe it started 
21 out about zero and went negative. So it didn't start 
2 2 there, but it consistently read negative after the 
2 3 gauge settled in they call it. 
2 4 (Whereupon, Deposition 21 was 
2 5 marked for identification.) 
10 34 37) 
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at east low psi it shows starting at zero and 
9 but negative readings up to the 14th. 
0 A Correct 
11 And then if you look at page 2, appears to be 
1 2 some data; is that correct? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q. And what does that data indicate? Is that 
15 stress monitoring data? 
16 A Yes. 
1 7 Q. So this particular information was plotted 
1 8 into the graph on -- that is page 1? 
1 9 A That's correct 
2 0 Q. What is page 3? 
2 1 A Page 3 is the raw readings you get from the 
2 2 gauges when you download the stressmeters with a --
2 3 it's a hand-held gauge that reads out in digits. And 
2 4 then those digits need to go through a formula to then 
2 5 convert it to a psi. This is some sort of frequency 
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8 rocks, right, different sides vein or something. 
But this was the same -- same rocks, same vein package 
10 all the way around. So there was no -- there's no 
11 reason to believe the east would be any different than 
12 the west or the top or the bottom 
13 Q. Did you develop an understanding after the 
14 December 14th burst as to the location of the burst, 
15 where it originated? 
16 A December or November? 
1 7 Q. December 14. The burst that injured my 
18 clients. 
19 A. So can you -- I'm sorry. Can you rephrase 
2 0 the question then. 
21 Q. Did you develop an understanding as to the 
2 2 location of that burst within the pillar? 
2 3 A. I understood after the burst that it occurred 
2 4 in the east wall. 





or you know, these digits really don't mean anything 1 was carrying more stress than other areas of the 








Did you ever develop a concern about the 
consistent negative readings on the east low psi? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you understand that that east wall was 
the wall that was expected to carry -- that was 
historically expected to carry extra stress for that 
pillar? 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object, to the form, 
11 foundation. You can go ahead and answer the question. 
12 WITNESS: I never expected the east wall 
13 or nobody, to my knowledge, expected the east wall to 
14 carry more load than any other part of the pillar. The 
15 pillar was consistent. 
MR. R0SS~1A.N: 
Q. The pillar was consistent what? 
16 
17 
18 A. In the same rock mass so there would be no 
19 reason to think one side would be higher stress than 
2 O the other. 
2 1 Q. So you would expect both walls to be 
2 2 consistent stress? 
I
. 2 3 A. I would, yeah. Yes. 
2 4 Q. Is it possible or com..111on one to 






Q. But the stress monitor wasn't showing 
substantial increase in stress leading up to that 
burst? 
A. No. 7 
8 
9 
Q. In fact, it was showing nothing but negative 
readings for the entire period of time that that east 
1 0 low monitor was used? 
11 A. And I've seen that before in numerous 
12 monitors in other areas of the mine including this 
13 pillar. 
14 Q. Did you take any steps to determine what the 
15 cause of those consistent negative readings was? 
1 6 A. could be several reasons. 
1 7 Q. Okay. What are those reasons? 
18 A. One could simply be that the gauge is in 
1 9 tension instead of compression. If it's in 
2 0 compression, it will show positive increases. If it's 
2 1 in tension, it will show a negative. 
2 2 The other gauges that we installed in that 
2 3 same pillar in 2005 or 2006, a couple of those went 
2 4 negative and stayed negative for periods of months 
2 before they finally -- the ground finally 
1 s 38 to 4 
could not be 
8 contact with a big enough area of rock until that 
9 those little ridges get pushed or crushed. 
1 0 Then the gauge will start responding like the others. 
11 Q. So the hole itself can affect the -- or cause 
1 2 the monitoring gauge to register negative readings? 
1 3 A. Theway I understand it, yes. 
14 Q. The installation of the platen can cause 
15 negative readings? 
16 A It can. 
17 Q. The rock properties at the location of the 
18 monitor can cause it to show negative readings, perhaps 
1 9 if it's a softer rock than a compressed rock in another 
2 O portion of the wall? 
21 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. Go ahead 
2 2 and answer. 
2 3 THE WITNESS: I don't believe that to be 
2 4 true. 
2 5 MR. ROSSMAN: Let's mark 
1 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 22 was 
2 marked for identification.) 
3 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
4 Exhibit 22. Do you recognize that document? 
5 A. Yes. I believe that's a e-mail back from a 
6 person at Geokon responding to questions about the 
7 gauges. 
8 Q. So it appears that on May 23rd, 2012, at 
9 4:31 p.m. Zac Thomas was requesting some information 
1 0 from someone named Brian Brown at Geokon; is that 
11 correct? 
12 A. It appears so, yes. 
13 Q. Do you know why Mr. Thomas was contacting 
1 4 Mr. Brown at that time? 
15 A. We wanted an official response from Geokon as 
16 to a gauge would go negative. 
1 7 Q. Why did you want an official response from 
18 Geokon? 
1 9 A. Because there were questions about why was 
2 0 the gauge negative. 
21 Q. So did you ask Mr. Thomas to contact 
2 2 Mr. Brown? 
2 3 A. I don't think I asked him directly, but I 
2 4 don't recall exactly. I would -- I would think his 





this east wall monitor was showing consistent 
npo,~T1,rPreadings? 
A. No. 
Q. Did anyone contact anyone to your knowledge 
2 to try to determine why this wall was showing 
consistent negative readings? 
A I believe Wilson Blake would have seen the 
data. I'm not sure about Mark Board. And our own 
on-site staff reviewed the data. But we didn't contact 
1 7 Geokon because it was not out of the ordinary to be 
18 negative. 
19 Q. Okay. Well, at 8:47 a.m. Mr. Brown responded 
2 0 to Mr. Thomas. And that's in front ofus as Exhibit 
2 1 22, correct? 
22 A. Yes. 
2 3 Q. And he says, "As we discussed the 
2 4 stressmeters could see a relaxation in the stress due 
to a of factors including the wedge/platen 
1 de-bonding from the rock or some elastic rebound of 
2 rock after the stressmeter was initially set." 
3 Did anyone, to your knowledge, when these 
4 consistent negative readings were being shown in 
5 December of 2011, assess the wedge/platen for this 
6 particular monitor on the east wall to see if it had 
7 de-bonded from the rock? 
8 A. De-bonded? Not to my knowledge. 
9 Q. Did anyone assess the fit between the platen 
10 and the borehole at that particular location? 
11 A. I -- assess the fit. I believe I asked Zac 
12 how the -- how did it go installing the three monitors 
13 and did he have any issues getting the platen to set. 
1 4 You know, did he get them orientated perpendicular to 
1 5 the main structure, which there's certain orientation 
1 6 of the meter. So I asked Zac how -- how did the 
1 7 installation go in general. 
18 My recollection is he -- I don't think he had 
1 9 any issues or anything out of the ordinary that I can 
2 0 recall him saying that was different from the east 
2 1 versus the west or the top installation. So we were --
2 2 I was fairly confident it was installed correctly. 
2 3 Q. Did you ask Ted Wiliiams with NIOSH to 
2 4 evaluate the wedge/platen or the installation of that 
2 5 monitoring gauge? 
(P s 4 to 4 5) 
ask anyone 
He was trained by NIOSH. 8 
Trained to install by NIOSH? 9 
10 A. mm-hmm. 0 
11 Q. Did you ask Wilson Blake to assess the 11 
12 installation of the monitoring gauge on the east wall? 12 
13 A. No. I don't know how you would assess the 13 
14 installation. I'm not sure how you determine -- I 14 
15 don't know if there's anything you could see. If you 15 
16 put a camera there, I don't -- so I would never even 16 
7 have thought to try to -- I don't know how you'd do 17 
18 that, I guess. How do you assess the installation of 18 
19 the -- other than taking it out and putting it back in. 19 
20 Q. Okay. Did you ask anyone to take it out and 20 
21 put it back in when you were getting consistent 21 
22 negative readings every day? 
122 23 A. No, because consistent negative readings are 23 
24 not out of the ordinary. 124 
25 Q. Are they out of the ordinary on a -- in a 12s 
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1 pillar that was determined by a constant -- or believed i 1 I 2 a consultant to be continuing to carry stress? 2 
3 A. All pillars carry stress, so ... 
I 
4 Q. Mr. Brown says in the second paragraph, first 4 
5 sentence, "Perhaps the wedge/platen is sitting in an 5 
6 area of rock that has a lower stiffness than the 
I 
6 
7 surrounding rock mass?" Did anyone assess that? 7 
8 A. That wasn't the case. l 8 
9 Q. How do you know that wasn't the case? I 9 I 
10 A. Because we had videotaped those holes. We 
I 
10 
11 know what the rock mass looked like. 11 
12 Q. You videotape the holes when they're bored? 12 
13 A. Well, we -- there's surrounding -- there's 13 
14 probe holes in the pillar that we installed when we put 14 
15 in the initial instruments around that time -- 2006, 15 
16 2007 time frame. We videotaped and kept a log of the 
[16 17 condition of the pillar through those holes. So I'm 17 
18 pretty familiar with the rock mass. And in my opinion 18 
19 there wasn't an area of lower stiffness. 19 
20 I believe the consultant, not being familiar 20 
21 with the installation, is just throwing out an idea, 21 
22 you know, of all possible reasons. 22 
23 Q. You said that they were -- the boreholes were 23 
24 videotaped. What did you mean by that? 24 




the peripheral edges of the pillar to determine if the 
pillar was shrinking or coming unraveled or -- it's 
just another visual indication. So I knew basically 
what the rock looked like through the whole pillar 
because of the video of the holes. 
Q. So when you talk about video through 
boreholes, you're not talking about the boreholes in 
which the platens or the monitoring gauges were 
installed? 
A. No. They're different holes. 
Q. Okay. And were you videotaping through those 
boreholes in December of 2011? 
A. No. 
Q. Whynot? 
A. There's no need to videotape the boreholes. 
Q. Okay. You videotaped -- you did some 
videotaping on those boreholes before November of 2011, 
correct? 
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A. Different boreholes, but yes. 
Q. Why did you do that? 
A. I just explained. To at the condition 
of the pillar. 
Q. Why did you videotape it? 
A. So we had a record. 
Q. And did you periodically videotape it to see 
any changes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were there boreholes in the 5900 pillar? 
A. That's the pillar I'm talking about. 
Q. And were there boreholes still present at the 
5900 pillar in December of 2011? 
A I don't remember seeing them after the first 
rockburst. So they may have got crushed. But we also 
shotcreted the whole area. So we would have covered up 
where holes were located, through the rehab. 
I don't recall seeing them after the November 
rockburst. 
Q. Okay. Did you take any measures to determine 
whether those boreholes were still present after the 
November 16 rockburst? 
MR. RAMSDEN: Other than looking? 
tv1R. ROSSMAN: 1 don't think he said he 
looked. 
1 s 6 0 4 9) 
8 
there any videotaping 
monitoring gauges? 
A. No. 
12 Q. Was there any record of the installation of 
13 these.monitoring gauges? 
1 4 A. Other than, I mean, they were installed on a 
15 certain day. They're -- no, not -- I don't know if 
16 engineering keeps a record of their daily activities. 
1 7 That would be the only record I could think of. 
18 Q. Mr. Brown says, "Or maybe there was some 
1 9 localized crushing of the rock around the wedge during 
2 0 the installation and the ground is now relaxing?" 
2 1 Was there any steps taken to determine, when 
2 2 you were seeing consistent negative readings on the 
2 3 east wall, any steps to determine whether or not that 
2 4 was occurring or had occurred? 










was in tension and not compression. So that was a 
possibility to me in my mind. 
Q. Did anyone assess it, look at see if 
there was any localized crushing of rock around the 
wedge? 
A. I don't know. I wasn't there when they 
installed them. 
Q. He says, "Since the gauge is still giving you 




8 A. It -- yeah. It takes a while for the gauge 
9 to adjust to the rock temperatures and things. It 
10 needs to settle in, they say, for some period of time. 
1 Q. And on the east wall you installed on 
12 December or Heda did, a single monitoring gauge 
13 to evaluate stress monitoring at that particular wall, 
14 correct? 
15 A. Yes. There's three installed, one in the 
l 6 east and one in the west and one vertically upwards. 
1 7 Q. And you also represented to MSHA that 
18 additional gauges had been ordered? 
19 A. Yes. 
2 0 Q. Did you order additional gauges? 
21 A. Yes. 
2 2 Q. Who ordered them? 
2 3 A. The engineering department, but I don't know 
who specifically. 
Who 
order the gauges? 
2 A. I probably did. 
Q. Who did you to do that? 
4 A. I don't remember. 
5 Q. Did the engineering depaitment -- do you know 
6 how they requested those gauges? 
7 A. I don't recall exactly how. Normally I would 
8 walk over and say order me some more gauges. 
9 Q. Okay. And do you know whether they followed 
10 The question is what is causing the apparent decrease 1 O through with that request? 










So Mr. Brown was asking what is causing the 
apparent decrease in stress in this particular e-mail 
on May 24, 2012, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever ask that prior to 
December 14, 2011? 
A. I thought I recall having discussion with 
Wilson Blake about the gauge performance or gauge 
readings. And because I'm familiar with the original 
2 1 stressmeters and I've seen them do that before, I 
wasn't concerned that it was -- wasn't functioning 
correctly or was was installed incorrectly or 




You just assumed it was working properly? 
www mmcourt corn 
11 
12 
A. I -- yes, they did. 
Q. How do you know that? 
13 A. Because I asked did you order them and when 
14 are they supposed to arrive. Because Zac, I believe, 
1 5 probably would have ordered them, but -- either I asked 
16 Zac specifically or his boss. I don't recall. But I 
7 needed to know, because I had to keep MSHA informed of 
18 everything we did, when the gauges were ordered and 
19 when they were expected to anive and when the other 
2 0 three would be installed. 
21 
2 
('Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 23 was 
mai·ked for identification.) 
23 BY :tv1R. ROSSMAN: 
24 Q. Showing you EY.hibit 23. Is that a memo 
2 5 written by you and produced to MSHA, dated November 
14 s 50 to 5 
9 
10 Is that true; the stress monitors -- or 
1 meters were no longer working? 
12 A. Yes. The November rockburst wiped them out. 
13 Q. And then you said, "6 new stress gauges will 
14 be installed, 2 in the back and 2 in each wall"; 
15 correct? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. So you intended to have two stress gauges in 
18 the east wall, west wall and up above? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. I noticed in the monitoring data that the 
21 gauge that was installed was called east low. What 
22 does low mean? 
23 A. We would have had a high and a low, so it's 
24 the spacing on the rib. 
25 Q. And so the intention was that there would 
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1 also be a monitoring gauge installed high on the east 
2 wall, correct? 
3 A. That was going to be the plan. 
4 Q. Where did you get the three gauges that were 
5 installed on December 1st? 
6 A. We had them on site as spares. 
7 Q. Have you ever seen any documentation, a 
8 purchase order, an invoice, anything representing that 
9 the additional three monitoring gauges were ordered? 
1 O A. I never saw a purchase order. 
11 Q. Typically when you ordered something from 
12 Geokon or one of your suppliers, you'd get a purchase 
13 order or some kind of documentation, correct? 
1 4 A. Should. 
15 Q. Did you search -- did anyone at Hecla to your 
16 knowledge search to see if there was a purchase order 
1 7 or an invoice relating to that -- the ordering of three 
18 additional monitors? 
19 A. I -- I don't know. 
2 0 Q. It says, "The other 3 gauges are on order and 
21 will be shipped December 7th." Do you know whether or 
2 2 not additional monitors were ever shipped? 
2 3 A. I don't know. 
2 4 Q. Do you know whether Hecla ever received 




















you ever take any to 
after making this to MSHA, whether or 
not Hecla had received those monitoring gauges? 
A. I don't recall ifI asked had arrived 
yet or not. 
This is an early November 29. There's 
several other updates, December 2nd, December 6th, 
others. So some of these plans changed as we went 
forward. 
Q. Did this plan change that you weren't going 
to install additional monitoring gauges at the 5900 
pillar? 
A. The location of where they were going to be 
installed. The other three, second set of three 
changed. 
Q. Okay. Why did it change? 
A. Because the tunnel liner was to be installed. 
6 
25 And had to move the location of the outside 
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1 of where the tunnel liner is. Because the tunnel 
2 liner -- the metal liner is in the way of the rim -- or 
3 the ground to -- to install them. So they had no -- no 
4 method, no means to install them in the exact location 
5 of the other three. They had to move -- the plan was 
6 to move them about 15 feet north and install them at 
7 the end of the liner. 
8 Q. Well, before the tunnel liner was installed 
9 on or about December 13th, the -- or started to be 
1 0 installed, the existing monitoring gauge in the east 
11 wall, an extended lead was run from that. Was that 
12 your understanding? 
13 A. It wasn't extended lead, but the leads for 
1 4 the stress gauges were ran down the rib beyond the 
1 5 tunnel liner start. 
16 Q. So you were able to read the monitoring 
1 7 gauge --
18 A. Yeah. 
19 Q. -- data? 
2 0 A. Mm-hmm. 
21 Q. And so because of the liner, after they began 
2 2 installing the liner, the intention was to install 
2 3 additional monitors at different locations to avoid the 
2 4 impact of the liner? 
25 A. Yes. 






you water Yes. 
so water will drain out, that kind of thing. 8 Q. In fact, it would sustain -- it was designed 
So when the liner arrives and the plans to sustain the impact of a rockburst at level up to 
change that you're going to install monitors at O about on a Richter scale, correct? 
1 different locations, did you take any steps to 11 A At a certain distance, yeah. 









additional monitors? 13 and appropriately supported, it did not provide that 
A. My focus was getting the tunnel liner in. So 14 stability, did it? 
as soon as the liner was in, I would have got the 15 A Well, it provided some stability. It saved 
monitors down there. I -- I don't recall if I asked if 1 6 their lives. 
the monitors were there yet or not. 1 7 Q. It provided some stability, but it did not 
Q. Well, one of the reasons the monitors were 18 provide the intended stability until it --
present and one of the reasons you had them installed 1 9 A It wasn't finished yet. 




pillar? 2 1 MR. RAMSDEN: Be sure and let him finish his 
A That's one method to try to assess the 2 2 question before you start your answer and that will 
23 condition of the pillar. 2 3 give me an opportunity to object, which I do, it's 
24 
25 
Q. You had employees, I believe seven of them, 2 4 compound. 
in the 5900 between December I st and 2 5 THE WITNESS: 
59 
1 December 14th, correct? 1 
2 A. They -- there was dates we repaired. Once 2 
3 the repair was finished, we waited for the tunnel 3 
4 liner. So they weren't working in the pillar every day 4 
5 between those dates. 5 
6 Q. Okay. But they were working in the pillar 6 
7 between those dates, correct? 7 
8 A. After the first burst until we got permission / 8 
9 to go back mining on December 6th, they were working in 9 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Was it your intent -- were you concerned 
prior to the installation, full complete installation 
of the liner, were you concerned about the safety of 
the employees? 
A I did not expect the pillar to burst. I had 
no indication that the stress -- that a second burst 
was imminent. 
Q. So you're not concerned about the safety of 
61 
1 0 the area. And then the night of -- or the day of 1 O 
11 December 14th. 11 
the employee -- particularly concerned about the safety 
of the employees at that point in time, correct? 
12 Q. And it's your testimony you never took any 12 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, mischaracterizes his 
testimony. It's argumentative. Go ahead and answer. 1 3 steps to determine -- that you can recall -- to 1 3 
1 4 determine whether or not the additional monitors were 1 4 THE WITNESS: I'm always concerned about the 
15 safety of miners. But I was in that drift for six 1 5 received? 
1 6 A. I don't remember if I asked if the monitors 
1 7 were there yet, but the plan changed. Okay. So we 
1 8 asked MSHA the other -- for permission to move the 






2 0 Instead of installing them in the tunnel liner where 
you could never go back and change them or do any 
maintenance on them, it made more sense to put them 
just outside of the tunnel liner. 
So it didn't matter if they were there that 
5 day or not. I had to get the tunnel liner in first and 
WWW, 
1 6 hours that morning. I did a workplace inspection. I 
1 7 looked at the shotcrete. I listened to the ground. I 
1 8 had the data from the morning readings. And there was 
1 9 nothing that indicated another rockburst was imminent 
2 0 or -- there was no indications. 
21 BYMR.ROSSMAN: 
22 Q. Were there morning readings on December 14, 




Q. Were you that 












Q. Did you ridicule or put down any employees 
for raising concerns about the stability of that pillar 
in that time period? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you call one of them a pussy for not 









A. Not that I recall, no. I wouldn't do that. 
Q. Not that you can recall? 
A. I don't call people names. No. 
Q. Look at Exhibit No. 5. 
A. (Complying.) 
Q. It appears to be a technical memorandum from 
Itasca regarding some modeling that they've done at the 
5900 pillar in March of 2010, correct? 
8 understood what he's yes. 
9 And what did you understand that was 
10 saying? 
11 A. The periphery of the pillar had yielded 
2 somewhat, had crushed, which was expected. So that 
13 wasn't a surprise to me. 
14 Q. So you expected that there would be some 
15 yielding around the perimeter of the 5900 pillar moving 




A. Yeah, that's normal. 
Q. Okay. You can look at page 18 of Exhibit 5. 
A. Page 18? 
20 Q. Let's jump forward to the conclusion section, 
21 page 28. 
22 
23 
A. (Complying.) Okay. 
Q. Under Conclusions, the second sentence says, 
2 4 "More importantly, the modeling indicates that the 5900 
pillar is not currently in a failed state." That was 25 
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1 A. Correct. 
2 Q. Did you review this documentation when you 
3 received it? 
4 A. I believe so, yes. 
5 Q. Did you understand it when you received it? 
6 A. I believe so. 
7 Q. Did you communicate with Mr. Board regarding 
8 the conclusions and opinions contained within it? 
9 A. I believe we met at the mine, and he gave us, 
10 you know, verbal discussion about the result of the 
11 model and then his report followed, you know, sometime 
12 after the meeting on site. If I remember correctly, 
13 there was several different models and things. 
14 But that's nonnally how we do it. We meet 
15 before they leave, talk about what observations they 
16 had and then when can we a report So ... 
17 Q. The first page, third paragraph down, middle 
18 of the paragraph, there's a sentence that starts, The 
19 conclusion. 
20 A. Okay. 
21 Q. He says, "The conclusion from the analyses 
22 indicate that the pillar is yielded around its 
23 peripher;, but that the interior of the pillar remains 



























your understanding in March of 2010, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And was that the goal of this modeling to 
determine when and if that pillar would be in a failed 
state? 
A. I believe the goal of the memorandum or the 
study was to review the stability of the pillar and how 
the data we have compares to the modeling. 
Q. Okay. Because one of the concerns about the 
stability of the pillar is the pillar failing while 
your employees are working in the pillar, correct? 
A. That could be a concern. We ask consultants 
what does it mean by "fail" because it's kind of a 
broad term. 
Q. What is your understanding of that, what that 
means? 
A. What I understood "failure" to mean in this 
context, both by Mark Board and the previous 
consultant, is it crushing but not failing violently. 
Over time the surrounding grounds closure 
would crush -- crush the pillar to where it can't take 
a load anymore, that it was not supposed to fail 
violently. 
Q. Okay. He says, "Only the outer 1 O' to 15' of 
the pillar has yielded, 
7 
is still in 





9 A. understand that he's about the 
10 stresses going through the pillar. They have to go 
111 through the pillar. The ground -- we have high 
12 stresses at Lucky Friday. That's what causes 
13 rockbursts. So the pillar is seeing the surrounding 
14 ground stress is what that means. 
15 Q. He says, "The answer is no, the 5900 pillar 
16 has a width:height ratio of approximately I 0: 1." And 
17 he's referencing that that's large enough 
18 width-to-height ratio to address any concern of it 
19 failing, correct? 
20 A. Correct. 
21 Q. So you understood that the modeling was based 
22 upon a 1 O-to-1 width-to-height ratio, correct? 
23 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. You can go 
24 ahead and answer the question. 
25 THE WITNESS: The was 
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1 performed by Rimas Pakalnis to determine what size 
2 pillar would be long-term stable. And that's why that 
3 pillar was chosen because it had a pretty tall 
4 width-to-height or pretty large ratio. He goes on to 
5 say that width-to-height ratios of less than two 
6 commonly don't fail. 
7 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
8 Q. So he's indicating to you, will you agree, 
9 that he's basing his opinions regarding the stability 
10 of the pillar on its geometrics at the time of the 
11 modeling, 1 O-to-1 width-to-height ratio? 
12 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. 
13 THE WITNESS: Can you rephrase that or can 
14 you restate that. 
15 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
16 Q. Did you understand that at the time of his 
17 modeling there was a 1 O-to-1 width-to-height ratio? 
18 A. I understood what the ratio was, yes. 
19 Q. And did you understand that the 
20 width-to-height ratio impacted the stability of the 
21 pillar? 
22 A. I understood that a l O-to-1 width-to-height 
123 
ratio was fairly large and that with a confined pillar 
24 that should be stable. So the -- so yes. 










































MR. RAMSDEN: We've been about two 
hours. 
MR. ROSSMAN: Sure. Let's take a short 
break. 
(A short break was taken.) 
MR. ROSSMAN: Let's go back on the record. 
BYMR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. If I could have you look at Exhibit No. 
please. 
A. (Complying.) Okay. 
Q. Recognize that document? 
A. I do. 
Q. What is it? 
A. It's a memorandum from Wilson Blake, dated 
November 18, 2011, on a mine visit report regarding the 
5900 rockburst. 
Q. So you just had a major rockburst at the 5900 
correct? 
A. Yes. 




Q. One of the things you wanted him to do was 
try to determine the cause of the rockburst, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And one of the things you wanted to 
understand from that is whether or not there's a 
continuing risk of safety at that pillar? 
A. Pillar stability, yes. 
Q. 5900 level -- or the 5900 access drift pillar 
was the only access to the Gold Hunter vein, correct, 
for mining? 
A. There's two other ramps that connect to 4900, 
so there's other ways to get there. But the main 
haulage -- able to get ore out, really, it's -- that 
was our main haulage level. 
Q. So in order to get ore out of the Gold Hunter 
mine, you needed access across the 5900 drift? 
A. To do it efficiently, yes. 
Q. Okay. And you received this November 18, 
2011, memo report back from Mr. Blake? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you 




to occur. Because the actual burst appears to 
been structurally controlled, we may want Itasca 
1 0 to rerun the model with structure running through the 
1 pillar in order to see if we can replicate the burst. 
12 We reallv need to better understano whv thi-: hnr.<:t 
~ - - - --~ ·--,/ ----- ---~--
1 3 occurred, as it has significant implications with 
4 respect to mining the main sill, particularly along the 
1 5 more burst prone eastern portion of the sill." 
1 6 Did you understand that when you read it? 
1 7 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Did you understand that he was calling for --
1 9 or raising concerns about whether or not the modeling 
2 0 that was done in the spring of 2010 was still accurate? 
2 1 A. Yes. He is suggesting we rerun the model 
2 2 with structure. 
2 3 This is Wilson's first visit after the burst. 
2 4 He, based on this memo, was theorizing that -- that it 
2 5 was a pillar burst. It wasn't until later that they 
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1 determined it was a fault-slip event somewhere else 
2 that caused -- the seismic wave caused the damage to 
3 the pillar. 
4 So at this point he's thinking that the 
5 pillar did burst, and it was concerning because the 
6 pillar wasn't supposed to be able to fail in a burst of 
7 that size. And what I understood him to mean is -- his 
8 last sentence, "significant implications with respect 
9 to mining the main sill," I knew that to mean this 5300 
1 0 sill. As we mined to that 70-foot plateau that I 
11 talked about earlier, when we -- and he's saying we 
1 2 need to rerun the model to make sure that that 70 foot 
1 3 is still valid is what he's talking about. So that's 
1 4 at the time roughly a year of mining before we get to 
1 5 that point. 
16 Q. Did you understand he was raising concerns 
1 7 about the validity of the modeling that was carried out 
18 in the spring of 20107 
19 A. No. I don't think he had concern that the 
2 O model was inaccurate. At that point he still thought 
2 1 it was a pillar burst, and there must have been 
2 2 structure for it to burst So he's wondering if we can 
2 3 rerun the model with strncture to see if the model 
2 4 could predict such a burst at that magnitude. He 
2 5 his theory and said it wasn't structure. It 
www. 
that burst It was 
after 
understanding, correct? 
MR RAMSDEN: to the You're 
asking him to speculate what's in somebody else's 
11 BY MR. ROSS:MAN: 
1 '.7 Q. Nn. r -:,iirl tn yrnir 11nrlPr~t,inrling. That's 
13 what I need to know. 
14 A. My understanding was Wilson thought it was a 
15 pillar burst or a foundation failure up until -- at 
16 some point. And I don't know if it was directly after 
1 7 the second burst, but it was later. It was a later 
18 conclusion. 
19 Q. You thought it was a pillar burst right up 
2 0 until after December 14, 2011, correct? 
21 A. I did, yes. 
2 2 Q. And he's indicating "we really need to better 
2 3 understand why this burst occurred" with further 
2 4 modeling, correct? 
2 5 A. For the 5300 model. 
3 
1 Q. You say for the 5300 model. What do you mean 
2 by that? 
3 A. He's talking about the respect to mining the 
4 main sill. He's talking about the 5300 sill. He's 
5 talking about that model. The future mining of the 
6 Gold Hunter on the sill. He's not talking about the 
7 5900 pillar. He's talking about the model of the sill. 
8 Q. He's talking about the modeling of the pill 
9 (sic) and the mining -- how that mining of that sill 
0 may affect this pillar, correct? 
11 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. 
12 Mischaracterizes the letter. 
13 THE WITNESS: He wants to rerun the model 
14 with structure in the 5900 pillar to see if it can 
15 replicate the burst. 
16 BY :MR. ROSSMAN: 
17 Q. Okay. 
1 8 A. And then he needs to better understand why 
1 9 this occmTed for mining the remaining sill, the 5300 
2 0 sill. So he's concerned with two things. But mainly 
21 he's talking about the 5300 sill and that modeling. 
2 2 Q. So was it your understanding he was not 
2 3 concerned at all about the stability of the 5900 pillar 
2 4 the November 16th 
2 I said. 
19 s 70 to 73) 
9 A. Yes. So he's that future 
1 O needs to be done. 
11 Is that telling you that he did not fully 
1 2 understand why this burst occurred at that 
13 time? Did you understand it that way? 
in 
14 MR RAMSDEN: Object It's compound. Which 
1 5 one do you want him to answer? 
MR RAMSDEN: 
reading this memo as to what Blake is expressing? 
9 MR. RAMSDEN: Same Go ahead 
1 O answer the question. 
11 THE WITNESS: In other areas of this memo or 
12 Athf'r mP-mA<:. Wikm1 P-vprf'<:<:P.<: tr, .. rith r.,:i11tiAn 
13 in rehab of the pillar. He knows the pillar was still 
14 intact and still had some load. He states that. I 
15 understood that. 
16 MR. ROSSMAN: Do you understand the question? 16 This section that you've highlighted that 
17 THE WITNESS: No. Can you rephrase it 
1 8 BY MR ROSSMAN: 
Q. Did you understand that he was ask -- he was 19 
20 indicating that he did not fully understand why this 
21 burst occurred? 
2 2 A. What I understand him to be saying is there 
2 3 was no reason for that pillar to burst unless it had 
2 4 structure. So if there's some structure we never 
2 5 with the -- with the 5900 
1 drift pillar then we need to reevaluate that and model 
2 future -- update the model again the future 
3 implications years down the road. He's talking about 
4 years down the road. 
5 Q. And your understanding when you read 
6 this, that he was concerned about the stability of the 
7 pillar years down the road? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And he wasn't calling for any short-term 
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10 modeling to determine the cause of the November 16th 
11 burst? 
12 A Not short-term modeling. He's concerned with 
13 mining years down the road. 
14 Q. And it's your understanding from this memo 






stability of the pillar? 
.MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form, 
argumentative and calls for speculation on what's in 
Wilson Blake's mind. 
20 .MR. ROSSMAN: I'm asking your understanding. 
21 Go ahead. 
22 .MR. RAMSDEN: I know. But it still calls for 
2 3 speculation about what's in Wilson Blake's mind. 








you're talking about is talking long-term mine planning 
stuff. That's what I understand and know. He did have 
concerns about the pillar, but they were longer term. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
21 Q. And you understood that further model -- he's 
2 2 expressing fmiher modeling might help the mine in 
2 3 understanding the long-tenn implications at that 
2 4 pillar, correct? 
25 A. Yes. I understood it to be 
1 Q. And did you understand that modeling before 
2 sending employees into the 5900 level was not indicated 
at that point in time? 
4 A. I didn't understand him to be --
5 MR. RAMSDEN: Same objection, speculation. 
6 Go ahead. 
7 THE WITNESS: I didn't understand Wilson to 
8 be recommending we do modeling short-term before we 
9 sent people in there. That's not what he's 
77 
1 0 recommending in my -- in the way I understand his memo. 
11 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
12 Q. Did you ask him whether or not additional 
13 modeling would be helpful in determining -- getting a 
1 4 better understanding as to why that burst occurred? 
15 A We had discussions. But I can tell you that 
16 I understood him -- what he's saying is long-term 
1 7 modeling. 
18 Q. He says in Summary, "Because the upper ribs 
19 and back appeared to be solid, we can't assume that the 
2 0 remaining pillar is destressed." Did you read that 
21 part of his memo? 
22 A Mm-hmm. 
2 3 Q. What did you understand that he meant that 
2 4 part of his memo? 








Object, speculation about 
A Yes. 
of 
8 up to 2.0." Did you understand that from the modeling II 
9 that was done? 
0 A. Yes. l 
1 Q. He says, "We did have such bursting, with the 
12 largest a magnitude 1. 9. The model results also 
1 4 what's in his mind. 
13 indicated that the only way the pillar could fail was 
14 if the height to width ratio changed and the pillar 
1 5 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 15 lost confinement, in which case a foundation failure 























to proceed with caution? 1 7 · A Mm-hmm. 
A. Rehabilitation needs to proceed with caution. 
1
18 Q. Yes? 
And we did. 19 A. Yes. 
Q. You did by installing a monitor in each wall 2 0 Q. What did you understand that to mean? 
for stress monitoring, correct? I 21 A. I understand what he means by foundation 
A. And successfully rehabbed the drift. i 2 2 failure. So I know what that means. So he's -- what I 
Q. Successfully rehabbed the drift by installing 1 2 3 understand him to be saying there is he's still under 
a liner? I 2 4 the assumption that it was a pillar burst. And the 
A. No. We rebolted the entire area. Right -- I 2 5 only way a pillar could fail is if something changed in 
Q. You dl
.d", Page 7911. 1 'd h h . h . h ·11 1 fi Patge 81 
w1 t -to- e1g t ratio or t e p1 ar ost con memen . 
A. -- with cable bolts, 12-foot Dywidags, I 2 So he still has the assumption that it was a pillar 
-·~ ... ,,~,,. Dywidags, six-foot Dywidags, split · 3 burst or a foundation failure. 
chain link and three inches of shotcrete. That was I 4 Q. So he's telling you and other Hecla 




5 representatives on November 25th that the model results 
employees were hurt during that rehab. 6 indicated that the only way the pillar could fail was 
We proceeded with caution. We monitored the 7 if the width-to-height ratio changed and the pillar 
area. We measured closure. We monitored the seismic 8 lost confinement, correct? 
data. We had visual observations. We took all that I 9 A. Right 
into account We proceeded with caution. 
his recommendation. 
Q. Let's look at Exhibit 13. 
A. (Complying.) Okay. 
I 
We followed ' 10 Q. Did you understand that the width-to-height 
11 ratio as a result of the November 16th burst had 
12 changed? 
13 A. I knew that we lost 12 foot of the back. So 
14 Q. This is his November 25th, 2011, memo that 14 there's -- the pillar was smaller. 












Did you read that and understand it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you read the third paragraph down, second 
sentence, "Itasca concluded that the 5900 pillar was 
stable and too big to fail suddenly and violently, 
behaving more like a stabilizing pillar," correct? 
A. Correct. 
And that was your understanding as 
correct? 
15 Q. Did you understand the width-to-height ratio 
1 6 had changed? 
A. No. 17 
18 Q. Well, he's telling you, "The model assumed a 
19 10:1 width to height ratio," correct? 
20 A. Mm-hmm. 
21 Q. Yes? 
2 2 A. The model assumed 1 O-to-1. 
2 3 Q. And then he says in the next paragraph, "With 
2 4 the observed stress along the and 
2 5 outer of the pillar, in the 10 ft range, 
21 78 to 81) 
8 
4 
8 Did you ask Mr. Board to rerun the 
9 Did you you that 9 assuming a 3 .5-to-l ratio? 
1 0 now the width-to-height ratio pillar is 10 A. We hadn't gotten to the point where we 
contracted Mark Board to rerun the model. And my 
recollection we would have had a specific list of tasks 
that we would have wanted Mark to do and that would 
have been -- there would have been future modeling. I 
11 3.5-to-l 11 
2 MR RAMSDEN: Object, speculation. Go ahead 12 
13 and answer. 13 
14 THE WITNESS: Do I understand that he's 14 
telling us it's 3.5? That's his assumption. He 
doesn't know the -- the deterioration along the inner 
1 7 and outer edges of the piliar. He's guessing it's ten 
18 feet. A prior memo that we just looked at says the 



















Q. Did you read that particular portion of the 
memo where he's telling you the doughnut-shaped pillar 
is actually 3.5? 
A. I read it. 
Q. Did you understand that to mean that the 
width-to-height ratio had changed as a result of that 
burst? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you understand it was his -- your expert 
consultant's opinion was it was now closer to 3 .5-to- l? 
A. I understood that's his opinion, yes. 
Q. Okay. Did you have a different opinion? 
A. I did not have a different opinion. 
Q. Did anyone else tell you that there was 
something other than a 3.5-to-l width-to-height ratio 

















A. Nobody else told me a different, no. 
Q. So assuming his opinion was correct, will you 
agree that he's telling you that the width-to-height 
ratio of the pillar after the burst was now 
approximately a third of what it was before the burst? 
A. I understood he's saying it's -- he thinks 
it's 3.5. 
Q. Is that a substantial change in your mind? 
A. It's a change. 
Q. Is it a substantial change? Two-thirds of 
the width-to-height ratio upon which the model was 
based. 
15 just don't know if we contracted Mark to do it yet or 
16 not. 
17 Q. Did you afford any consideration to having 
18 Mark Board run further modeling based upon a 3.5-to-1 
19 width-to-height ratio before sending employees into the 
2 0 pillar? 
21 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. Go ahead 
2 2 and answer. 
23 THE WITNESS: Did I -- let me try to rephrase 
2 4 it so I understand it. Did I put any consideration to 
2 5 having model runs done with a different width-to-height 
3 
ratio before putting miners in there? 





A. I didn't considering rerunning the model in a 
short-tenn. It was not my understanding it needed to 
6 be done short-tenn. 
7 
8 
Q. You say it's not your understanding it needed 
to be done short-term. What are you basing that 
9 understanding on? 
10 A. Wilson Blake's memos. 
11 Q. What about Wilson Blake's memos told you that 
12 further modeling in the short-term was not necessary 
13 despite the fact that the width-height ratio had 
14 decreased by two-thirds? 
15 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. 
16 THE WITNESS: Because I his memo 
1 7 to say future modeling is referring to the mining of 
18 the 5300 sill to that ultimate height. So I know he's 
1 9 talking about the long-term mine plan. 
20 BYMR. ROSSMAN: 
21 Q. Did you ask Mark Board if a 3- or 3.5-to-l 
2 2 width-to-height ratio would affect his modeling 
2 3 results? 
24 A. No. 
5 if it would 
22 s 82 to 85) 
8 
8 values, was also some 
9 He's talking about the before the November 
10 
11 He says, "Hence, the stress in the pillar was 
12 very near the unconfined compressive strength of the 
13 pillar, and any further loss of confinement could lead 
14 to a pillar failure." 
15 Did you read that and understand that when 
16 Mr. Blake issued his memo in November of201 l? 
17 A. I read it 
18 Q. What did you understand that to mean? 
















THE WITNESS: I understand that unconfined 
compressive strength of the pillar is based on the 
values that we've tested with the UCS testing. I know 
the pillar is confined. So I know in my mind -- or, 
of the that it's not 
unconfined means it can carry that much load. 
So I understood what he's -- I understand 
horizontal stress. I understand the principal 
stress direction. I understand the psi values because 
those are standard values we've used at the mine. So 
they're -- they're stuff I've seen before. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. So did you understand he was telling you and 
87 
9 Hecla that prior to the November 16th burst the stress 
10 in the pillar was very near the unconfined compressive 
11 strength of the pillar? 
12 MR. RAMSDEN: Speculation. Go ahead and 
13 answer. 
14 THE WITNESS: I did not understand that to be 
15 any warning or any -- addressing Wilson Blake trying to 
6 the company guidance on what he the pillar 
1 7 to do. That comes later in the report. 
18 BYI\1R.ROSSMAN: 
19 Q. Did you have concerns that the stress prior 
2 0 to the November 16th rockburst was believed by at least 
21 Mr. Blake to have been very near the unconfined 
2 2 compressive strength of the pillar? 
2 3 Jv!R. RAMSDEN: Object to the 
2 4 speculation. Go ahead. 




8 Let me see. You this memo on or about 




A. I understand. But I thought you said before 
November 16, so it confused me. So I just want to make 






Q. As of November 25th, 2011,.he's telling 
you he believed the stress in pillar prior to the 
November 16th burst was very near the unconfined 
compressive strength of the pillar. Did you utilize 
that information in any way? 
18 
19 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the fom1. Go ahead 
and answer. 




Did I utilize it in any way? I utilized his 
recommendations throughout. So I don't -- I don't know 
how to answer your question. 
24 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
25 He also told in the November 18th 
memo that the upper ribs and back appear to be solid 
2 and therefore we can't assume the remaining pillar to 
3 be 
4 A. Correct 
5 Q. Do you recall that part? 
6 A. Mm-hmm. 
7 Q. Okay. So he's told you he thought before the 
8 burst that the stress in the pillar was near its 
9 unconfined compressive strength and that the burst 
1 0 didn't complete -- didn't de-stress -- or we can't 
11 assume that the burst de-stressed that pillar, correct? 
12 A. Correct. So later on he says, "It is 
13 apparent the 2.8 Richter (sic) burst in the 5900 pillar 
14 did not completely destress this pillar. Hence, it is 
15 possible that further small bursts could occur in this 
1 6 pillar as it continues to be loaded by ongoing wall 
1 7 closure from continued mining off the 5900 level." 
18 He's talking about the 5300 sill again. So 
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1 9 he's recommending -- or saying that we could have small 
2 0 bursting as we mine in the future. 
21 Q. He's telling you you could have at least 
2 2 small bursting from continued mining in the 5300 sill 
2 3 pillar -- or sill? 
2 4 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. It's a 
2 5 characterization of the document, which says what it 
23 s 8 6 to 8 9) 




11 A Not from the monitors or the stress 
12 gauges, no. 
1 3 Q. And there's no way to tell to what extent, if 
1 4 any, the stress was reduced in that pillar after the 
1 5 burst, correct? 
l 6 A I don't know of any numerical or empirical 
l 7 fonnula that can really tell you that exactly. There's 
l 8 no exact measurement for that. 
1 9 Q. You could attempt to recreate the burst 
2 0 through further modeling, correct? 
2 1 A I don't know. I don't know if the model's 
2 2 capable of predicting-- how accurate the model would 
23 be. 
2 4 Q. Let's look at Exhibit No. 15, please. 
2 5 (Complying.) 
Page 91 
1 Q. That's Mr. Blake and Mr. Board's December 27, 
2 2011, memo regarding the November 16 and December 14 
correct? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Did you receive that memo, read it and 
6 understand it? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Look at page 5 and 6. There's a section 
9 entitled December 14 Event, correct? 
10 A. Okay. 
11 Q. In that section they're describing what they 
12 believe to have been the cause of the December 14th 
13 event as of December 27, 2011, correct? 
1 4 A. Correct. 
15 Q. And it says, "This appears to be a" -- this 
1 6 is on the first paragraph of page 6. "This appears to 
1 7 be a typical strain burst mechanism resulting from the 
18 solid pillar in the wall of the 5900 drift reaching its 
1 9 peak strength." Do you see that? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. So they're telling you that the cause of --
2 2 or at the time of the December 14, 2011 burst, they 
2 3 believed that the solid pillar in the wall of the 5900 
2 4 drift reached its peak strength? 
2 A. That's their conclusion of the second 
4 
10 in the pillar." Correct? 
1 A. Correct. 
12 0. So did von understand that were tellin2: '-- - - .I - - - ---- - _.. ._, 
13 you that because of the November 16th burst changed the 
14 dimensions of the 5900 pillar that that was a cause of 
15 the December 14th burst? 
16 A. Yes. 
1 7 Q. And Mr. Blake was telling you on November 25, 
18 2011, that the dimensions of the pillar had 
19 substantially changed, correct? 
2 O MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. 
21 Speculation. 
2 2 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
2 3 Q. Correct? 
2 4 A. He did not say substantially changed. That's 
2 5 your words. But he stated what the new -- what he felt 
Page 9 
1 the new width-to-height ratio was. 
2 Q. He said he believed it had gone from 10-to- l 
to 3.5-to-l? 
4 A. Correct. 
5 Q. And you knew that before December 14, 2011, 
6 correct? 
A. Yes. 7 
8 Q. And he also said he believed that prior to 
9 the November 16th burst, he believed the walls in that 
1 0 pillar had reached their peak strength, correct? 
11 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. Go ahead 
12 and answer it. 
13 THE WITNESS: Say that -- please repeat the 
14 question. 
15 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
16 Q. He had told you in his November 25th 
1 7 memo -- you'd received that; read it -- that he 
18 believed the walls in the 5900 pillar had reached their 
19 maximum stress or their peak strength prior to the 
2 0 November 16th burst. 
21 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. 
2 2 Mischaracterizes the document. Go ahead and answer. 
THE WITNESS: You just said the November 16th 
2 4 burst. Prior to. 
2 MR. ROSSMAN: I think we 
4 
about three 




A. the November memo, correct? 9 
Q. That's correct. 10 
11 A. I understood his memo stating that the pillar 11 
12 still carried lo>irl :mrl th>it he Px-pertf'rl c:ml'l 11 hnr<::tin g 12 
13 to occur and fully supported putting a tunnel liner in 13 
14 as a long-term solution. 14 
5 Q. Let's go back to Exhibit 13, if you would. 15 
16 Look at page 2, please. 16 
17 A. (Complying.) 17 
18 MR.ROSSMAN: Interesting. I'm going to make 18 
19 another exhibit 19 
20 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 24 was 20 
21 marked for identification.) 21 
22 BY MR ROSSMAN: 22 
23 Q. Exhibit 24 is a November 25th, 2011, memo 123 
24 from Wilson Blake to the same individuals. I'll I 2 <l 
25 represent that I believed while initially reviewing it l2~ 
9s J 
1 that it was the same memo as Exhibit No. 13. But after I 1 
2 reviewing it, it's not. Do you know which of these you 
( 
2 
3 actually received? 3 
4 (Witness examining documents.) I 4 
I 5 THE WITNESS: It doesn't say which one was 
I 
5 
6 final. I can only assume one was a draft and then he 6 
7 reissued a final. But I actually don't remember which I 7 
8 one I received. I 8 9 BY MR. ROSSMAN: I 9 
10 Q. Okay. Look at page 2, please. /10 
11 A. (Complying.) J11 
12 Q. Third paragraph under Mechanism of 5900 ,12 
13 Pillar 2.8 Rockburst. The paragraph states, "With the \13 
14 observed stress deterioration along the inner and outer 114 
15 edges of the pillar, likely in the 10 ft range, the l1s 
16 width:height ratio of the in place doughnut shaped /16 
17 pillar is actually 3.5, assuming a 10 ft !17 
18 thickness." Exhibit 13 stops there, correct? l1s 
19 A. Yes. 19 
20 Q. In Exhibit 24 there's an additional sentence 20 
21 And it says, "This pillar is borderline stable based on 21 
22 mining history at Lucky Friday/Gold Hunter." Do you 22 
23 recall ever seeing that particular representation? 23 




Q. Under December 14 Rockburst, it says, "The 
2.8 burst shockwave damage to the 5900 pillar reduced 
the of this pillar, as well as its height to width 
ratio, in effect, increasing the stress in this pillar 
and making it more burst prone." Do you recall seeing 
that section of the memo? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have an understanding prior to 
December 14th that a reduction in the height-to-width 
ratio of the pillar would cause the pillar to take on 
more stress? 
A. No. I had the opposite understanding. 
Q. So you thought that if the width-height 
dimensions reduced or dropped that the pillar would be 
more stable? 
A. No. The first theory was the first burst was 
a pillar burst and that it released 2.8 Richter 
magnitude of energy, which is lot of energy, and that 
the pillar couldn't store as much energy now. And it 
was -- there's less area but also less -- less load on 
the pillar because the burst would have released a 
bunch of stored energy. 
Q. Did Mr. Blake -- and I've looked at all of 
97 
his memos. Do you recall him ever telling you in a 
memo or verbally or otherwise that he believed that the 
November 16th burst reduced a majority of its stress at 
the pillar? 
A. Yes. I'll show you where. 
Q. Okay. 
(Witness examining document.) 
THE WITNESS: Just give me a minute. 
MR. ROSSMAi"I: Mm-hmm. 
(Brief pause.) 
THE WITNESS: There's a section. I'm not 
sure which memo it was in. 
(Brief pause.) 
THE WITNESS: So on his -- on Exhibit 24, 
which is the November 25th memo, on page 3, fourth 
paragraph down, ''The majority of the energy released. 
as well as" that's not the 
25 s 94 to 97) 
4 
c;,111,u11u11t- intact pillar has been reduced 
hence, the amount of stored strain energy now 
1 0 in the pillar has also been significantly reduced." 
11 Q. Okay. So he's saying it's possible that 
12 further small bursts could occur in this pillar as it 
1 3 continues to be loaded by ongoing wall closure from 
14 continued mining off of the 5900 level, correct? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. So he's saying that -- he believed that the 
1 7 pillar would continue to be loaded from further mining 
18 off of that level, correct? 
1 9 A. Yes. And I'm talking long-term mining. I 
2 0 know that's what he's talking about. 
21 Q. Okay. Yet you still initiated mining during 
2 2 the rehabilitation process, correct? 
2 3 A. We mined when MSHA allowed us to mine between 
2 4 December 6th and December 13th. 
2 5 Wilson's talking about the long-term mining 
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1 plan of the 5300 sill pillar. As that pillar reduces 
2 in size and the other mining takes place, the stress 
has to go somewhere. So he's woITied about that future 
4 mining down the road of how it would affect that 
5 pillar. 
6 Q. So what he's telling you -- what you 
7 understood he was telling you in the memo was fu1iher 
8 mining at some point, whether short-term or long-term, 
9 at some point will continue to load that pillar, 
10 correct? 
11 A. No. I'm telling you that I understood it to 
12 be long-term, not short-term. 
13 Q. So short-term mining would have no effect 
14 on -- you understood him to say that short-tem1 mining 
1 5 would have no effect on the increased -- on increasing 
1 6 stress at that pillar? 
1 7 A. Correct. 
18 MR. RAMSDEN: Objection, calls for 
1 9 speculation. 
2 0 THE WITNESS: Well, I do know that for a 
21 fact. 
22 BYMR ROSSMAN: 
2 3 Q. How do you know that for a fact? 
2 4 A. Because I know that's what Wilson was talking 
2 5 I had discussions with him about the short-term 
WWW. 
8 
9 Yes. They changed theory 
10 changed. 
11 Q. You don't dispute that their representation 
2 th"t thP c:trPc:c 1PuPk rm thP umll<: r,fthP pilbr ,;it 
13 the 5900 level on December 14th reached the walls' 
14 maximum strength? 
15 A. Yes. That was the conclusion after the 
1 6 second rockburst. 
17 Q. So is it your testimony that Hecla was 
00 
18 relying upon Mr. Blake's consultation in developing its 
19 rehabilitation plan? 
2 0 A We followed his recommendations on the rehab 
21 of the -- after the first burst, yes. 
2 2 Q. If he had told you that he felt that the 
2 3 changed dimensions as a result of the November 16th 
2 4 burst rendered the pillar borderline stable, would that 
2 5 have been important to you? 
10 
1 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, speculation. 
2 THE WITNESS: Yeah, that's important. I 
3 wouldn't have put miners in there if we thought it was 
4 unstable. 




Q. You wouldn't have put miners in there if you 
thought it was even borderline stable, correct? 
A. Correct. 
9 Q. You don't disagree that Hecla didn't have to 
1 0 mine -- restart mining at the mine prior to the 
11 installation -- complete installation of the liner, 
12 correct? 
13 A Make sure I understand your question. 
14 Q. Kind of a confusing question. Let me 
1 5 rephrase it. 
Hecla restarted mining, particularly at 





119 A. The rehabilitation was two phases. So it was 
2 O after the first phase was complete before the second 
2 1 phase was complete. So, yes, we started mining while 
2 2 we waited for the liner to show up. 
23 Q. Started mining on December 6, 2011, correct'? 
24 A Correct 
25 And you'll agree was nothing that 




10 Q. Are you aware of anything that prevented you 
11 from waiting until the liner was installed to restart 
12 mining? 
1 3 A Could have waited. It would have made no 
1 4 difference. But could have waited. 
15 Q. Mining involves blasting, correct? 
16 A Yes. 
1 7 Q. And as of December 14, 2011, it was your 
18 understanding and belief that the November 16th burst 
1 9 was a pillar burst in close proximity to a blast at the 
2 0 5700 level, correct? 
2 1 A. The November 16th rockburst went off at the 
2 2 end of blast time, during blast time. 
2 3 Q. And you also understood as of December 14 
2 4 or December 6th, let's start there, at least the 
2 5 understanding and belief was that there was a pillar 
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1 burst at the 5900 -- in the 5900 pillar, correct? 
2 A. That was my belief at the time, yes. 
3 Q. And you also understood and believed, 
4 recognized, that the pillar's ability to withstand a 
5 rockburst up to 2.2 on the Richter scale was dependent 
6 upon the liner being installed, correct? 
7 A. I believe the amount of ground support we 
8 installed initially, the bolts and the shotcrete, would 
9 withstand a Richter 2.5 at a ce1iain distance. But 
10 I -- I think if you read Wilson's memo, he'll state 
11 that. And then the tunnel liner with the Tekfoam would 
12 further protect the opening from damage if the pillar 
13 had future bursting. 
14 So, yeah, there was -- there was a level of 
15 protection afforded by the bolts and shotcrete that was 
6 supposed to withstand a certain amount of energy and 
1 7 then the tunnel liner had another level of strength. 
18 Q. You understood maximum protection wouldn't be 
19 provided at the 5900 pillar until the liner was 
2 0 completely installed, correct? 
21 A. That was the final plan, yes. 
2 2 Q. And it's your representation that MSHA 
2 3 approved your request to mine during installation -- or 
2 4 during rehabilitation, correct? 




8 handing it to Scott on 
9 site during the -- for the work with the order 
0 involving the first rockburst. I don't recall if I 
e-mailed it to him or not. I know I provided hard 
12 copies though. 
13 Q. Do you know if Scott Amos would admit that he 
1 4 actually saw the monitoring data before December 
15 2011? 
16 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. Calls for 
1 7 speculation. 
18 THE WITNESS: I have no idea. 
19 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
2 0 Q. Okay. Did you communicate to MSHA the extent 
2 to which Hecla intended to mine during the 
2 2 rehabilitation process? 
23 A. Yes. 
2 4 Q. How did you communicate that? 
2 5 A. Through discussions both underground and on 
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1 surface with various members of management and Scott. 
2 I don't remember who was underground, what exactly was 
3 discussed there. But at some point, like, Jolm Jordan 
4 would have been involved on surface discussions. 
5 Underground would have been myself and I don't 
6 recall who all was there. 
7 But it's a lot of infonnation with MSHA 
8 because we're under a (k) order. So every move we make 
9 has to be approved. And it's pretty typical for MSHA 
10 to ask for more information so they've got everything 
11 they have to make their decision. So they requested 
12 all the data. It was all provided. 
13 The plan that was discussed was to resume 
14 mining but to limit travel through the pillar. No foot 
15 travel. Everybody that went through there had to stop 
16 and visually examine before proceeding. Ifthere was 
1 7 any indication of closure or cracking or change in 
18 conditions, we were to stop and remove miners. 
1 9 But MSHA understood that we were going to 
2 O resume mining. And it states that in their 
21 modification. 
22 Q. Okay. You were under a 103(k) order, 
23 conect? 
24 A 
25 order for a 1 order to be 




0 A Our discussions were with Scott Amos because 
11 he was the inspector on site. I do not -- I'm not 
12 privy to how much he was on the phone with his boss. 
13 You know, that's -- I don't have any knowledge of that 
1 4 But we dealt with Scott Amos. And we 
15 discussed resumption of mining in the Gold Hunter. So 
1 6 they know -- Scott Amos is familiar with our mine. 
1 7 He's inspected there numerous times. And he 
18 understands where the stopes are located. So I don't 
1 9 remember if I named off, you know, the numbers of the 
2 0 stopes or the names of the stopes. But when we said 
2 1 we're going to resume mining, it's implied that it 
2 2 means the Gold Hunter. 
2 3 There's only five stopes there. Okay. So it 
2 4 was pretty well understood that resumption of mining 
1 MR. ROSSMAN: Move to strike, speculation. 
2 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
3 Did you tell Mr. Amos that you intended to --
4 you say anything other than we would like to resume 
5 
6 MR. RAMSDEN: Object It's been asked and 
7 answered. 
8 THE WITNESS: Like I already stated, I don't 
9 remember ifI told him this stope and this stope and 
10 this stope. It meant mining in the Gold Hunter is what 
11 we discussed. 
12 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
13 Q. Okay. So you recall telling him that Hecla 
14 wanted to resume mining in the Gold Hunter, coITect? 
15 A. Resume production. 
16 Q. Resume production. Do you recall him 
17 anything else? 
18 A. Not in detail. Not ... 
19 Q. Do you recall telling him how many shifts you 
20 intended to work mining during rehabilitation? 
21 A. I don't recall if we discussed, but he --
22 Scott Amos knows that we mine two ten-hour shifts a 
23 day. And when I -- when we were talking about 
24 resumption of mining, it's mining on the two ten-hour 
5 two a day, six days a 
www mmcourt. com 
08 
1 
8 answered. Go ahead. 
9 THE WITNESS: think I answered Two 
1 O shifts a day. 
11 BY l\tlR. ROSSMAN: 
12 Q. Did you tell Mr. Amos how many shifts you 
13 intended to work mining the Gold Hunter mine? 
14 MR. RAMSDEN: Asked and answered. Go ahead. 
15 THE WITNESS: We told him we were-- our 
16 modification request was to resume mining. Resume 
1 7 normal mining. That means ten-hour shifts, two shifts 
18 a day, six days a week. 
19 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
2 0 Q. You say now that you told him you wanted to 
21 resume normal mining. Do you recall specifically what 
22 you said? 
2 3 A. I don't know ifI said normal mining to 































Q. Do you ever recall having any discussion with 
Mr. Amos about -- specifically about how many shifts 
that mining would entail? 
A. I don't recall specifically. 
Q. Do you recall having any discussion with 
Mr. Amos about when that mining would occur in relation 
to the rehabilitation efforts? 
A. Mining would occur until -- and he understood 
this and wrote it in the modification request -- or the 
modification -- that mining would resume until the 
tunnel liner arrived and then all would cease in 
the Gold Hunter and the priority would be the tunnel 
liner. So he understood that, and he wrote it in his 
modification. 
Q. Did you tell Mr. Amos -- I'm not asking you 
what he understood. I'm asking what you told him. Do 
you understand the difference? 
A. l don't remember every conversation I had 
four years ago. 
Q. I don't understand is a acceptable 














































tunnel liner showed up December 13th or 8 
time -- it was shipped from so there's 9 
or two we weren't going to know exactly what day it l 0 
No. We did not give them projections on how 
many rounds or how much footage we thought we'd mine. 
was going to show up. 
So our request was to resume mining 
December 6 and mine until the tunnel liner showed up. 
Q. Did you tell him how many you intended 
to mine? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you tell him the particular locations you 
intended to mine? 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object. It's been asked and 
answered. 
THE WITNESS: I don't recall if I told him 
each stope. But mining operations in Gold Hunter 
means -- it can only mean five different stopes. 
There's only five there. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
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Q. It could mean less than five stopes, correct? 
A. It could. 
It could mean less than double 
shifting, correct? 
A. It could. 
Q. If you'll look at Exhibit No. 17, please. 
A. (Complying.) Okay. 
Q. Did you or anyone on behalf of Hecla ever 
tell anyone on behalf of MSHA that between November J 7 
and December 13 you intended to mine 12 feet and a 
6-foot slab in stope 10? 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form of the 
question. It's vague as to time. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Ijust mentioned the time, between 
November 17, 2011, and December 13. Do you understand 
the question? 
A. I don't know if I understand the question. 
Are you asking did we tell MSHA the footage? 
Q. Let me rephrase the question. Did you or 
anyone else tell anyone on behalf of MSHA the extent to 
which you were going to mine stope 1 O? 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object. It's been asked and 
answered. Go ahead answer it 
THE WITNESS: We did not tell them how many 
11 Q. Did you tell them that you intended to mine 
12 both the east and west sides of stopes 11 and 14? 
13 A. No. That's called mining. We asked to 
1 4 resume mining. Mining means mine the stopes, east and 
west. 15 
16 Q. And do you know what Mr. Amos's understanding 
l 7 was as to the extent to which you were going to mine, 
18 ifat all? 
19 
20 
A. He seemed pretty --
MR. RAMSDEN: That's speculation. 
21 THE WITNESS: -- clear to me. 
22 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
23 Q. Has he told you what his understanding was? 
2 4 A. We had discussions about resume mining. And 
2 5 he seemed to understand the request. 
113 
1 Q. Did you ever put it in any documentation that 






















A. My December 6 update to MSHA, which was the 
request for modification to the order, to allow us to 
resume mining. So yes. 
Q. Other than that document, did you provide any 
communication to MSHA as to the extent to which or if 
at all you would be mining or wanted to mine? 
A. I don't recall any other document$. 
(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 25 was 
marked for identification.) 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Show you Exhibit No. 25. Do you recognize 
that set of documents? 
A. Yes. These are shift reports. 
Q. These are shift reports indicating what is 
being done at particular locations at different times, 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you look at page 0038, bottom right 
comer. In the first section does it indicate during 
the p.m. shift on December 12th that there was mining 
on both the east and west ends of stope 11? 
A. That's what this would indicate that there 




and blasting at both 
of December 201 , correct? 
A. Which stope are you referring? 14? 














Q. And if you look at the~- page 36, the second 
page of Exhibit 25. 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the top does it indicate that in the 
morning shift on December 13 there was drilling and 
blasting at both ends of stope 11? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does it also indicate in the morning of 
December 13th there was drilling and blasting at both 
ends of stope 14? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then if you look at the first page of 
Exhibit 25, does it represent that there was drilling 
1 and blasting dw-ing the p.m. shift on December 13 at 
2 both the 11 and 14 stopes? 
Yes. 
4 The monitors that were installed on 
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5 December 1st, 2011, those were Geokon 4300-NX monitoring 
6 gauges, correct? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Those are what you'd used before, correct? 
9 A. Yes. 
1 0 Q. And you had some left over from prior use, 
11 COITect? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Isn't it true or is it correct that 
l 4 Mr. Williams had recommended or requested that Hecla 
l 5 consider using a biaxial gauge instead of the Geokon 
16 
17 A. I vaguely remember somebody asking for that 
18 But I don't recall if it was in this application or 
1 9 elsewhere in the mine for monitoring. 
20 Q. Do you know what type of monitors were 
21 ordered from Geokon on December 6th, 2011 -- or prior 
2 2 to December 6th, 2011? 
23 A. Prior to. I believe the same type of 
2 4 monitor. 
5 4300NX? 
6 
I'm to remember which business 8 
9 we had at the time. There was a time where all our 
purchase orders were handwritten on a standard form. 
That would be turned in to purchasing who would then 
order v,1hatever and tt1en \Vhen it arrives you a copy 
of the PO, the purchase order, with the packing slip or 
1 4 whatever. 
15 We've since gone to an electronic system that 
16 there is no paper trail. It's all in the computer, the 
1 7 business system. And I don't know what system we had 
1 8 at the time. 
19 So either -- it's one of two things. There 
2 0 would either be a record -- or there should be a record 
21 of a purchase order, a handwritten -- a hard copy. And 
2 2 if we were on the new system, then there should be a 
2 3 record in the history. 
2 4 Q. In the electronic history? 
25 A. Yeah. 
l 7 
1 Q. And that record would be something resembling 
2 a purchase order? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And then once the monitoring gauges are 
5 received, I would assume there's some kind of bill of 
6 lading or receipt? 
7 A. Should be, yes. 
8 Q. And then I assume once they're received 
9 they're placed in inventory for some period of time, 
l O aren't they? 
11 A. Not so much inventory in the warehouse 
12 because that's all -- usually those specific items like 
13 a stress gauge would go to an engineering storage shed 
14 we have. So it would be stored with the engineering 
15 department, those type of things, not in our general 
1 6 warehouse. Because they're not an inventory item; 
1 7 a specialty item. 
18 Q. So stored in the engineering warehouse. 
19 There wouldn't be any inventory documentation or record 
20 of it? 
21 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. Compound. 
2 2 THE WITNESS: There's no inventory of that. 
2 3 It's -- your record would be the purchase order. 
2 4 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
2 5 Q. And if the monitoring gauge is ultimately 
30 1 4 to 17) 
18 
would 
B Calied the weekly minutes. 
9 But we didn't keep minutes of those 
10 back in 2011. We do since. So there may not be a 
of the actual installation. 
12 MR. ROSSMAN: Let's mark this. 
13 (\Vhereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 26 was 
14 marked for identification.) 
15 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
16 Q. Exhibit 26. I'll represent these -- I 
17 believe these are trip reports prepared by Ted Williams 
18 in monitoring stress gauges at different levels prior 
19 to November 16, 2011. 
20 First page is August 23rd, 2011. I want to 
21 refer you to the last sentence. It says, "Because of 
22 the continued problem with the reliability of the 
23 Uni-axial gages (sic), I recommend that some Bi-axial 
24 gages (sic) or Hollow Inclusion cells be installed in 
25 the pillar." Do you know if that was ever done? 
1 A. No, not that I'm aware of. No. It wasn't 
2 done. No. 
3 Do you know if that was at any location 
4 in the mine? 
5 A. Well, we --yes. We've installed uni- --
6 either uniaxial or triaxial gauges built by NIOSH in 
7 some other areas of the mine since 2011. 
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8 Q. Who made the decision as to what gauges would 
9 be installed at the 5900 pillar after the November 16th 
10 burst? 
1 A. I don't recall exactly. But we had gauges on 
12 hand, and we wanted to monitor sooner than later. So 
13 we installed the gauges we had. They're the same 
14 gauges that have been used, so we were familiar with 
15 those. 
16 Q. And you don't !<.now what type of gauges were 
1 7 ordered? 
18 A I don't know for sure because, like I say, I 
19 didn't see the -- I didn't order them, and I don't 
2 0 recall ever seeing the purchase order. 
21 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 27 was 
2 2 marked for identification.) 
2 3 (A short break was taken.) 


















work. I didn't write these. 
Q. Okay. One's dated 16, one's dated 
November 17, and the other one's not dated? 
A. Correct. 
Did you review these; did you receive them? 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object, compound. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Did you receive these? 
A. I've seen them. 
Q. Did you review them in November of 2011? 
A. I reviewed them at some point. I don't 
remember the date. 
Q. November 16, 2011, says at the bottom, "At 
all times ground conditions will be monitored and 
evaluated and crews will remain under supported rock." 
Do you know where that came from? 
A. Where it came from? 






A I don't know. 
Q. Was this document provided to miners who were 
involved in the rehabilitation 
4 A. I'm not sure. A lot of this information 
5 would be on our wall in the hallway. But I do not know 
6 if this was posted or distributed to the miners. I was 
7 actually not at the mine that week. So I'm not sure if 
8 they were handed to them or not. 
9 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibits Nos. 28, 29 
10 and 30 were marked for identification.) 
11 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
12 Q. Show you Exhibit No. 28. Do you recognize 














I c: i -., 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was submitted to MSHA? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You represent -- and the purpose of sending 
this to MSHA was to request a modification of the 
103(k) order, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You understood they would be relying upon 
1 
whether or not to allow a 
118 to 12 ) 
4/6/20 5 
8 
0 W1TNESS: I just provide whatever 
11 they request, so ... 
12 BY MR ROSSMAN: 
13 Q. You understood they would read it, correct? 
14 A Yes. 
15 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, speculation. 
16 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
1 7 Q. I'm asking your understanding. I'm not 
1 8 asking what they understood. I'm asking you. Did you 
1 9 understand that they would read that? Did you 
2 0 expect --
21 MR. RAMSDEN: His understanding requires him 
2 2 to speculate. 
2 3 MR. ROSSMAN: No, it does not. 
2 4 MR. RAMSDEN: That's the objection. 
2 5 MR. ROSSMAN: It does not at all. He should 
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1 able to --
2 MR. RAMSDEN: We don't need to argue about 
3 
4 MR. ROSSMAN: Okay. 
5 MR. RAMSDEN: I made the objection. You can 
6 go ahead and ask the question. 
7 MR. ROSSMAN: Okay. It's a speaking 
8 objection, but we'll go forward. 
9 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
10 Q. Was your understanding at the time you sent 
11 this that someone at MSHA would read it? 
12 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, speculation. Go ahead 
l 3 and answer. 
8 A. Yes. 
All right. You indicate in the last sentence 
10 of the first paragraph, "It is expected the stress will 
build slowly over time, and may take weeks or months to 
12 show any me::isnmhlP. inc.rP:asP in stress." Where would 
1 3 you have developed that understanding? 
14 A. My experience at the mine and the response to 
15 the pillar -- the same pillar with the stressmeters 
16 that were installed prior, in 2006. 
l 7 Q. What do you mean by that? 
18 A. That's my experience is based on these same 
19 stressmeters in the same pillar, it was my expectation. 
2 0 Q. Your expectation was that stress will build 
21 slowly over time and may take weeks or months to show 
2 2 any measurable increase? 
2 3 A. That was my expectation on December I st, 
. 2 4 2011. 
25 Q. The last sentence on the first page says, "In 
addition to gathering stress data, the area will be 
2 visually inspected every shift by the underground 
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3 supervisors." Did they create any documentation when 
4 they inspected the ground? 
5 A I don't know that we documented that We had 
6 the miners document their inspections based on the 
7 December 6th request. So we had those. But unless --
8 unless it's on a shift report like the other one --
9 unless it would have been on a shift report like that 
1 0 that they inspected it would be the document that --
11 MR. RAMSDEN: And that is Exhibit 25? 
12 THE \VITNESS: Yeah. 
13 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
14 THE WITNESS: I would expect them to read the 14 Q. Did you expect that your supervisors would be 
15 request, yes. 15 inspecting every shift the ground conditions at the 
16 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 16 5900 pillar? 
17 
18 
Q. Did you expect that they would rely upon it? 1 7 A. Yes. 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object, speculation. Go ahead 18 Q. And did you expect that they would provide 
1 9 and answer. l 9 some documentation of their observations? 
20 THE W1TNESS: That would be reasonable to 2 0 A. Or feedback, yes. 
2 l expect they would reference the document, yes. 
22 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
21 Q. Observations or feedback. Feedback would be 
2 3 Q. Was that your expectation at the time? 
24 A. Yes. 
You say in the the 





Q. ¥/ho you 
verbal feedback to? 
32 
they provide 





Second page is a document dated December 2nd. 














Okay. Because if you look at Exhibit 29, 
there's a December 2nd update. So is that something 
different? 
A. Yes. It was a second update that day. 28 --
I don't have 29. What did I do with 29? 
Q. Oh, it's right here. 
A. I do remember doing two different updates 
though. 
Q. Do you recall why you sent an update the same 
day as the original -- the second page of Exhibit 28? 
A. I don't remember exactly. But I believe MSHA 
requested more data or more information or more 
background. So I made a little -- a more detailed 
1 Q. Okay. The first paragraph of the second page 
2 of Exhibit 28 says -- second sentence says, "We will 
3 continue to take readings every shift for 1 week." 
4 What you meant by that was stress readings, correct? 
5 A. Correct. 
6 Q. "If the gauges indicate no appreciable build 
7 up of stress, then the gauges will be read once a 
8 week." That was your representation at the time? 
9 A. Yes. 
0 Q. Did you -- well, I think I've seen monitoring 
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11 data for every shift between December 1 and December 
12 14 -- or December 13. 
13 A. MSHA came back and requested we take readings 
14 more often than what I initially requested. 
15 Q. So initially you wanted to read them every 
16 shift a week and if no appreciable build-up 
1 7 of stress, you wanted them to be read once a 
18 correct? 
19 A. That was my request. So in the first update 
2 0 of December 2nd, yes. 
2 1 Q. And you said, "The readings will be reviewed 
2 2 daily by mine personnel and our rock mechanics 
2 3 consultant," correct? 
24 A. Yes. 




8 A. not sure I understand that question. It 
9 was downloaded daily, and I saw updates daily, if 
0 that's ... 
11 Q. Okay. So you saw updates indicating the 
12 stress levels as determined hy the monitoring gauges? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And you did that daily? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And then it said "and our rock mechanics 
1 7 consultant." Were the stress readings read every day 
1 8 by a rock mechanics consultant? 
19 A. I don't recall how often that was sent to --
2 0 the intent there would have been Wilson Blake on the 
2 1 rock mechanics consultant. But I don't recall how 
2 2 often he got the updates. 
2 3 Q. If you'll look at Exhibit 29, please. 
2 4 A. (Complying.) 
2 5 You in the last sentence on 
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1 December 2nd update, Exhibit 29, "Although the piliar 
2 is still intact and is still carrying some load and 
3 it is believed the majority of the stress was 
4 dissipated with the large rockburst." 
5 How did you make the understanding or develop 
6 the understanding that a majority of the stress was 
7 dissipated with the November 16th burst? 
8 A. My understanding was, like we've already 
9 stated, that the November rock burst was a pillar burst. 
1 O And that was a lot of energy released at once. And as 
11 I pointed out in one of Wilson's memos, he talks about 
12 the strain being relieved, strain or stress. So I was 
13 using a little bit of what Wilson Blake had stated in 
14 his -- one of his earlier memos. And my history and my 
15 experience at the mine, when I've been around other 
1 6 large bursts, that's been my experience is it takes a 
1 7 long time to build that kind of stress back up. 
18 Q. Did Wilson Blake ever tell you that he 
19 believed the November 16th burst relieved a majority of 
2 O the stress? 
21 A I believe that was my -- my understanding. 
2 2 That's not -- Wilson did not tell me -- I don't 
2 3 remember if Wilson used those words. Those were my 
2 4 words. 
25 or years 











A. I don't believe Wilson or Mark published 




lines. But I did understand what Wilson was 11 Was that your intention? 
saying that he expected small bursting around the 12 At the time, yes. 
periphery of the pillar, that it's still possible it 13 Did that intention change? 
could still carry load. But once again, those are just 14 Yes. 
based on my background or my experience at the mine. 15 Why? 
Q. You say in the next sentence, "The pillar is 16 As I've already discussed, through further 
1 

































that caused this rockburst." What did you mean by 18 really didn't make sense to install the other three 
that? 1 9 gauges in the same location as the current three when 
A. My understanding -- or my opinion at the time 2 0 after the tunnel liner is installed, you lose access to 
of this date, December 2nd, that the pillar was smaller 21 the gauge. You still have the wire, but you can't go 
and had relieved the majority of its stress. So the 2 2 in and retrieve it or change it or anything. 
load, I believed, was smaller on the pillar. There was 2 3 So we decided to move the location further to 
not as much load on the pillar was my belief at the 2 4 the north to the outside of the area of the tunnel 
time. 2 5 liner. So that -- that 
131 
Q. You say "it cannot carry the same load that 
caused this rockburst." What did that mean? 
A. Because it didn't have as much area because 
there's -- part of the pillar was damaged. So the area 
is smaller; therefore, it cannot carry the same load as 
a function of area. 
Q. So you were representing your belief that a 
smaller pillar is less likely to burst? 
A. That was my belief at the time. 
Q. Did you base that on anything that you heard 
from Wilson Blake or Mark Board? 
A. The only part of that I would have based on 
what would have been Blake's one section of his memo 
where he mentions the strain is less because the pillar 
is smaller. So I based it on a little bit of that and 
my own understanding. 
Q. Okay. If you look in the fourth paragraph--
or third full paragraph down. Middle of the paragraph 
you say, The other -- or toward the end of the 
paragraph. "The other 3 gauges are on order and will 
be shipped December 7th." Do you know where you 
developed that understanding that that was the date 
they were going to be shipped? 
A. I don't recall the exact conversation, but I 
























Q. Okay. At some point you intended, when you 
received these additional monitors, to install them 
outside the area of the liner? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Nothing prevented you from installing those 
gauges when you received them, correct? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know whether you ever received them? 
A. I don't. 
Q. But your representation to MSHA was that they 
would be installed as soon as they arrived, correct? 
A. On December 2nd, yes. 
Q. Did you ever make a representation to them in 
any other documentation that you would not install them 
as soon as they aITived? 
A. Do you have my update? 
Q. Yes. Exhibit 30. 
THE WITNESS: I don't recall if I mentioned 
that in there. 
(Witness examining document.) 
MR. RAMSDEN: What's the exhibit number on 
this? 
MR. ROSSMI\.N: ExJ1ibit 30. 
WIThTESS: So it looks like I did not 
that in December 6th. But I do having 
34 (Pa 0 to 33) 





really the -- the 8 to Exhibit No. 1 
9 set gauges were in my understanding, were 9 A. (Complying.) 
10 really intended for the long-term monitoring of the 10 Q. Do you understand that employee non-
11 So if you lost one of the other gauges, you 11 supervisor employees were on the committee in 
12 had a backup. 12 December of 2015 -- or 2011? 
13 
14 
So we had the first three installed. They 13 A. Yes. The safety committee is a mixture of 
were still working. And we wanted the second set for 14 hourly and Hecla staff. 
15 redundancy and some check of accuracy of the first set , 15 Q. What's the purpose of the safety committee? 
Q. Okay. Exhibit No. 30. The second page you i 16 A. They meet monthly to -- it's for management 16 
1 7 say, second sentence, "The stress gauge readings show · 1 7 and the union to get together and -- and address safety 
18 that the small expected increase in stress over time 18 issues or work on projects. If we want to try to 
19 
20 
has slowed down." What did you mean by that? 19 implement or if the committee wants to try to implement 
A. If you'll refer back to Exhibit 21, pretty 2 0 a new procedure or a new process, it will go through 
21 common for engineers to look at slopes of lines. So if 21 the safety committee. 
22 
23 
you did a best-fit line on the first few days of the 2 2 Q. And it appears there was a meeting of the 
data, say December 2nd through December 7th, there's a 2 3 safety committee on December 8, 2011, correct? 
2 4 pretty --you know, a slope or a steepness. The A. December 8? 
25 second -- from that date the leveled out Yes. Third 
1 at a different slope. 
2 So I was looking at the data and trying to 
3 my interpretation that the stress increase over 
4 time was slowing down. 
5 Q. If you look at the west wall, it appears that 
6 at 1530 on December -- or at 6: 15 on December 6th, 
7 there was a -- there was an increase in stress on the 
8 west wall, correct? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. And that increase continued through 13:30 
11 (sic) on that date? 
12 A. Looks like it. 
13 Q. And the top psi or the top wall, will you 
14 agree, maintained a steady increase over time? 
15 A. No. 
6 Q. Was there leveling out or flattening out 
1 7 those monitor readings? 
1 8 A. I would contend that there's a change in 
1 9 slope between the data that -- that this slope -- or 
2 0 this first set is going that way (indicating). And 
2 1 then from about this point on, it's a different slope. 
2 2 So it's not as fast of a rate of increase. 
Q. From what date on? 
A. Looks to me the siope changes about 
4th, possibly well, about I 
www mmcourt.com 
1 A. My third page is April of 2015. Oh, okay. 
2 It does say December 8, 2011. 
3 Q. Does this appear to an agenda for that 
4 meeting? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Were there ever minutes taken of the 
7 meetings? 
8 A. Usually the safety technician takes minutes 
9 if he's present. 
10 Q. Do you know if the safety technician was 
11 present on December 8? 
12 A. I don't recall. I don't remember. 
13 Q. Do you usually get a copy of those minutes? 
1 4 A. They're posted on the bulletin board in the 
15 hall, and I always get a copy of concerns because I 
1 6 usually have to address safety concerns. I normally 
1 7 don't get a copy of all the minutes. 
1 8 Q. But they're usually posted on the bulletin 
1 9 board in the hall? 
20 A. Yes. I believe so. 
21 Q. So the employees can actually see them and 




Q. Do you recall 
December 8th 
5 34 0 1 7) 
8 concerns or 
1 0 A. I don't remember any safety concerns of 
11 who's having an issue with the rehab. At some 
1 2 point one miner brought up something about the pillar 
13 and why did we -- why did the mine decide to create it 
14 in the first place. I don't remember if that was in a 
15 safety committee meeting or just a regular crew meeting 
1 6 or underground or whatnot. But one miner asked 
1 7 specific questions about the pillar, but my 
1 8 recollection is they were more about how it was created 
1 9 and why as opposed to the rehab after the burst. 
2 0 Q. Do you recall someone expressing to you 
2 1 concerns about the process of installing the Dywidags 
2 2 and bolts? 
2 3 A. The process? 
2 4 Q. Concerns about the response or -- or 
2 5 observations during that process. 
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1 A. One miner -- I remember discussions with one 
2 miner about some of the bolts that were installed in 
3 in the area of the rehab. And I think, ifI 
4 remember correctly, his question was are they long 
5 enough. Did we feel that an eight-foot bolt is long 
6 enough. 
7 Q. Who was that miner? 
8 A. I think it was Bruce Baraby, if I recall. 
9 Q. Do you recall Mr. Baraby expressing concerns 
1 O about his observations while trying to install those 
11 bolts? 
12 A. I remember discussion about it, but I don't 
1 3 recall right now. It seemed that he was -- I don't 
14 remember if he had trouble with the glue or with the 
1 5 hole staying open and putting the glue in the hole and 
1 6 getting the bolt to set probably with the Dywidag 
1 7 resin. Seemed to me that was -- I -- I think that was 
1 8 what his discussion was. And it seemed to me he had 
1 9 drilled extra holes installed so he had extra bolts 
2 0 to -- to make up for having some that didn't. 
21 Q. Do you recall Mr. Baraby expressing concerns 
2 2 about going back into the pillar? 
23 A. No. 
Do you recail him concerns 
further bolting and Dywidaging at that 
Do you 
installed the Dywidags and 
9 A. There were several crews repairing in there 
10 that installed bolts. So there's more than Bruce. So, 
11 yeah, quite a few guys would have installed the bolts 
2 in addition to Bruce. 
13 MR. ROSSMAN: That's all the questions I 
14 have. Thank you. 
15 (Whereupon, the deposition was concluded at 
16 4:57 p.m.) 
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